The aesthetic thought of Zhu Guangqian  (1897-1986) by Shim, Tae-Shik
The Aesthetic Thought of Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986)
Tae-Shik Shim
PhD
The University of Edinburgh
2008
Declaration:
All work, unless otherwise acknowledged, is my own. This thesis has not
been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.
Signed:





CHAPTER I: Eariy Education and Intellectual Background
1.1. Family and Primary Education in Tongcheng 11
1.2. Tongcheng Middle School 15
1.3. Hong Kong University and the New Culture Movement 19
1.4. Language: baihua and guwen 23
CHAPTER II: The Formation of Intellectual Attitude
2.1. Zhu's Attitude towards Social Background 27
2.2. An Effort to Set Up a New School System 32
2.3. Towards a New Philosophy of Life 38
CHAPTER ID: Studies in Europe and Encounter with European Thinkers
3.1. Subjects for Studies in Europe 46
3.2. Zhu Guangqian and Grace's Aesthetic Theory 52
3.3. Zhu Guangqian and Philosophy of Nietzsche 59
CHAPTER IV: Aesthetic Theoiy as Aesthetic Experience
4.1. Zhu's Pragmatic Approach to Aesthetics 69
4.2. Aesthetic Experience as the Starting Point 74
4.3. Psychological Theories for Aesthetic Experience 83
- Empathy, Inner Imitation and Psychical Distance
CHAPTER V: Defining Beauty with Associative Thinking and Morality
5.1. Towards a More Flexible Theory: Associative Thinking 96
5.2. Sense of Morality in Aesthetic Experience 101
5.3. Evaluation of Beauty 110
5.4. Reinterpretation of Croce's Theory 117
CHAPTER VI: Towanls Marxist Aesthetics
6.1. Social and Intellectual Background in the 1940s and 1950s 125
6.2. The Influence of Thought Reform 128
6.3. Similarities between Zhu Guangqian and Karl Marx 132
6.3.1. Human Value and Art in Zhu and Marx's Thinking 137
6.3.2. Pragmatic Approach 143
6.3.3. Praxis and Action/Tranquillity 145
6.3.4. Reciprocity of the Subject and the Object 148
CHAPTER VII: Reconstruction of Marxism
7.1. Zhu's Self-criticism in 1956 153
7.2. Zhu's Reply to Cai Yi and Li Zehou during the Debate 157
7.3. Zhu's Interpretation of Marxism 166
7.4. The Post-Mao Era: Discovery of Vico 172
CONCLUSION 180





Many thanks are due to those who have helped and encouraged me in the preparation
of this thesis. First and foremost, I wish to express my profound indebtedness to my
supervisor Dr T McClellan for all his kind help and valuable insights throughout the
research and writing of this thesis. He has been a constant source of enthusiasm,
encouragement and refreshing inspiration. Often, it was through the discussions with him
thatmy thinking on the topic became clearer and, as a result, I made progress inmy studies.
I am also very grateful to Dr Susan Daruvala and Dr Julian Ward for their helpful
suggestions that have contributed to the coherence of the thesis. I would also like to express
my gratitude to Prof Natascha Gentz and Prof Bonnie McDougall who arranged a
thought-provoking seminar series and gave me constructive criticism. I also owe a special
note of thanks to the University and the staff, especially Ms Ferguson, in the Special
Collections of the University of Edinburgh Library, for their kind assistance and for
allowing me to consult Zhu Guangqian's student records.
I am also much indebted to my colleague and friends, Dr Xiaohuan Zhao, Dr Kazuki
Takada, Radhi Ibrahim, DrNingyi Li, Meng Pei and Lina Cai for their warm encouragement
and sustained support in many ways. Warm thanks are also due to George Daniels and
Sarah Howard for their time and proof-reading.
Finally, I should also like to thankmy family for their patience and encouragement
while I spent many years staring at my computer screen.
Abstract
In modern Chinese aesthetics and literary criticism, Zhu Guangqian
(1897-1986) is one ofthe most well-known theorists and a writer renowned both amongst
Chinese intellectuals and the many young readers who enjoy accessible versions of his
theories. In the 1980s, Zhu's status as an influential figure was heightened once more
through the debates over socialist alienation in Marxist humanism and 'Culture Fever.'
His emphasis on the aesthetic dimension of art was at odds with prevailing
contemporary views on political utility in art. In consequence, the literary theory and
aesthetics of his early stage were, until the 1980s, criticised in mainland China for their
idealist tendencies. Although there have been some studies on Zhu's contributions to
modern Chinese aesthetic theory and literary criticism, there has been little comprehensive
research on the formation and development of his thought.
This thesis is, therefore, concerned to provide a detailed reconstruction and analysis
of these relatively neglected aspects ofZhu's thought throughout his life. I seek to show
that Zhu offers a unique attitude towards the intellectual turmoil ofChina since the 1920s
and a highly original account of the reciprocity of traditional Chinese ethical ideals and
Western thinking derived from his education in both China and Europe and developed
throughout his further studies ofWestern thinkers. While examining Zhu's interpretation
of aesthetic experience and Western theories of aesthetics and psychology, I argue that
despite the apparent influence ofWestern ideas on the formation ofhis theories, his unique
attitude is steeped in traditional Chinese thought. Unlike previous studies, this thesis also
argues that there is consistency in his thinking between in the first half and the second half
of the 20th century.
INTRODUCTION
Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986),' also known by his pen name Mengshi S.it,
is one ofthe best-knownmodern theorists ofChinese aesthetics and literary criticism. At
the same time he is a writer renowned amongst intellectuals in China, whose readable
versions ofhis theories are enjoyed by a large number ofyoung readers. In the 1980s, Zhu
drew attention again as an influential figure during the debates over socialist alienation
and Marxist humanism in 1983, Culture Fever in 1985, and the emergent problematic of
subjectivity from 1985 onward. This is due not only to Zhu's emphasis on subjectivity in
Marxist theory in his late phase but also to his fundamental question ofhow to retain the
integration between human nature and the world.2
After his first nineteen years as a child and youth in Tongcheng in Anhui
province, China, Zhu obtained his BA at the University ofHong Kong in 1923 and went
on to study Western philosophy, psychology, English literature and aesthetics at the
University of Edinburgh, University College London (UCL) and the University of
Strasbourg between 1925 and 1933. During his time at Strasbourg he completed a PhD
thesis in Englishwhich was published in 1933. Following his return to China, he became
a professor, initially at Peking University, until his death in 1986.
Zhu's academic career and his writings can be roughly divided into two phases. The
first stage was from the 1920s to 1949 during the Republican era. In the first phase, Zhu
Guangqian attempted not only to introduce modern Western philosophy and psychology,
1 Zhu Guangqian is also known as Chu Kwang-Tsien in English. This English name was used until
his death in 1986: from his student records in Edinburgh and on his English thesis to the complimentary
copies of his books in the 1980s. For Zhu's student records at the University of Edinburgh, see the
following: FirstMatriculation Book 1925-1926, vol. 60 (Edinburgh: The University ofEdinburgh),
no publication date and not paginated; Graduates in Arts 1928 (Edinburgh: The University of
Edinburgh), no publication date and not paginated. These two archives are in the Special Collections
of the University of Edinburgh Library.
2 For a detailed account of the 1980s debates, see Jing Wang, High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics,
and Ideology in Deng's China (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University ofCalifornia Press,
1996), especially Chapters 1,2, and 5. Also see Liu Rang, Aesthetics andMarxism: Chinese Aesthetic
Marxists and their Western Contemporaries (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000),
especially Chapter 4.
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but also to incorporate them into China's aesthetic traditions. In this period, his major
theoretical works on literature and aesthetics, mainly completed or planned during his eight
years in Europe, consist of the following: Gei qingnian de shierfengxin J+—M
it [Twelve letters to young people] (1929), Tan mei J4 [Talking about beauty] (1932),
The Psychology of Tragedy: A Critical Study of Various Theories of Tragic Pleasure
(1933), Wenyixinlixue xf§"C£JJL^ [The psychology ofliteratureandart] (1936), Mengshi
wen chao jLlfX#" [Collected writings ofMengshi] (1936), Shi lun OfMj [On poetry]
(1943), Tanxiuyang [Discussion of self-cultivation] (1943), Tan wenxue
[Discussion of literature] (1946), Keluoqi zhexue shuping ff [A study of
Croce's philosophy] (1948).3
The second phase lies in the People's Republic ofChina (PRC) era, from the 1950s
to Zhu's death in 1986. In this period, his writings were greatly influenced by Marxism,
either as a result ofhis own initiative or because ofpolitical constraints. Although the total
number of his theoretical writings declined during this phase compared to the previous
era and he concentrated more on translations, which comprise nine out of the twenty
volumes ofZhu Guangqian quanji [Complete works ofZhu Guangqian],4
he continued to produce significant contributions to the development ofMarxist theory
of aesthetics, in particular the relationship between the subject and the object from the
perspective ofZhu's emphasis on human values.5 Apart from his PhD thesis, which was
not published in Chinese until Zhang Longxi, one of his students, translated it in 1983,
most of these major works were widely read by young readers in the 1930s and are still
read today, both academically and by the general public.6
3 For the publication details of these works, see the appendix at the end of this thesis.
4 This collection was published in Beijing by Anhui Jiaoyu Chubanshe between 1987-1993. Hereafter
cited as QJ.
5 All these works produced during Zhu's life are included in QJ except his published PhD thesis in
English. Instead a Chinese translation was included in QJ. For the publication details of these works,
see the appendix at the end of this thesis.
6 There have been a large number of reprints ofZhu's early major works, both in Taiwan and mainland
China. For example, in mainland China, Gei qingnian de shierfengxin was so enjoyed by the public
as to be printed in more than 200,000 copies in the 1930s and 1940s. See Zhu Guangqian, "Da
Chongqing Da gong bao wen" 1^4/i: (A/AfEl)) F»1 [Reply to a question from Chongqian Da gong
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Studies on Zhu Guangqian in mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong do not have
a long history. His emphasis on the aesthetic dimension ofart was at odds with prevailing
views on political utility in art. In consequence, his literary theory and aesthetics were,
until the 1980s, criticised in mainland China for their idealist tendencies or unorthodox
approach to key issues in aesthetics. In Taiwan, Zhu's well-known book Gei qingnian de
shierfengxin and other theoretical works have been widely read in high schools and used
in some literary theory courses at universities.7 However, beyond this, Zhu's works were
rarely studied in Taiwan until the 1990s. One ofthe main reasons for this seems to be his
choice to stay in Beijing in 1949, even though he was a member of the Nationalist Party
(Kuomintang El & Jt, hereafter KMT).8
On the other hand in the West, advanced research on Zhu began as early as in the
1970s, for example, Mario Sabattini (1970) and Bonnie S. McDougall's articles (1977).9
In his detailed comparative account ofZhu and Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), Sabattini
argues that it is true that Zhu's aesthetic approach was greatly influenced by Croce as well
as by the Chinese traditional thinking of Taoism, especially Zhuangzi. However, it is
incorrect to regard him simply as a follower ofCroce, as Zhu's basic aesthetic ideas are
different and sometimes contradictory to Croce's aesthetic concepts, even when Zhu
bao], Da gong bao (Chongqing, Jan 1948), in QJ, vol. 9, p. 312. See also Bonnie S. McDougall,
"The View from the Leaning Tower: Zhu Guangqian on Aesthetics and Society in the
Nineteen-twenties and Thirties," in Goran Malmqvist ed., Modern Chinese Literature and its Social
Context, Nobel Symposium No. 32 (Stockholm, 1977), p. 83. In Taiwan and Hong Kong, a large
number ofZhu's early works were published. For example, Tan wenxue (Taipei: Taiwan kaiming
shudian, 1974) was the twelfth edition (first ed. 1958). For the publication ofZhu's works in mainland
China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, see the bibliography.
7 This is based on Dr Tzi-Cheng Wang's comments on my research and the recollection of graduate
students from Taiwan. Dr Tzi-Cheng Wang, currently a lecturer at SOAS, University of London,
grew up and was educated in Taiwan.
8 In 1942 Zhu joined the KMT during his tenure at Wuhan University [Wuhan daxue Leshan
and became one ofthe Central Committee Members in 1948. See, Wang Youxin ifiJUtfc, Zhu
Guangqian xueshu sixiangpingzhuan ik JhTf^#r Mif{§ [A critical biography of the academic
thought of Zhu Guangqian] (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999), pp. 59-61.
9 Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsiieh," East and West, vol. 20,
nos. 1-2 (March-June 1970), pp. 179-198; Bonnie S. McDougall, "The View from the Leaning Tower:
Zhu Guangqian on Aesthetics and Society in the Nineteen-twenties and Thirties," in Goran
Malmqvist ed., Modern Chinese Literature and its Social Context, Nobel Symposium No. 32
(Stockholm, 1977), pp. 76-122.
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interprets aesthetic experience through Croce's notion of intuition [zhijue Sabattini
points out that although Zhu showed his theoretical inclination towards Western theories,
especially Croce, he was more interested in the way in which Western theories were
interpreted in line with classical Chinese thought.10
McDougall's article is the first general study on the early works ofZhu, dealing with
Zhu's works published in book form in the 1930s and 1940s in the light ofhis attitude to
literature and society. Although McDougall has slight doubts about Sabattini's strong
emphasis on Zhu's early studies in Chinese philosophy, in particular Taoism, she mostly
agrees with his discussion and concludes that "the most obvious characteristics are the
continual note ofpessimism and a shrinking not only from realism in literature but from
reality in general, which always overshadow his pleas for tolerance and experiment,"
summarising Zhu's attitude as defeatist, escapist, eclectic and transcendental. Both of these
articles have been influential in China as well as in the West, since Sabattini's article was
translated into Chinese in abridged form in the well-known literary criticism magazine
DushuH IF [Reading monthly] in 1981, and McDougall's article was fully translated in
the authoritative academic journal of literary study Xin wenxue shiliao
[Historicalmaterial ofnew literature] in the same year.11 In later studies published in both
Chinese and English, these two articles have been extensively cited and debated.12 One
10 See Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsiieh," p. 179.
11 Mali'ao Shabadini '&C-[Mario Sabattini], "Waiguo xuezhe lun Zhu Guangqian yu
Keluoqi meixue" [A foreign scholar's study on Zhu Guangqian and
Croce's aesthetics], abridged trans, by Shen Ao $ Dushu it#, vol. 3 (1981), pp. 139-143; Bangni
Maikeduge [Bonnie McDougall], "Cong qingxie de ta shang liaowang: Zhu
Guangqian lun shijiu shiji ershi zhi sanshi niandai de meixue he shehui beijing
^AifT™TAtMrfe,—+TAAAJ^ trans, by Shen Ao T H,Xin wenxue shiliao
ff vol. 3 (1981), pp. 237-255. There are two conspicuous mistakes in the latter translation.
The information about the author Bonnie McDougall is incorrect and the article title in Chinese is
also inaccurate. It should have been ershi shiji—[Twentieth century] instead ofshijiu shiji
+AiAfe [Nineteenth century],
12 For example, see Qian Niansun Zhu Guangqianyu zhongxi wenhua XXXMT 5?X-ffc [Zhu
Guangqian and East-West culture] (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), p. 115, 251, and pp.
302-305; Kuai Dashen M'JX T, Zhu Guangqian houqimeixue sixiang lunshu A AlX^
it [Discussion ofthe late aesthetic thought ofZhu Guangqian] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan
chubanshe, 2001), pp. 210-217; Wang Youxin ifk/tk, Xuanze, jieshou yu shuli: Wang Guowei
jieshou Shubenhua, Zhu Guangqianjieshou Keluoqi meixue bijiaoyanjiuHI#, i 13
[Choice, acceptance and distance - a comparative
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ofthe main observations is that although Sabattini clearly observes that Zhu's view shows
a different approach from that ofCroce, it is questionable whether Zhu's affiliation with
Chinese traditional thinking is derived mainly from Taoism. This discussion will be dealt
with in detail in this thesis.
In mainland China, studies on Zhu began to be published after the Cultural Revolution,
including articles giving a brief introduction to his life and career, reviews ofhis books,
interviews with him, obituaries and academic studies.13 Most of these articles, however,
were short in length and lacked in-depth academic investigation and analysis,
concentrating on Zhu's discussion of ideology under the influence ofthe official orthodox
view of'Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.' It was thus not until Zhu's death in
1986 that more studies in book form, together with the 20 volumes of Zhu Guangqian
quanji, began to be published in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.14 With the
emergence ofa new generation oftheorists15 whose thinking is less restrained by socialist
ideology, study ofZhu's aesthetic theories is deepening. Some, such as Wang Yuxiong,
attribute Zhu's emphasis on human creative activity to traditional Chinese origins16 while
study ofWang Guowei's adoption of Schopenhauer's aesthetics and Zhu Guangqian's adoption of
Croce's aesthetics] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1999), pp. 130-131 and p. 202; Cui Zhiying, "Saving
China from its National Crisis: A Defence ofZhu Guangqian's Aesthetics," Journal ofOriental Society
ofAustralia, vol. 32/33 (2000/2001), pp. 28-46.
13 See Lu Rongchun "Ye tan wenyi yu renxing lun, rendaozhuyi wenti - jian yu Zhu Guangqian
tongzhi shangque" &itffS [Another talk about
human nature, humanism and literature and art - discussion with Zhu Guangqian], Fuyin baokan
ziliao: Wenyi lilun flfP^Hf]'##: vol. 16 (1980), pp. 73-80; Hao Mingjian
"Meixue laoren de qingnian shidai" [Youth period of an aesthetic old man],
Qingnian yidai #-4-—fi, no. 5 (1981), pp. 54-56; Cheng Daixi flfCSE, "Fang Zhu Guangqian
jiaoshou" ij[An interview with Professor Zhu Guangqian], Renmin ribao AR 3
12 March 1982. reprinted in Fuyin baokan ziliao: Meixue ftfPfElf] ft#: vol. 4 (1982), p. 76;
Guo Yin ll5 ®, "Cong Tan mei dao Tan mei shujian - shilun Zhu Guangqian meixue sixiang de bian
yububian" ft (tLJI) J'j [From Talking about
Beauty to Letters ofTalking about Beauty - on change and continuity of aesthetic thought of Zhu
Guangqian], Fuyin baokan ziliao: Meixue ftfPfilfJ 'iftt: vol. 1 (1982), pp. 8-14; Li Pixian
"Zhu Guangqian meixue sixiang shuping" [Review of aesthetic
thought ofZhu Guangqian], Meixue vol. 4 (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1982), pp.
88-113; For an obituary, see Hu Qiaomu et al., Zhu Guangqian jinian ji
[Collected writings in memory of Zhu Guangqian] (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987).
14 In particular, more than five volumes were published by Anhui Jiaoyu Chubanshe in the 1990s. For
details, see the section ofCritical Studies on Zhu Guangqian in the bibliography of this thesis.
15 For a glimpse ofthe new generation ofaesthetic theorists in the PRC, see Zhu Liyuan and Gene Blocker
eds., Contemporary Chinese Aesthetics (Bern: Peter Lang, 1995).
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others, such as Zhang Qiqun, discern a link between Zhu's aesthetic theories and modern
Western thought, although without shedding any light on the theoretical foundation and
essential origin ofZhu's aesthetics and simply suggesting Zhu must have received some
influence from Western ideas during his time in Europe.17
In contrast to the recent proliferation of studies in China, there has been little
monographic research on Zhu in Western languages over the thirty years since
McDougall's article in 1977.18 Recent development in discussions ofZhu offer different
perspectives in evaluating the many sides ofhis works, whose view on and attitude towards
society, art and literature, were construed in McDougall's 1977 article as indecisive and
defeatist idealism in the course of Chinese modernisation.
As observed above, both earlier and current studies on Zhu have beenmostly within
the narrow range of specific interpretations ofZhu's aesthetic approach and ideas, focusing
on a short period of Zhu's long academic career, although they can be said to present
16 See Wang Yuxiong ifS#, "Zhu Guangqian lun shenmei duixiang: 'yixiang yu \vuyi" IHSf##4
M Ik: 'it [Zhu Guangqian's discussion ofthe aesthetic object: 'image' and 'object B'], Fuyin
baokan ziliao: Meixue flf, vol. 4 (1997), pp. 7-9.
17 See Zhang Qiqun "Xiandai de yu gudian de zhi wo jian - Zhu Guangqian yu Zong Baihua
deyizhongbijiaoyanjiu" —ft iZ [My view on
the modem and the classical - a comparative study ofZhu Guangqian and Zong Baihua], Zhexueyanjiu
#^t9f&,vol. 5 (1997), p. 64.
18 See Heinrich Geiger's research in German, ChinesischeAsthetik im 20. Jahrhundert: Bibliographie
Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986), Zong Baihua (geb. 1897) und Li Zehou (geb. 1930): mit einer
einfuhrenden Darstellung von Leben und Werk der drei Autoren [Chinese Aesthetics in the 20th
century: Bibliographies of Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986), Zong Baihua (1897-1987) und Li Zehou
(1930- )] (Berlin: C. Bell, 1987); Mario Sabattini, "Tra critica e autocritica: Zhu Guangqian e il
dibattito sull'estetica negli anni Cinquanta" [Between criticism and self-criticism: Zhu Guangqian
and the debate on aesthetics in the 1950s], in Raoul Findeisen and Robert Gassmann eds., Autumn
Floods: Essays in Honour ofMarian Galik (Bern: Peter Lang, 1997); Mario Sabattini, "Chu
Kuang-ch'ien and Croce," Tamkang Review, vol. 23, nos. 1-4 (Taipei: 1992-93), pp. 601-626;
Hans-GeorgMoller, "Dionysian, Apollonian, Negation ofNegation: Zhu Guangqian's Interpretation
ofNietzsche," in Raoul Findeisen and Robert Gassmann edsAutumn Floods, pp. 635-641; Cui
Zhiying, "Saving China from its National Crisis." The latter three essays are the only articles on Zhu
in English to have appeared during the last two decades. Although there are some passages and
discussions relevant to Zhu in several articles and books, they do not deal exclusively with Zhu's
theory. Major examples would be Octave Briere, Fifty Years ofChinese Philosophy 1898-1950, trans,
by Laurence G. Thompson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), Liu Kang, Aesthetics and
Marxism and Ban Wang, The Sublime Figure ofHistory: Aesthetics andPolitics in Twentieth- Century
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). Also, in her well-known book, Michelle Yeh
values Zhu highly as a theorist when she refers to Zhu's theory concerning the similarities between
games and art. See Michelle Yeh, Modern Chinese Poetry: Theory andPractice since 1917 (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 17-28.
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different approaches and thus opinions among them vary. Despite the fact that Zhu's ideas
are spread over his lifetime's range of many works, little attention has been paid to
comprehensive studies on the continuation and development ofZhu's views between his
first stage in the Republican period and the second stage in the PRC era. Regarding Zhu's
changes in the PRC era, some aesthetic theorists such as Cai Yi and Li Zehou
who were Zhu's most severe critics in the 1950s debate on aesthetics, dismissed Zhu's
interpretation of Marxism as a manifestation of his idealist tendency, arguing that his
approach to Marxism was erroneous.19 In contrast, Yan Guozhong and Zhu
Shirong maintained that Zhu's adaptation of Marxism showed a thorough
conversion from idealism.20
With this argument in mind, this thesis searches for the underlying motivations and
purposes of Zhu's aesthetic theories, and will thus investigate his intellectual unifying
thinking which justify his specific ways of theorisation. This means that this study will
by necessity focus on Zhu's intellectual background and its development, an area neglected
bymany researchers when they evaluated Zhu's aesthetic theories, thus making ahistorical
comparisons between Zhu and other thinkers. In contrast, this thesis will take the contextual
facts, such as the extraordinary diversity of the political and cultural milieu in modern
China, into consideration when examining modern theory, whether intrinsically Chinese
or largely Western-oriented. In his critical discussion ofChinese intellectuals' reception
ofOrientalism, postcolonialism, and postmodernism in the Chinese context in the 1980s
and 1990s, Zhang Longxi lucidly points out that the Chinese tendency of discourse on
Orientalism and the Third World ironically "compromises with the cultural orthodoxy and
political authorities in China and discusses issues ofculture and history with a simple 'blame
it on theWest' approach," whereas Western discourse on the Third World plays a significant
19 See the section "7.2. Reply to Cai Yi and Le Zehou during the Debate," in Chapter VII.
20 See Yan Guozhong Pa1] ® Zhu Guangqian meixue sixiangji qi lilun tixi Thief^^®«fS^
f&& [The aesthetic thought and theoretical system of Zhu Guangqian] (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu
chubanshe, 1994), Chapters. 5, 6 and 7 and Zhu Shirong and Xu Daoming fh^0f], Zhu
Guangqian - congmitu dao tongjing [Zhu Guanqian - from a blind alley to
a thoroughfare] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1991), Chapters 4 and 5.
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role in forming a self-critique of the Western tradition, institutions, and the political cultural
status quo.21 In other words, it is necessary to carry out my research carefully within the
cultural and historical context in which Zhu produced his writings.
With this framework, this thesis makes the point that both Zhu Guangqian and his
aesthetic theories were products of the time, at a point when both China and the West were
experiencing a social and intellectual transition brought on by developments in science,
technology and consequent modernism.
This thesis is an effort to unfold, in a chronological order, the development ofZhu's
aesthetic theories: his early intellectual background (Chapter I), the formation ofa view
of life (Chapter II) and its refinement and development to a deeper level of study during
his stay in Europe (Chapter III); the establishment ofan aesthetic theory related to his view
of life (Chapters IV and V); and the eventual maturation of an aesthetic system reaching
beyond individual psychology towards Marxist humanity and Vico (Chapters VI andVII).
Zhu's intellectual foundations, assessed in Chapter I, will provide clues to
understanding his unique way ofapproaching the issues which are discussed in subsequent
chapters. The traditional education he received was the common background for most
intellectuals of his time, but, as pointed out in Chapter I, I will examine what specific
environment made it possible for him to maintain his connection with traditional
influences, especially Confucian studies, until a mature age. This chapter sheds light on
the details of how and to what extent Zhu undertook traditional classical studies, as well
as possible influences on his mode of thinking. In doing so, the chapter suggests a way
ofunderstanding the reasons behind Zhu's inclination in his life to approach social, ethical
21 See Zhang Longxi Mighty Opposites: From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative
Study ofChina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 204-205. In this sense, He Shang
[River Elegy], as Chen argues, is an example of "an expression of an anti-official discourse
prevalent in China at the end of the 1980s which painted the Occident as an oppositional and
supplementary Other," and the depiction ofChina as 'inferior' in this controversial work is "part of
a strategy for exposing the inferiority of a monolithic, one-Party system." Xiaomei Chen,
Occidentialism: A Theory ofCounter-Discourse in Post-Mao China (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995), p. 41.
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and philosophical issues in ways invariably betraying traditional Chinese points of
departure.
By the time of the early 1920s when Zhu graduated from university and became a
school teacher, the economic and political situation ofChina were in crisis. In sketching
an overall picture of the intellectual setting ofthis time, Chapter II shows where Zhu stood
when he, for the first time in his intellectual life, came into direct contact with both the
intellectual and social reality of China. By establishing Zhu's position in this historical
context, this chapter examines the extent to which inhuman and unjust conditions in China
had contributed to his concern about their effects on social morality and explains Zhu's
dedication to education with the aim of transforming the individual mind for the betterment
ofChinese society. At the same time, elucidated in a series of essays he wrote for school
students, Zhu's view of lifewill be discussed alongside an illustration ofhow Zhu remained
positive and optimistic in contrastwith the ideological confusion and emotional pessimism
prevalent among the young at that time, focusing on his notion of individual cultivation
based on an reciprocal process of action and tranquillity.
Chapter III sets out to show his theoretical inclination by demonstrating that Zhu's
learning and scholarly research onWestern ideas tended to revolve around the theme of
humanity. The chapter assesses Zhu's interpretation of the philosophies of Croce and
Nietzsche. In providing an assessment ofWestern intellectual development since Kant,
Chapter IV further points out that the method applied by Zhu in setting up an aesthetic
system was in step with the Western intellectual trend of the 1920s. The significance here
lies in the coherence and relevance ofZhu's Chinese intellectual background with modem
Western thought. Zhu formed an aesthetic system which synthesised various schools of
modem philosophy and psychology within Chinese philosophical traditions. Chapter IV
therefore traces how Zhu's intention to emphasise the dynamic and holistic totality of
aesthetic experience was constructed with the help of psychological and physiological
mechanisms (Lipps' Empathy, Bullough's Psychical Distance and Groos' Inner Imitation).
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After Zhu returned from Europe in 1933, he found that some ofhis concepts conceived
in Europe and in 1920s China needed revision in order to solve emotional and spiritual
problems in reality. He was very much engaged in thinking about the moral state ofmind
ofthe Chinese people, resulting in his writing numerous essays on this topic. Itwas during
this period that Zhu also supplemented Wenyi xinlixue a first draft ofwhich
he had written in Europe and revised later in China. Chapter V concentrates on a discussion
ofthe new chapters added to this major book, through which some further developments
in his aesthetics can be examined in line with his view of life.
After Marxism-Leninism was introduced as the sole orthodoxy after the Chinese
Communist Party took over China, all other theories, notably idealism, were criticised as
either politically incorrect or intellectually taboo. However, Zhu found the fundamental
views of the young Karl Marx accordant to his own, and thus tried to justify his aesthetic
system in the name of Marxist thought. In giving an assessment of this ideologically
oriented environment, Chapters VI and VII show how Zhu managed to become involved
in the debate on aesthetics in the 1950s and then discusses his interpretation ofMarxist
theory, which emphasised a reciprocal and dynamic relationship between the subject and
the object. As intellectual restrictions eased after the Cultural Revolution, Zhu embarked
at the age of eighty-three on a translation of Vico's work New Science. The last chapter
thus includes an evaluation ofZhu's approach to Vico's ideas, which he claimed to be in
line with Marx's, focusing on Vico's notion ofhistory as created by human beings. While
providing a detailed analysis ofhow Zhu reconstructed Marxist theory and how he viewed
Vico's notion as revealing his affirmation of human value in aesthetic consciousness in
accordance with Marx's own comprehension of uneven development in human




Early Education and Intellectual Background
1.1. Family and Primary Education in Tongcheng
Zhu Guangqian was born in Wuzhuang a small village in Tongcheng county
in Anhui -3c#. province,1 on 14 October (19 September by the lunar calendar), 1897.2
According to his retrospective writings, he was ofa declining traditional landlord family.3
Being the first of the three sons, Zhu was treated as fresh hope for this declining family
that had been wealthy two generations previously. His grandfather and his father, however,
gradually lost the land that his great-grandfather had possessed, and neither passed the
civil service examination. As the civil service examination was the only route for scholars
to achieve 'gentry' status, failing to obtain a degree meant not only financial disadvantages
1 Since 1949, Tongcheng county has been divided into two counties: Tongcheng county and Congyang
Wj county. Wuzhuang belongs to Congyang county.
2 Zhu's birth date is different in some sources. For example, his birth date is 19 Sep 1898 in his first
matriculation record of the University of Edinburgh and 19 Sep 1899 in his CV "Curriculum
scientifique de l'auteur," published in his thesis. But the year ofhis birth date in these records seems
to be incorrect ormisprinted. According to his later autobiographical writings and the most recently
published information on him, his birth date is 14 Oct 1897 (19 Sep 1897 by the lunar calendar). See
First Matriculation Book 1925-1926 and Chu Kwang-Tsien, The Psychology ofTragedy: A Critical
Study ofVarious Theories ofTragic Pleasure (Strasbourg: Librairie Universitaire d'Alsace, 1933),
not paginated. Reprinted in Hong Kong by Joint Publishing Co. in 1987. The page including Zhu's
birth date and his brief CV does not appear in the reprinted edition.
3 The information on Zhu's early life and his schooling is based on his following four writings and
others: "Zuozhe zizhuan" # £l # [Writer's autobiography], Zhu Guangqian quanji
[Complete works ofZhu Guangqian], vol. 1 (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987. Hereafter cited
as QJ), pp. 1-9; "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" @ [How did I study
Chinese literature?], Wo yu wenxue ji qita [Literature and me and other essays]
(Beijing: Kaiming shudian, 1943) in QJ, vol. 3, pp. 439-450; "Wo de wenyi sixiang de fandongxing"
[The reactionary aspects ofmy thoughts of literature and art], Wenyi bao
X##-, vol. 12(30 June 1956). This article was republished inMeixue wenti taolunji
[Essays of the debate about aesthetic problems], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1957) and Meixue
pipan lunwenji [Critical essays ofaesthetics] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1958).
Here refer to QJ, vol. 5, pp. 11 -39. For a English translation of this, see Chinese Studies in Philosophy,
vol. VI, no. 2 (Winter 1974-1975). This English version has some crucial inaccuracies; "Huiyi ershiwu
nianqian de Xianggang daxue"E7j[In memory ofHong Kong University
twenty-five years ago], Wenxue chuangkan X^I'if'J, vol. 3, no. 1 (May 1944), in QJ, vol. 9, pp.
183-187.
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but also a strong sense of failure for scholars such as Zhu's father, who was, nevertheless,
accomplished in classical Chinese literature.
Similar to other intellectuals born at the turn ofthe century, Zhu began his very early
education in a traditional family school from six up to fourteen years old. His father was
his teacher, under whose stern supervision he was educated in a typical traditional way
in which he recited the basic Chinese classics such as the Sishu W IT [Four Books],4 the
Wujing -54JL [Five Classics],5 the Tang Song ba dajia wenxuan
[Collected essays ofthe eight great masters ofthe Tang and Song] and Tang shi xuan H
[Selected Tang poems].
Although he could not understand these books as a child, Zhu enjoyed reciting them
rhythmically, sentence by sentence, as if he were singing songs. This was probably the
only way he was able to entertain himself in order to continue with his learning. However,
he came to realise years later that his intellectual life had greatly benefited because he was
able to remember every detail in these books and now was able to better understand them.6
And it is precisely because he had a thorough understanding of the Chinese classics, which
he admitted in later years, that his intellectual inclination and scholarship were significantly
affected by Chinese traditional way of thinking, especially Confucian doctrines.7
Under the guidance of his father, the thorough memorisation of the classics was to
be further imprinted and reinforced on Zhu's mind by verbalising the classics in writings.
Zhuwas taught to write civil service examination style essays such as celunjingyi
4 Sishu W# [Four Books]: Lunyu [Analects], Mengzi [Mencius], Daxue [Great
Learning] and Zhongyong TM [The Doctrine oftheMean]. Zhongyong and Daxue were originally
Chapter 31 and 42 respectively in Liji fStl [the Book ofRites], The author is unknown. Organised
by Zhu Xi ifri;, aNeo-Confucian scholar, two chapters stand out as a separate treatise. Zhu Xi grouped
the Great Learning, the Doctrine ofthe Mean, along with the Analects and Mencius, as "the Four
Books." These four books have been viewed as the Confucian classics ever since.
5 Wujing JLff [Five Classics]: Shijing [The Book ofSongs], Shujing # If [The BookofHistory],
Yijing J? If. [The Book ofChanges], Liji IlicL [The Book ofRites] and Chunqiu [The Spring and
Autumn Annals],
6 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did 1 study Chinese literature?],
in QJ, vol. 3, p. 439.
7 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zhu Guangqian jiaoshou tan meixue" [Professor Zhu
Guangqian's talk on aesthetics] (1981), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 533.
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[essays on politics and Confucian classics]. Because the celunjingyi was designed for the
examinations, its style became formalised. It had to start with amajor principle followed
by the theme with pro-and-con arguments to form the main body of the essay and had to
finish with a conclusion. However, such a formula also presents coherent, logical as well
as persuasive qualities which propose the essential requirements for future government
officials. However, Zhu was ambivalent when he recalled the experience. On the one hand,
he bitterly complained that being forced to write in such a rigid and conventional style
for at least ten years stifled his childhood imagination.8 On the other hand, recalling that
"this training built up his pattern ofthinking as well as affected the destiny ofhis writing,"
he attributed his ability of being coherent and clear in his essay writings later in his
intellectual life to the training he had received from his father.9
His father's attitude towards his education was so strict and dignified that Zhu was
not allowed to pursue an interest in other miscellaneous books such as fiction. All he could
do was to follow the traditional preparation for the examinations. Although the examination
system had already been abolished in 1905 by the Qing monarchy as a part of its political
reforms, it seemed that the geographical isolation ofZhu's village from the political centre
did not put direct pressure on his father to catch up with the new trend. He still adhered
to the traditional method of education in bringing up his son.
Although Zhu was forbidden to look into his father's books that were stored in a trunk,
he stealthily read these books which included Shiji [The records of the grand
historian], Zhanguo ce ^SIH. [The stories of the Warring States], Guoyu 01#
[Conversations of the states] etc. After he had exhausted his father's book collection, he
was so desperate to read more that he started to go through the eight-legged essays [baguwen
zVU£x.] his grandfather had copied by hand from the original texts. Without much
knowledge ofeight-legged essays, Zhu taught himselfabout this type ofwriting by reading
8 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did I study Chinese literature?],
in QJ, vol. 3, p. 441.
9 Ibid.
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several boxes of them; the years oftraining in writing celunjingyi may have played a role
in helping him to appreciate eight-legged essays. Thus, unlike some ofhis contemporaries
who thought eight-legged essays were mechanically formulated and weakenedminds and
talents,10 Zhu praised eight-legged essays for being well balanced, coherent and logical.11
Zhu also developed a taste for Chinese novels and dramas from a young age. While
Zhu's parents did not allow him to read any ofwhat his father called idle books, his cousin,
who lived in the same village, would go to a local market to buy books. Zhu was grateful
that his cousin generously lent him the books he wanted to read. Unknown to his father,
Zhu started to read "idle books" and it was in these books that he came across Yinbingshi
wenji [Collected works from the Ice-drinker's Studio] written by Liang
Qichao (1873-1929). Zhu claimed that Liang Qichao's book opened anew world
to him.12 The notion ofNew Learning [xinxue advocated by Liang Qichao stimulated
Zhu's young mind and encouraged him to take a step further away from the educational
agenda that his father had designed for him.
Inspired by Yinbingshi wenji, Zhu became interested in Chinese novels and drama.
For the first time in his life, he came into contact with Chinese romantic literature like
Honglou meng [Dream ofthe Red Chamber], Shuihu zhuan YCiijYf [The Water
Margin], Pipaji [The story of the pipa] andXixiangji [The romance of
the western chamber]. He started to fantasise about being a talented scholar or a "chivalrous
lover" courting a beautiful woman. These newly found emotions may have been vague
and naive, but the impact on a teenager whose life had been strictly limited to classical
studies, must have been significant or, even disturbing. From then on, as he described, the
small and isolated village where he could see nothing but a few scattered thatched cottages,
some patches of fields and rows of hills, could hardly hold his heart.13
10 See Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu "Tongxin" iS-ft [Correspondence], X/u qingnian frjrf
[New Youth], vol. 5, no. 4 (15 October 1918). reprinted in Chen Duxiu, Duxiu wencun
[Collected works of Duxiu], vol. 2 (Hong Kong: Yuandong tushu gongsi, 1965), pp. 205-209.
11 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did I study Chinese literature?],
in QJ, vol. 3, p. 441.
12 Ibid., p. 442.
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1.2. Tongcheng Middle School
In 1912 when he was fifteen years old, Zhu was sent to a public primary school in
Tongcheng county. He stayed there for only a term before moving to Tongcheng Middle
School [Tongcheng Zhongxue ^ because of his mastery of essay writing.
Tongcheng Middle School was established by Wu Rulun (1840-1903), not only
a prominent educational reformer and a distinguished guwen X. [ancient-style prose]
writer but also a successor to the Tongcheng School [Tongcheng pai ^A^Sfc.].14 Wu Rulun
set up primary and middle schools in Tongcheng county with the purpose ofproducing
civil service examination candidates. After the imperial examination system was
abolished, the Tongcheng tradition, with its emphasis on Confucianism, education and
guwen writing, was still carried on by Tongcheng Middle School. In particular, guwen
writing in the Tongcheng style was strictly kept in the school curriculum. The main school
textbooks were Guwen cilei zuan [Classified collection of ancient-style
prose]15 edited by Yao Nai and Jingshi baijia zachao li. $LHf [Selected works of
13 See Zhu Guangqian, Tan mei tklk [Talking about beauty] (1932), in QJ, vol. 2, p. 15.
14 Tongcheng is renowned as the home of the Tongcheng School [Tongcheng pai fl=)J$,i®-], one of the
most influential schools of literary thought and their literary advocacy in the Qing dynasty. Most of
the School's representative originators and founders, such as Fang Bao 71 zL (1668-1749), Liu Dakui
f'JA® (1698-1780), and Yao Nai HhM (1731-1815), were from Tongcheng county. The Tongcheng
School, according toWilt Idema and Lloyd Haft's discussion, "emphasised the study ofgreat examples
from the past (Zuo zhuan A#, Shiji jfeitL, the Eight Great Masters of the Tang and Song) and the
didactic function of literature; ideologically this school was in favor ofZhu Xi's neo-Confucianism."
Due to their stress on the didactic principle that "literature should convey the Dao" [Wen yi zai dao
XL^ill], this school came under fierce attack from the May Fourth literary reformers, including
the first two leaders, Chen Duxiu Pfilj^ and Hu Shi #!!§., who were also born in Tongcheng. See
Wilt Idema and Lloyd Haft, A Guide to Chinese Literature (Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan,
1997), p. 188 and pp. 245-246; Ying-shih Yii, "T'ung-ch'engp'ai" flsp&iA, in William H. Nienhauser
ed. and comp., The Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature, vol. 1 (Bloomington:
IndianaUniversity Press, 1986), pp. 837-840. For an account of the origin of the name'Tongcheng
pai' see Guo Shaoyu IMSji, Zhongguo wenxuepipingshi TH [A history of
Chinese literary criticism], vol. 2 (Tianjin: Baihua wenyi chubanshe, 1999, 1st ed. 1949), pp. 310-312.
15 Guwen cilei zuan [Classified collection of ancient-style prose] was compiled by Yao
Nai in 1799. It was classified by twelve different guwen writing styles and also divided into 73 chapters
according to the guwen yifa -£"X.Jb'£ [guwen theory of substance and form] which Fang Bao
formulated as the principle of ideal guwen writing. For a detailed account of the book, see William
15
Confucian classics and history] compiled by Zeng Guofan If HI *H§- (1811-1872). Zeng
Guofan and Yao Nai were both proponents of the Tongcheng School, although Zeng
Guofan was best known as the military leader who suppressed the Taiping Rebellion. In
Tongcheng Middle School the students were required to memorise while reading aloud
the text word by word in order to comprehend the charm and essence ofguwen.16 All school
assignments and projects including non-literary subjects such as physics and chemistry
were to be written in natural, clear, simple and elegant style. By and large, the students
were instructed to express their ideas in nothing but guwen.
Because of the systematic training he had received from his father, Zhu had no
problems in adapting and soon stood out from other students with his writings. The teachers
in Tongcheng Middle school were so impressed with this young man that they encouraged
him to carry on the style ofTongcheng guwen writing. Zhu responded by exerting himself
to excel in his guwen writing. He tried his hand at every style ofguwen writing until he
could comfortably imitate guwen masters such as Ouyang Xiu (1007-1072) and
Gui Youguang (1507-1571),17 who were well known for their natural, fluent and
eloquent writings. Zhu's life-long interest in Chinese classical poetry, especially Tang and
Song poetry, was also the result ofhis studies at Tongcheng Middle school. However, since
he described himself in the 1930s as "a twisted mind stuffed with abstract principles,"18
he was never able to write poems himself. Nevertheless, later in his life, he always
nostalgically attributed his capacity for appreciation ofChinese classical poetry to the years
he spent in Tongcheng Middle School. "The teacher who gave me most was Mr Pan Jiye
who was himselfa poet of the Song Poetry School. Under his influence, I developed
a strong interest in Chinese classical poetry."19
Schultz, "Ku-wen-tz'u lei-ts'uan"WinWilliam H. Nienhauser ed. and comp., The Indiana
Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature, vol. 1, pp. 501-504.
16 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zizhuan," in QJ, vol. 1. p. 1.
17 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did I study Chinese literature?],
in QJ, vol. 3, p. 443.
is Ibid., p. 441.
19 Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zizhuan," in QJ, vol. 1. p. 1.
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When the Qing government decided to abandon the old civil service examination
system in favour of a Western-style ministry of education in 1905, this institutional
transformation provided the climate for the first generation of Western influenced
intellectuals to emerge. Old-style literati who mainly lived in the countryside, started to
give way to city-dwelling intellectuals. Being in the political centres and exposed to modem
ideas, the new generation of intellectuals was no longer as faithful to the traditional heritage
as their predecessors. In particular, whenWestern ideas together with Western technology
flowed into China, the city intellectuals became even more doubtful of the Confucian
legacy, resulting in a sense of ambivalence towards Confucian ideals.20
However, Zhu's specific experience made him react differently to the change. As
indicated above, although he was not under the pressure of sitting for imperial civil service
examinations and occasionally even enjoyed secret reading of "idle books," Zhu was more
in the shadow of the traditional way ofthinking than some ofhis contemporaries. Itwould
seem then that the isolated environment in the village where he grew up to the age ofsixteen
did not provide conditions enough for intellectual diversity. Such traditional influence was
reinforced during the years he spent in Tongcheng Middle School from 1913 to 1916. By
the time he started his middle school education, the Qing imperial system had already been
overthrown and the Republic ofChina established. The new republican government tended
to find its orientationmore inWestern ideas. The impact ofWesternisation and iconoclastic
mood in urban areas was becoming more and more distinct. As early as 1905 when the
traditional examination system was abolished and Confucian classics studies gradually
declined, Confucianism began to lose its relevance in education. Primary and middle
schools drastically reduced Confucian classics teaching in their curriculums, and
universities merged Confucian classics with Chinese literature. After the disassociation
ofConfucianism from the educational system, the vastmajority of the gentry youth turned
to Western studies with enthusiasm.21 On the whole, as Jerome Grieder sums up, "by the
20 For an assessment of this period, see Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State inModern China:
A Narrative History (New York: A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1981), pp. 1-47.
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1920s Confucian China had already become an abstraction: something to be described,
analysed, and understood, ifonly the better to attack it; but no longer something that could
be experienced or reacted to as a coherent system of intellectual and moral values or political
institutions."22
In contrast to this background, Tongcheng Middle School nevertheless maintained
its loyalty to traditional Confucian studies. Zhu's dedication to guwen studies in Tongcheng
Middle School under the full influence of the Tongcheng style must have helped further
define his Confucianmentality. Although the possible link between studies ofConfucian
classics in his early years and guwen studies in his teenage years with his intellectual
inclination in later years was not acknowledged by himself, he did repeatedly admit that
his state ofmind was initially framed with Confucian ideas. "From the age of about ten
to that of twenty, I spent at least ten years writing such essays [celun jingyi and the
Tongcheng guwen styles]. This training formed the pattern ofmy thinking as well as my
writing style."23 Therefore, it can be argued that the Chinese classical language which is
strongly linked to Confucian ideals was responsible for shaping Zhu's ideas in his childhood
and youth. When this language was not only passively learned by heart but also actively
applied in writing, the influence can be profound. Don J. Wyatt observes: "Confucian
language took on a status beyond a tool ofneutral expression. Its correct or incorrect use
necessarily displayed one's degree of acculturation as an individual within a large Chinese
group-centredmatrix of Confucian relationships and a still larger Chinese social order."
This is because "Confucians felt that language, rather than being primarily descriptive as
in the classical Western tradition, should affect conduct directly, by inculcating proper
attitudes."24
21 See Ranbir Vohra, China's Path toModernisation: A Historical Review From 1800 To The Present
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1987), p. 100.
22 Jerome B Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative History, p. 213.
23 Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did I study Chinese literature?], in
QJ, vol. 3, p. 441
24 Don J. Wyatt, "A Language of Continuity in Confucian Thought," in Paul A. Cohen and Merle
Goldman eds., Ideas Across Culture: Essays on Chinese Thought in Honour ofBenjamin I. Schwartz
(Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 58-59.
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After four years in Tongcheng Middle School, Zhu graduated in 1916. He
subsequently worked as a primary school teacher in a small village not far from his home
for halfa year. While he was teaching, he developed an ambition to go to Peking University
to study Chinese literature because he believed Peking University had the best teachers
ofChinese literature. His ambition turned sour after he realised that his family was too
poor to provide him evenwith travelling expenses. He had to give up his dream, but enrolled
in the Department of Chinese ofWuchang Teachers' College [Wuchang gaodeng shifan
xuexiao 5^1?rin neighbouring Hubei ?#Mb province in 1917. Although
there were no tuition fees, he was disappointed when he learned that the teachers there
were far behind those in Tongcheng Middle School. He particularly disliked the fact that
some teachers vulgarised the Confucian classics by attaching their own decorative
language to them. They violated the natural, simple and eloquent style to which he was
accustomed in away that he found hard to tolerate. He realised that he had made a big mistake
in coming to this school.25
1.3. Hong Kong University and the New Culture Movement
In 1918, the Ministry ofEducation ofthe Northern Warlord Government offered some
scholarships for students in education in various teachers' colleges to study at Hong Kong
University. Zhu passed the examination and arrived in Hong Kong the same year. The
Western atmosphere of the school caused the initial cultural shock he experienced. Apart
from the twenty newcomers from mainland China who looked shabby, awkward and out
ofplace, the rest ofthe more than four hundred students were able to speak English fluently,
were well-dressed, and confident, and felt at home. They played European sports such as
rugby, tennis and chess, and they displayed their articulateness and eloquence in debates
that Zhu could not even understand. He was either uninterested or unable to participate
25 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did I study Chinese literature?],
in QJ, vol. 3, pp. 443-444.
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in these foreign activities. At the university where English and Cantonese were the only
languages ofcommunication, he was "crippled." The fact that he came the last ofhis class
in an IQ test in English made him feel very inadequate.26
After a year of catching up in English and mathematics, Zhu was transferred to the
Department of Education to study subjects such as English literature, psychology,
philosophy and biology. The subjects were new and challenging for him. As all the classes
were taught in English and the books that he had to read for assignments were also in English,
he had to spend extra time and energy to improve his English. Finally, he mastered the
English language and soon became fond ofEnglish literature. By the time he graduated
from Hong Kong University in the summer of 1923 after five years ofuninterrupted studies,
he was a mature man of twenty-six who had been educated in two completely different
cultures.
Hong Kong University, which was operated under the English educational system
and was geographically isolated from the intellectual as well as political centres ofChina,
provided Zhu with a unique environment. Here, Western ideas were not to be learned on
the assumption of the rejection of Confucian ideals. In fact, the new environment gave
Zhu enough space and time to remain a detached observer with little emotional and
ideological involvement in the depressing situation in China, especially in Beijing.
During the years Zhu spent at Hong Kong University from 1918 to 1923, China was
experiencing unprecedented political, social and cultural upheavals. The anti-Confucian
mood reached an explosive point when the Chinese government was about to sign the
Versailles Peace Treaty after the FirstWorld War. The treaty would grant Japan the right
to take over the German-leased Qingdao §h Peninsular (Shandong Tj province) rather
than returning it to China. The iconoclastic fever of the New Culture movement was joined
with intensely emotional nationalism and the movement turned political. The May Fourth
Incident (1919) followed.27 More than ever before, many Chinese intellectuals blamed
26 See Zhu Guangqian, "Huiyi ershiwu nian qian de Xianggang daxue," in QJ, vol. 9, p. 184.
27 See Chow Tse-ts'ung, The May Fourth Movement (Cambridge(Mass.): Harvard University Press,
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Confucianism for causing conservative framework of the Chinese mind which had resulted
in China lagging behind the West. Apart from pressing the government to change its mind
at the conference table in Paris, the New Culture movement campaigners pushed their
advocacy of dumping Confucian traditions on a larger scale.28
Chen Duxiu I^flj% (1879-1942), a leader of the New Culture movement, declared
in 1919 that "in order to foster democracy, we must oppose Confucianism, chastity, old
ethics, and old politics. In order to foster both democracy and science, we must oppose
our national heritage and our old literature."29 His views were strongly supported especially
when the continuing national weakness of China became acutely revealed. During the
period of the May Fourth movement, it was commonly agreed among iconoclastic
intellectuals that Confucianism, in contrastwithWestern ideas, was an obstacle to progress
and therefore worthy of destruction.
Being safely far away from the political upheaval and cultural crisis in China, Zhu's
attitude towards the intellectual rebellion appeared to be relatively free from extreme
intellectual tendencies. For instance, he was deeply hurt when he first learned from the
Xin qingnian ["La Jeunesse"; New Youth] magazine that iconoclastic intellectuals
had launched all out attacks on the Confucian classics. He could not accept the fact that
the Confucian heritage which he had learned for years, had suddenly become a target of
criticism. "It was like amerchant having collected lots ofmoney after years of frugal saving,
discovering overnight that the cash in his hand is worthless."30 Zhu's initial reaction was
angry and defensive. He supported the idea ofprotest with those in China who shared a
similar background. The severe attack on Confucian traditions by the New Culture
intellectuals caused bitter reactions from some so-called "National Essence" conservatives
1960), pp. 84-144.
28 See ibid., pp. 171-196 and pp. 289-313.
29 Chen Duxiu, "Ben zazhi zui'an zhi dabianshu" ♦ [Our answer to the charges
against this magazine],Xin qingnian, vol. 6, no. 1,(15 January 1919). Here quoted from Chen Duxiu,
Duxiu wencun , vol. 1, p. 362.
30 Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did 1 study Chinese literature?], in
QJ, vol. 3, p. 444.
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such as Lin Shu (1852-1924), Gu Hongming (1857-1928) and Liu Shipei
f'J^(1884-1919).3i
However, unlike other defenders ofConfucianism in China, Zhu was at Hong Kong
University studying Western ideas. He acknowledged that the scientific training he was
receiving persuaded him to look at the change objectively. He accepted that theNew Culture
movement, which aimed at delivering scientific and systematic methods to the traditional
values, was necessary and inevitable.32 Nevertheless, this acceptance of change was not
purely Darwinist in its detailed sense. Paradoxically, because of his Western studies as
well as his traditional Confucian background, he refused to worship Western ideas and
cast aside Chinese traditions as a whole, simply because the West was a better survivor
in amaterial sense. With an attitude which was characterised by a Confucian middle course
of thinking and, at the same time, Western liberalism, Zhu made it clear that all he wanted
to see in Chinese scholarship was the spirit of independent thinking and creativity rather
than what he called blind competition. He criticised theNew Culture movement for lacking
intellectual independence, alleging that, as soon as they had abandoned their Confucian
heritage, the campaigners of the movement started to imitate Western practices
unconditionally. Zhu imputed this behaviour to more than two thousands years of
"slavishness mentality" in Chinese intellectual history since the Han Dynasty.
Zhu observed, using the examples in Chinese intellectual history, that "once the
literary styles ofYang Ziyun [Yang Xiong 4Jj# (53 BC-18)] and SimaXiangru
s] (179-117 BC) were established in the Western Han dynasty, pursuers of
literature were excessive; relying on the Confucian studies ofZheng Kangcheng
[Zheng Xuan HP'ST (127-200)] and Xu Shucong fH&lif [Xu Shen H (c.58-c. 147)] of
the Eastern Han dynasty, every Confucian scholar turned into an exponent of the Confucian
classics ... in the Song dynasty, it was the Neo-Confucianists everywhere; and the
31 For this point, see Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modem China, pp. 203-279.
32 Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did 1 study Chinese literature?], in
QJ, vol. 3, p. 444.
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classicism ofDai Dongyuan [Dai Zhen MM (1724-1777)] and Wang Niansun
(1744-1832) of the Qing dynasty yet again brought out a flock of followers to
classical studies. This conformist atmosphere ... restrained scholarship from equal
development. Even these so-called authoritative schools stopped progressing for lack of
intellectual challenge."33 Thus Zhu strongly urged that independent-minded intellectuals
should be encouraged in China. Hong Kong was the unique environment where Chinese
and Western values were not under pressure to contend against each other, whereas the
New Culture iconoclasts fought passionately for an wholesale importation ofWestern
values as opposed to the traditionalists struggling to retain Chinese fundamental values.34
1.4. Language: baihua and guwen
Owing to this different environment, Zhu could afford to view the changes such as
the baihua % [vernacular] movement with a calm and yet critical mind. He declared
that his change ofmind about baihua taking over guwen was totally different from the
motives of the New Culture intellectuals.35 He claimed that while the New Culture
intellectuals drew a separate line between baihua and guwen as if the latter deserved
abandonment simply because it represented the old, on the other hand, he believed that
any form of language is primarily the expression ofhuman feeling and thought. It is amatter
of training and habit to feel comfortable with a certain form of language: some may be
more used to expressing themselves in modern language and others may be happier to
express themselves in classical language.36 From this perspective, Zhu found no
33 Zhu Guangqian, "Zenyang gaizao xueshu jie" [How to reform scholarship], in
QJ, vol. 8, p. 29.
34 See Lin Yu-sheng, "Radical leonoclasm in the May Fourth Period and the Future of Chinese
Liberalism," in Benjamin I. Schwartz ed., Reflections On theMay Fourth Movement: A Symposium
(Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 23-58.
35 For a brief overview ofMay Fourth iconclasts' attitudes towards the baihua literature, see Merle
Goldman, "Left-wing Criticism ofthe Pai-hua Movement," in Benjamin I. Schwartz ed., Reflections
On the May Fourth Movement: A Symposium, pp. 85-94.
36 See Zhu Guangqian, Shi lun ifim [On poetry] (Chongqing: Guomin tushu chubanshe, 1943), in QJ,
vol, 3, p. 102.
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contradiction between baihua and guwen. Thus, since both forms of language served the
purpose ofself-expression, it would not be difficult for Zhu also to accept baihua if it suits
better the modern life style and hence the modern mode of thinking.37
As far as Zhu was concerned, a form of literature, whether it is traditional or new,
must adequately reveal one's true feelings without pretentiousness and artificiality.38 He
noticed that his view was actually shaped inWestern literary thought.39 For instance, the
English Romantic poet, WilliamWordsworth (1770-1850), whose works Zhu read and
admired at Hong Kong University, also advocated plain language in poetry, emphasising
its naturalness and truthfulness. Zhu claimed years later that he decided to adopt baihua
writing because he was greatly inspired by Wordsworth's "Preface to Lyrical Ballads
(1800)"40 in which Wordsworth states that plainer language should be applied in poetry
"because in that condition of life our elementary feelings coexist in a state of greater
simplicity and, consequently, may be more accurately contemplated, and more forcibly
communicated ... and ... because in that condition the passions ofmen are incorporated
with the beautiful and permanent forms of nature." Yet, the language that poets used,
according to Wordsworth, tends to be elaborated "under the influence of social vanity."
These poets "think that they are conferring honour upon themselves and their art, in
proportion as they separate themselves from the sympathies ofmen, and indulge in arbitrary
and capricious habits of expression, in order to furnish food for fickle tastes, and fickle
appetites, of their own creation."41
Based on the fact thatWordsworth saw the simplicity ofplain language as associated
with the beauty of nature, one cannot help but wonder if it was in one way or another
37 See ibid., p. 103.
38 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did I study Chinese literature?],
in QJ, vol. 3, pp. 448-449.
39 See Zhu Guangqian, Shi lun [On poetry], in QJ, vol. 3, p. 104.
40 See Zhu Shirong S and Xu Daoming ifiit0!1], Zhu Guangqian - congmitu dao tongjing
- #U£££S'Jii!UiL [Zhu Guangqian - from a wrong path to a coherent road] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue
chubanshe, 1991), p. 15.
41 William Wordsworth, "Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800)," inNowell C. Smith ed., Wordsworth's
Literary Criticism (London: Henry Frowde, 1905), pp. 14-15.
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reminiscent of Zhu's own intellectual background. If plain language was intended by
Wordsworth to express the real feelings ofmen and to avoid the capricious vanity ofpoets,
then the Tongcheng style which was also pursued by Zhu in his writings showed a similar
purpose. Tongcheng style was grounded on the belief that a simple and natural style of
writing should replace ornamentality and ostentatiousness. In addition, it was also the
principle ofTongcheng writing to avoid too many unnecessary words. The Tongcheng
style gradually became very easily influenced by superficiality during the late Qing dynasty
due to its over-emphasis on rhetoric,42 but so far as its fundamental ideal is concerned,
Wordsworth's approach would denote nothing totally antagonistic butwould help enlarge
the scope ofsuch an ideal. Since Zhu also endeavoured to illuminate the beauty of simplicity
in writings, it would not be difficult for him to accept the vernacular used by most people
without negating the chastity of the classical language if both forms of language could
serve the purpose of expressing true feelings.
While insisting that the Chinese classical language was succinct, stylish and flexible,
Zhu conceded that the vernacular was more intimate with daily life, and therefore more
available and expressive. He claimed that he preferred to see a situation in which the
linguistic merits ofboth the Chinese vernacular and classical languages and even European
languages were combined.43 Zhu claimed that his training in classical writing and the
English language helped him pick up the vernacular writing and excel in it within a short
time. He earned himselfa reputation as a persuasive vernacular writer.44 Making his debut
in the vernacular with an introductory essay on the German psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud
(1856-1939) in the magazine Dongfang zazhi $177 [Eastern Miscellany] in 1921,45
Zhu gradually became widely well-known, especially amongst young readers, for his
42 See Guo Shaoyu, Zhongguo wenxue piping shi, vol. 2, pp. 310-349.
43 See Zhu Guangqian, "Congwo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did I study Chinese literature?],
in QJ, vol. 3, p. 446.
44 Ibid.
45 See Zhu Guangqian, "Fuluoyide de yin yishishuo yu xinli fenxi"
[The theory of Freud's unconsciousness and psychoanalysis], Dongfang zazhi fftgfe [Eastern
Miscellany], vol. 18, no. 14 (July 1921), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 1-11.
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simple but eloquent vernacular style. However, instead of treating his success as an
ideological conversion, he invariably attributed it to his previous knowledge ofclassical
writing: "According to my personal experience, I can say that the difference between
classical language and the vernacular is not as big as some presumed... I thinkmy training
in classical writing helps me greatly to improve my writing in the vernacular." He was
convinced that vernacular writing could not be successfully established and improved
without inheriting the legacy of classical language.46
In comparison with the May Fourth intellectuals who failed to look for an opportunity
to transform the Confucian tradition since they consciously rejected it completely,47 Zhu
treatedWestern ideas and Chinese traditions on the same intellectual scale. In other words,
Zhu's thinking on values, old or new, Chinese or Western, would not be directed either
to an absolute and totalistic rejection or to indiscriminate acceptance. As it appeared, the
Western ideas that he was studying worked in a complementary manner to his
consciousness ofChinese traditions and vice versa. Admittedly, the environment ofbeing
away from the crisis ofconsciousness in China provided Zhu with time and space to evaluate
the two values more rationally in order to find common ground between them. He was
probably one of the few in China at this time who had the advantage of scrutinisingWestern
ideas as human knowledge rather than as an ideological paradigm opposed to Chinese
culture.
46 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong wo zenyang xue guowen shuoqi" [How did I study Chinese literature?],
in QJ, vol. 3, p. 445-446.
47 See Lin Yii-sheng, "Radical Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Period and the Future of Chinese




The Formation of Intellectual Attitude (1921-1926)
2.1. Zhu's Attitude towards Social Background
Following his graduation from Hong Kong University in the summer in 1923, Zhu
became an English teacher at Wusong State Secondary School, near Shanghai, at
a time when China was still in turmoil. In spite of the efforts ofthe iconoclastic intellectuals
to modernise Chinese thinking,1 the Republic ofChina had descended into a nation divided
and at war. After the fresh education in Western philosophy, psychology and literature
in Hong Kong, which complemented his strong Confucian educational grounding, Zhu
started to assess the social reality ofChina in a way that was closely linked to the synthetic
tendencies of the neo-traditionalists in the early 1920s.2
In his usual gentle and modestmanner, from the very beginning Zhu developed his
opinions and attitudes towards the social issues in China. These were not politically directed
or intellectually factious but showed evidence of a mixture of scientific positivism and
ethical idealism, rationalism and romanticism, dissolved in a solution of intellectual
relativism.3 Zhu held that the cause ofthe turmoil ofChinese society stemmed from the
education system. He stated that "society would not progress unless it was driven forward
1 For an account of the general state ofmind of the May Fourth intellectuals and the weaknesses and
strengths oftheMay Fourth movement, see Chow Tse-tsung, The May FourthMovement (Cambridge
(Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1960), especially pp. 338-368 and Benjamin I. Schwartz ed.,
Reflections on theMay FourthMovement: A Symposium (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University
Press, 1973).
2 The neo-traditionalists are those, such as Liang Qichao (1873-1928), Liang Shuming IfUIUS
(1893-1962), Zhang Junmai ft (1886-1969), Zhang Dongsun (1886- 1973) etc, who
expressed their support of humanity and Eastern values as opposed to science and Western values
during the debate in the 1920s. See O. Briere, Fifty Years ofChinese Philosophy, 1898-1950 ( London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1956), pp. 27-32 and 66-72. Also see John K. Fairbank and Denis
Twitchett eds., The Cambridge History ofChina, vol. 12: Republican China 1912-1949 Part 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 437-444.
3 Zhu's attitude towards theoretical method was expressed in his article "Zenyang gaizao xueshujie"
%ITgfcit.If#f ? [How to reform academia], Shishixinbao hTTTtTH- [Daily current affairs] (Mar
30,31 1922), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 23-39, especially pp. 29-30 in which he firmly urged that all theoretical
works should depend on verifiable facts.
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by fully developed rational minds."4 Table 1 shows Zhu's strong interests in education in
the 1920s.





Place and date of publication
Jul 1921
"Fuluoyide de yinyishi shuo yu xinli fenxi" $
[Freud's theory of the unconscious and psychoanalysis]
Psychology
Dongfang zazhi [Eastern Miscellany], vol. 18, no. 14 (July
1921) in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 1-11.
Nov 1921
"Xingweipai (behaviourism) xinlixue zhi gailue ji qi piping"
(behaviourism)'CiJS^^.]S(.8§-^^t-fthif- [Outline and criticism of
behaviourist psychology] Psychology
Gaizao fJtisIt [Reform], vol. 4, no. 3 (Nov 1921) in QJ, vol. 8, pp.
12-22.
Mar 1922
"Zenyang gaizao xueshujie" %if Ik. -f1#T ? [How to reform
academia]
Education
Shishi xinbao H-f [Daily current affairs] (Mar 30, 31 1922),
in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 23-39.
Apr 1922
"Jinhua lunzheng" 'Okfcikfi. [Account of the theory of evolution]
Evolutionary
theoryMinduo R# [People's bell], vol. 3, no. 4 (April 1922), in QJ, vol.
8, pp. 40-61.
May 1922
"Zhili ceyan fa de biaozhun" J] iS'Ji!t4^- [Standards of
intelligence tests]
Education
Jiaoyu zazhi %k.[Education], vol. 14, no. 5 (May 1922), in
QJ, vol. 8, pp. 62-69.
Dec 1922
"Zai 'Daoerdun zhi' zhong zenyang yingyong sheji jiaoxue fa"
f|(#'J'T%If^[How to adopt and design teaching
methods from the 'Dalton Plan'] Education
Jiaoyu zazhi, vol. 14, no. 12 (Dec 1922), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 70-83.
Feb 1923
"Maidugu yu Huasheng neng fou tonglie xingweipai"
l°] [Do McDougall and Watson belong to the same
behaviourist school?] Psychology
Shishi xinbao (9 Feb 1923), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 84-87.
Apr 1923
"Xiaochu fanmen yu chaotuo xianshi" /"$ PI
[Dispelling frustration and transcending reality] Advice to
youthXuesheng zazhi [Student magazine], vol. 10, no. 5 (Apr
1923), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 88-95.
4 Ibid., p. 23.
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Dec 1923
'"Daoerdun zhi' xia de yingwen jiaoxue fa" 'illM#Ui'T XIf
it [Teaching English under the 'Dalton Plan'] Education
Jiaoyu zazhi, vol. 15, no. 12 (Dec 1923), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 96-104.
June 1924
"Siren chuangxiao jihua" t'l [My plan for founding a
private school] Education
Minduo, vol. 5, no. 4 (Jun 1924), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 105-118.
(?) 1924
"Wuyan zhi mei" ^ [Wordless beauty]
Aesthetics
Minduo, vol. 5, no. 5 (Jul 1924), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 62-72.
May 1925
"Zhongxuexiao yingwen jiaoxue fa shili" 'J
[Examples of English teaching methods at secondary school] Education
Jiaoyu zazhi, vol. 17, no. 8 (Aug 1925), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 119-133.
1925
"Zhiqu" [Aims]
Educationin Lida xueyuan yilan i^^S]—K [Lida Academy prospectus]
(1926) in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 170-172.
As Zhu thought that the way of forming amental attitude was the key towards a better
society, he focused his attention on the situation ofChinese intellectual life. Zhu published
his opinions in influential journals such as Shishi xinbao [Daily current affairs] and Minduo
[People's bell], implemented a new school system, and offered advice on ethical issues
to youth. His shift from the academic pursuit ofknowledge to the application ofknowledge
for the ethical needs ofsociety showed a change ofemphasis in his intellectual disposition.
Although he expressed his concern and his views about social issues while still at Hong
Kong University, it was from this stage onwards that Zhu became actively engaged in
seeking a way to improve the spiritual state of the nation as the foundation of a healthy
society.
Zhu's effort to reshape the Chinese mind, especially that of the young, is seen in
"Zenyang gaizao xueshujie" [How to reform academia], which he published shortly before
he graduated from Hong Kong University, in which he put forward an argument strongly
influenced by social Darwinism as well as traditional Chinese ethics, and insisted on the
urgency ofeducational reform. Zhu's ideas ofeducation are formed on the assumption that
a small group of "leaders of the future" guides the rest of society. "In fact, leaders of the
future are the forerunners of social evolution,"5 because "in a society there are many more
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ordinary people than outstanding figures. The ordinary people tend to follow the leaders;
they do not have independent views and lack pioneering characteristics and exceptional
resources." Thus in Zhu's discussion the outstanding figures who show these qualities "are
the main force to push society forward."6
It would seem that Zhu's concept ofoutstanding figures who influence social progress
is consistent with a social Darwinist and even a Nietzschean idea of 'Ubermensch'
[superman or overman] which seems incompatible with Confucian ethical benevolence.7
However, for Zhu, the outstanding efforts of progressive figures ultimately serve the
purpose of improving society "like an external force setting in motion an object which is
otherwise inactive."8 Therefore, his preference for heroes as leaders of society did not
appear totally in line with Nietzsche's teleological emphasis on the "possibility of the
emergence of exceptional human beings capable of independence and creativity which
would elevate them above the level of the general human rule."9 Zhu's intention was rather
simple. He states:
If we wish our society to be happy and progressive, we must make sure that
all social activities are subject to intelligent consciousness. ... When social activities
drift from the exercise of the intellect, society will become sick and thus need
n 10
reform.
In this way, Zhu's respect for knowledge, which presumably leads human beings to
enlightenment, necessarily inclined him to the view that educated people do not have the
privilege but the duty to exercise their knowledge to promote a better human society.
5 Zhu Guangqian, "Zenyang gaizao xueshujie" [How to reform academia], in QJ, vol. 8, p. 35.
6 Ibid.
7 For a detailed account, see David A. Kelly, "The Higher Chinadom: Nietzsche and the Chinese Mind,
1907-1989," in Graham Parkes ed., Nietzsche andAsian Though (Chicago and London: University
ofChicago Press, 1991), pp. 161-169.
8 Zhu Guangqian, "Zenyang gaizao xueshujie" [How to reform academia], in QJ, vol. 8, p. 35.
9 See Robert Audi general ed., The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), p. 535.
10 Zhu Guangqian, "Zenyang gaizao xueshujie" [How to reform academia], in QJ, vol. 8, p. 23.
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From this perspective, Zhu's society-oriented expectation of leaders of the future to
improve society seems to have greater affinity with the Confucian ethical ideal of ren f—
[humanity or benevolence] which involves the necessary relationship of a better selfwith
others. In TuWei-ming's words, "self, in the classical Confucian sense, referred to a centre
ofrelationships, a communal quality which was never conceived ofas an isolated or isolable
entity."11 Since Zhu's concept of leadership talent is not grounded in ontology of substance
but realistically and ethically related to society, it needs a process of learning exemplified
by some better cultivated personalities such as Aristotle, Kant, Bergson, Homer,
Shakespeare, Dante, Goethe, Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu.12 With this hierarchical but
transitional pattern of learning Zhu attached importance to an educational system that
would encourage independent and creative thinking, which was the bestway to produce
leadership talent in his view.
However, the reality was by no means ideal. The existing educational system
remained corrupt and unstable despite changes to the old system after 1905. As Jiang
Menglin (1886-1964), an American-educated educator observed at the end of
1922, "evidence has accumulated to prove that education is not only economically
bankrupt, but spiritually bankrupt as well. So the blind faith of a few years back, the notion
that 'one should talk only about education, and not about politics,' has gradually been
discredited."13 Zhu also came to realise that the production of the leaders of the future would
be limited since the state schools were hindered by the politically corrupt and conservative
warlord government. It was therefore his duty to endeavour to continue promoting a new
educational system above government control to train real leaders for the salvation of
Chinese society.14
11 Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood As Creative Transformation (New York: State
University ofNew York Press, 1985), p. 53.
12 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zenyang gaizao xueshujie" [How to reform academia], in QJ, vol. 8, p. 35.
13 Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative History, p 276.
14 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zhiqu" a [Aims], in Lida xueyuan yilan — ft [Lida Academy
prospectus] (1926) in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 170-171.
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2.2. An Effort to Set Up a New School System
Zhu's tenure atWusong Secondary School was cut short because it was forced to close
down after a territorial dispute between Jiangsu and Zhejiang #/pX broke into awar.
In 1924, he relocated to Chunhui Secondary School in Zhejiang province, but his
stay at this school was even shorter. When the Dean ofStudies, Kuang Husheng IE
an anarchist, resigned in protest against the school principal who had rejected his proposals
for student representation and a co-educational system, Zhu himself resigned in sympathy.
Kuang and Zhu subsequently went to Shanghai and later were joined by other Chunhui
School colleagues such as XiaMianzun JL^ Feng Zikai and Zhou Weiqun
ffl who had also resigned. In Shanghai, they met Ye Shengtao H1? IT«J, Hu Yuzhi
Zhou Yutong and Xia Yan JO>T with whom they became friends through
cultural circles. Zhu and his friends soon formed an academic society called Lida
Society and prepared to establish a school to put their educational ideas into practice.15
When Zhu and his friends eagerly embarked on this project in 1925, the new education
under the state school system, as Grieder observes, was "somehow an anomalous
innovation, possessing neither traditions nor a character of its own. On the part ofmany
Chinese intellectuals in the 1920s there was a growing conviction that the values ofNew
Culture liberalism were not, in fact, generalisable.... In the eyes of its critics, the vaunted
'new education' created only an intellectual elite divided in personal taste and style of life
and even more important, in vocational competence and social expectations, from the
masses whose welfare they were supposed to promote."16 In response to this situation,
some reformers such as Liang Shuming moved their attention to the countryside
15 See Zhu Guangqian, "Huiyi Shanghai LidaXueyuan he Kaiming shudian"
[Recollections ofShanghai Lida Academy and Kaiming Publishing House], Jiefang ribao
3 fk (2 Dec 1980), in QJ, vol. 10, pp. 520-523. Also see Chen Xing [$21., Baimahu zuojia qun
[Baima Lake writers] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang wenyi chubanshe, 1998), pp. 134-156; Shang Jinlin
1Zhu Guangqianyu Zhongguo xiandai wenxue TkiLrfYCf' [Zhu Guangqian and
modern Chinese literature] (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995), pp. 7-27.
16 Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China, p. 277.
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and set up Confucian style schools among the ordinary people, hoping to "shape a social
ideology that would draw upon the energies of the masses in order to meet their needs,
while once again rendering morally coherent the relationship between leaders and led."17
With a similar desire to restore the link between intellectuals as the leaders and the
masses as the learners, Zhu and his colleagues sought to establish a system that would
concentrate on training a group of talented leaders whose moral as well as intellectual
qualities would spread throughout society. "If we intend to reform society through
education within a reasonably short time, we must first of all produce a group oftalented
leaders to lead the community towards a brighter future."18
With this ambition, despite financial difficulties Zhu and his associates succeeded
in founding a school called Lida Academy in 1925. The academy was named Lida xueyuan
S] because it was modelled after the Confucian notion of learning as well as the
Academy ofAthens founded by Plato around 387 BC. As Zhu explained, the word Lida
iLii was taken from Confucian doctrine:
Fu ren zhe, ji yu li er li ren, ji yu da er da ren. Neng jin qu pi, ke wei
ren zhi fang ye yi. £j£fcA.v7r}_iA, cL£LIi.fbii.A.
tL. [As for humaneness - you want to establish yourself; then help others to establish
themselves. You want to develop yourself; then help others to develop themselves.
Being able to recognise oneself in others, one is on the way to being humane.].19
At the same time, instead of the conventional words of'school' or 'college,' the word
'academy' was adopted because it was recollective of Plato's 'Academy' which used the
teaching method based on free discussion which Zhu favoured.20
Zhu and his associates, who were advocates of the anarchism and intellectual
liberalism popular among many intellectuals at this time, expected the school environment
17 Ibid., p. 278.
18 Zhu Guangqian, "Siren chuangxiao jihua" f'J [My plan for founding a school], Minduo,
vol. 5, no. 4 (Jun 1924), in QJ, vol. 8, p. 111.
19Analects, 6:28., in William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom comp, Sources ofChinese Tradition:
From Earliest Times to 1600, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999 2nd ed.), p. 50.
20 See Zhu Guangqian, "Huiyi Shanghai Lida Xueyuan he Kaiming shudian" [Recollections ofShanghai
Lida Academy and Kaiming Publishing House], in QJ, vol. 10, p. 521.
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to form a breeding ground for talented leaders who would become what Zhu called "the
quiet heroes" of society.21 Therefore, the school emphasised the cultivation of the whole
personality of an individual as the academy's fundamental policy. The school constitution
restated themoral requirements of the leaders of the future that he had proposed in an essay
entitled "My Plan for Founding a School", written and published inMinduo in June 1924.22
From Zhu's article, we may see three essential leadership qualities to be cultivated
at Lida Academy. The first was a quasi-Christian altruism \yesu de sheji wei qun dejingshen
Zhu complained that a deep-seated Chinese habit was to
overemphasise security, wealth, and the glory of one's own family. As a consequence,
people tended to be selfish and lacked a sense of sympathy. This mentality was so
deep-rooted that even national humiliation and civil wars failed to change the spirit. He
was determined to establish altruism as a fundamental principle to produce heroes who
were willing to sacrifice their own interests to save society.23
The second quality was to live a simple and frugal life like the Greek Stoics [Siduoge
xuezhe de jianpu keyu de shenghuo fangfaM ^ fh JiLiS 69 ^ ZF /£"]• Zhu
pointed out that secular indulgence in material possessions corrupted the spirit and
generated greed. Thus, "one must overcome one's material desire to achieve this goal."24
The Stoic ethic ofpursuing moral progress by identifying with the impartial, inevitable
and moral order of the universe is very similar to the Confucian ethical ideal that advises
'knowing the Mandate ofHeaven' [zhi tianming To know the Mandate ofHeaven
is to follow the Way embedded in human nature and to cultivate one's personal life by
perfecting the universal virtues of wisdom, humanity and courage.25 Similarly, Zhu
expected his future heroes to maintain peace with the material world, and he insisted that
21 See ibid., p. 522.
22 See Zhu Guangqian, "Siren chuangxiao jihua" [My plan for founding a school], in QJ, vol. 8, pp.
105-118.
23 See ibid., pp. 111-112.
24 Ibid., p. 112.
25 See the Doctrine ofthe Mean, 20, trans, by Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy,
pp. 104-107.
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they endure and embrace hardship, poverty and death like Confucius, Buddha and Jesus.
In this way, individuals would be able to keep a clear mind and a powerful will.26
The third quality was to possess and apply scientific knowledge and methodology
\jindai kexue suofuyu de zhishi he fangfa ZF /'£"]. Unlike some
of his contemporaries whom he criticised for blindly following Rabindranath Tagore
(1861 -1941) and adopting a skeptical attitude towards science, Zhu gave his approval to
science. He did not think that having scientific qualifications would conflict with the other
three qualities which were morally oriented. While he opposed material desire which
overwhelmed spiritual or moral character, he was convinced that "material civilisation
would promote spiritual civilisation."27 In this sense, not only did he disagree with the
idea that science would displace morality but also he opposed the idea thatmorality could
replace science. According to Zhu, the advantage of science was that "rational and
analytical thinking could isolate patterns in a chaotic situation and allow for the action of
feasible programs without emotional distractions."28 In his view, a scientific way of
thinking was particularly needed in China. "The characteristics of the Chinese way of
thinking tend to be good at synthesising but poor at analysing; good at deduction but poor
in induction. As a result, systematic theories were not fully developed in China. China's
less concrete theories tend to cause intellectual confusion which consequently gives rise
to misjudgement."29 To avoid this "national weakness" which affected the way of thinking
of talented leaders, Zhu strongly advocated scientific training at school.
Zhu continued to discuss what measures would need to be taken by the academy to
ensure the development of these qualities. Instead ofencouraging students to develop the
pure knowledge of these qualities through the process ofdeductive reasoning in the sense
ofPlato's way of thinking developed in his school, the Lida Academy adopted a different
26 See Zhu Guangqian, "Siren chuangxiao jihua" [My plan for founding a school], in QJ, vol. 8, pp.
112-113.




method that combined knowledge learning with practice. The teachers and students were
required to work occasionally in a nearby farm established by some anarchist educators.
At the same time, they were encouraged to use their holidays to go among ordinary people
"to make friends with them, persuade them to become organised for public benefit and
talk to them in plain language on science and politics in order for them to learn more about
public hygiene, the mechanism of the national organisations as well as their rights and
duties."30 This effort ofcombining education with social practice as well as physical labour
was intended to build the personality and practical character of students for the future and
is in line with the Confucian worldly way ofpersonal cultivation, which presupposes that
"only the human being who places themselves in the midst ofworldly affairs is capable
of transforming other people."31 That is to say, the students of Lida Academy were not
trained to be simply another group of intellectual elite but problem-solving leaders for
society. "Our society desperately needs help. We hope that our students will become the
leaders of the future society.... (To realise this goal) they should be prepared while they
are still at school. That is why we encourage them to get involved in social affairs."32
It seems that by involving the teachers and the students in physical work as well as
social affairs, the academy attempted to avoid the possible disconnection of one's inner
world and the outer world, knowledge and action, theory and practice.33 The unification
of these contrasting elements was the ultimate principle of the Confucian doctrines,
because, as Hall and Ames point out, "the mutual immanence of the primary elements of
the Confucian cosmos - heaven, earth and man - precludes the use of the language of
transcendence and therefore renders any sort of dualistic contrast pernicious."34
30 ibid., p. 115.
31 The Doctrine ofthe Mean, 1, trans, by Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, pp.
95-96.
32 Zhu Guangqian, "Siren chuangxiao jihua" [My plan for founding a school], in QJ, vol. 8, p. 116.
33 The possible similarity between Zhu's emphasis ofunity ofknowledge and action (or knowing and
doing), an that of Confucians, will be further discussed in the following chapters.
34 David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (New York: State University ofNew York
Press, 1987), p. 17.
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To advance the aims of the academy broadly in society, Zhu and his colleagues also
established a publishing house called Kaiming shudian [Enlightenment
publishing house] as well as a magazine called Yiban — iz. [Ordinary issues] which later
changed its name to Zhongxuesheng ^[Secondary school student]. According to
Zhu, despite the fact that the school was ideologically different from the government-run
schools, it eventually became successful. "The educational liberalism practised at Lida
Academy brought fresh air to a society which had been depressed by the despotic rule of
the NorthernWarlord government. Consequently the academy attracted many moderate
and liberal-minded youths who were keen to enrol."35
It can be said that Zhu's social practice of founding a non-government school in order
to establish his educational ideal may indicate the tendency of anarchism and liberalism
which was widely practised by some intellectuals of the early 1920s. However, Zhu's idea
of education as a way of changing society reflected the fact that like many of his
contemporaries he had not gone far from the traditional ethical theme. It seems that it was
Confucian ethical principles that led him to the process of seeking a way to transform the
deep structure of the Chinese mind.
For instance, his emphasis on character cultivation, the combination of theory and
practice and an equal relationship between teacher and student is in tune with the
educational principles of Liang Shuming's commune-cum-academy which followed a
Confucian approach to education.36 Liang's concept of rural reconstruction by linking the
intellectuals to the working people was also intended to create "an underlying moral
consensus and spiritual solidarity," and his advocacy of "the small face-to-face group, built
around the traditional teacher-student relationship, was to be the central agency of spiritual
transformation. Through mutual criticism and encouragement group members would
35 Zhu Guangqian, "Huiyi Shanghai LidaXueyuan he Kaiming shudian" [Recollections ofShanghai
Lida Academy and Kaiming Publishing House], in QJ, vol. 10, pp. 521-522.
36 Liang Shuming established his experimental commune-cum-academy in 1922 in order to revive
Confucian values. He particularly followed the example of the Confucian teacher-student relationship
as the central idea ofspiritual transformation. See Guy Allito, The Last Confucian - LiangShuming
and the Chinese Dilemma ofModernity (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1979), pp. 137-138.
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cultivate their moral character and spiritual qualities, thus energising themselves for action.
They would also develop habits of cooperation and organisation for united efforts to
achieve common goals."37
2.3. Towards a New Philosophy of Life
Following the launch of the debate on science and humanity by Zhang Junmai
in 1923, many intellectuals turned their attention to the problems of spiritual and moral
life independent of science.38 This debate created a group of new traditionalists who
re-evaluated the quintessence of Chinese culture [guocui tH#]. While the new
traditionalists, unlike the pre-May Fourth movement traditionalists such as Lin Shu TMT,
Liu Shipei Jr'J and Liu Yazi #PiSL-f-, were mostly educated in the West and tended
to apply Western ideas to validate the Chinese philosophy of life academically, Zhu, on
the other hand, did not seem to be interested in the purely academic side of the debate at
the time. Instead he sought a philosophy of life in the light ofboth Confucian andWestern
ideas and applied it directly to Chinese reality.
It seems that as a teacher, Zhu was very concerned about the young people who had
become extremely low-spirited when the excitement of the May Fourth movement was
declining and the achievements of the New Culture movement deteriorated under the
corrupt and weak government. As part ofhis plan to create talented leaders for a healthy
society, he saw that it was important to transform the decadent tendency among young
people in addition to his institutional reforms in the school system.39 Although his stay
37 Guy Allito, "The Conservative as Sage: Liang Shuming," in Charlotte Furth ed., The Limits ofChange:
Essays on ConservativeAlternatives in Republican China (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University
Press, 1976), p. 232.
38 The debate was started by Zhang Junmai (Carson Chang), a professor of philosophy at Qinghua
University, in a lecture given on February 14, 1923. He "declared in his lecture that day that the
philosophy of life could in no manner be governed by scientific, deterministic principles, but that
it had its origin in the intuitive moral conscience ofhuman being under the impulsion ofthe free will."
See O. Briere, Fifty Years ofChinese Philosophy, 1898-1950, p. 29. Also see Chow Tse-tsung, The
May Fourth Movement, pp. 327-337.
39 An early expression ofZhu's concern about young people can be found in his essay "Xiaochu fanmen
38
at the Lida Academy lasted only a few months before he went to study in Europe, Zhu
dedicated much of his time and energy to offering advice on affairs concerning young
people. His involvement in giving spiritual and moral support to young people was
continuous and conscientious. Even after he left China, he did not stop writing about his
concerns for young people's lives.
In the magazine Yiban —fix. [Ordinary issues] from 1926 to 1928 a year after he arrived
in Edinburgh, he wrote twelve essays in the form of letters discussing the philosophy of
life.40 In these letters, particularly aimed at secondary school students, Zhu took the same
approach as in the Lida Academy and wrote in a friendly style starting with 'pengyou'
[Dear friend] and ending with 'ni de pengyou Guangqian' # 69 flFi if [Your friend
Guangqian], The message which Zhu tried to deliver was widely received among educated
youth in the 1920s.41
Shortly before he graduated from Hong Kong University in 1923, Zhu was already
aware that there was a gloomy mood prevalent among young people who faced perplexity
in their view of life. Zhu suggested:
Without a strong inner existence one tends to be vulnerable to changes of
outer environment. That is to say, when the circumstances are favourable for one's
ideal, one may be optimistic and full of visions; when circumstances are not favourable,
one may feel defeated and consequently pessimistic. Many people are originally
very determined to overcome their environment but end up being overcome by
their environment. We may say that this is because they are not determined enough.
But why aren't they? We may suggest that it is because their spirits are not able
to be detached from reality42
yu chaotuo xianshi" ffcM f5] [Dispelling frustration and transcending reality],
Xuesheng zazhi [Student magazine], vol. 10, no. 5 (Apr 1923), in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 88-95.
40 See Zhu Guangqian, Gei qingnian de shierfengxin lo ff-ft [Twelve letters to young
people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1929), in QJ, vol. 1.
41 According to Zhu, this series of letters published in book form in 1929 was so popular that he did
not have any difficulty in publishing his works thereafter. According to O. Briere, the book was printed
more than thirty times after it was first published in 1929. See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zibai" fr# tl
#7 [Autobiography], in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 4-5; and O. Briere, Fifty Years ofChinese Philosophy, pp. 96-97.
42 Zhu Guangqian, "Xiaochu fanmen yu chaotuo xianshi" [Dispelling frustration and transcending
reality], in QJ, vol. 8, pp. 90-91.
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Zhu did not think that detachment from reality was built on a coward's philosophy
of life and argued:
If one is able to detach oneself spiritually from reality, one will not be crushed
by the difficulties of reality because one will find comfort in the spiritual realm.
If one's spirit cannot be conquered by reality, then one will of course persist in
carrying on one's ambition to overcome one's environment.43
The spiritual realm in Zhu's view of life is religion in the first place. Zhu accepted
religion as a way of detaching oneself from reality. However, he did not seem to favour
it asmuch as art. He admitted that religion was not necessarily a good point ofhuman nature
since "it indicated the self-deceiving character ofhuman beings."44 It appears that he did
not reject the function of religion as a spiritual comfort for some people and yet did not
recommend it as highly as art. This tendency became more obvious as his theory developed.
In contrast, art, as a human creation, provides people with the opportunity to release
repressed vitality and elevate and purify emotions. In this way, human beings are not only
detached from reality butmore importantly, according to Zhu, see beauty in reality only
from a detached point of view:
Art not only enables one to detach oneself from reality but helps one to comprehend
beauty in reality and to enjoy an existential link with nature.45
Zhu's connection of reality with nature may be traced to Confucian thought. Tu
Wei-ming points out that the ConfucianWay is realised in the experience ofordinary human
existence, because "one's own existence, body and mind, provides the primary context
wherein theWay is pursued concretely.... The Way does not in itselfgive full expression
to humanity; it is through human effort that the Way is manifest."46 It seems that instead
of regarding art as a transcendental realm in the Kantian sense,47 Zhu held his notion of
43 Ibid., p. 91.
44 Ibid.
45 See ibid., p. 93.
46 Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, p. 67.
47 Strictly speaking, Kant himself did not employ art as a transcendental realm but Kant's notion of
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detachment from reality within the human world. In this regard, Zhu's notion ofdetachment
became an interrelated concept and implied human value. In doing so, Zhu was confident
of reality even though it was by no means perfect. In one of his essays written in 1924,
he summarised this idea:
If the world were perfect, how would we have the pleasure of achievement?
The world is beautiful because it has defects. A world with defects gives us hope
and imagination. In other words, an imperfect world means more potential. ... It
is in this imperfect world that prospects of perfection are inspirational just like
beauty which cannot be put into words.48
It can be seen that the source ofZhu's confidence in reality originates from confidence
in human value. In Zhu's philosophy of life, the concept of reality is not an ontological
entity that externally determines the fate ofhuman beings. In Zhu's understanding, if there
are no human concrete activities, reality is void. Therefore, when he said that reality is
beautiful, he was in fact pointing out that human beings create their own reality. Zhu treats
the relationship between human beings and nature or reality as an interrelated and mutual
existence. Zhu explained in another essay:
We are merely the slaves of nature. To overcome nature, we must obey nature.
Only when we violate nature, do we start to feel inadequate. ... Human beings
are inherently active, progressive and creative, which means that giving free control
to these qualities is to obey nature. Disturbing these qualities would damage the
vital nature of human beings and result in unhappiness.49
Here, an interrelated and adequate relationship between human beings and nature
or reality connects Zhu's theory to the fundamental Confucian approach. Namely, since
neither human beings nor nature are the creation of an inactive entity, they come into a
meaningful relationship through a continuous, holistic and dynamic process. Then human
'disinterest' has been invoked to support the 'art for art's sake' estimation of art. See David Cooper
ed., A Companion to Aesthetics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 23-25 and 250-254.
48 Zhu Guangqian, "Wuyan zhi mei" [Wordless beauty], Minduo, vol. 5, no. 5 (Jul 1924),
in QJ, vol. 1, p. 72.
49 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dong" tkM [About 'action'], Gei qingnian de shierfengxin T—Mit
[Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1929), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 12.
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beings can cultivate their sensitivity and deepen their feelings towards nature in this
process. As seen in the Doctrine ofthe Mean, "what Heaven [tian imparts to man is
called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way... Before the feelings of
pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called equilibrium [zhong , centrality,
mean]. When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree,
it is called harmony. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony its
universal path. When equilibrium and harmony are realised to the highest degree, heaven
and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish."50
According to Zhu, this equilibrium and harmony between humans and nature is
realised through their actual 'doing' (action). "The purpose of life is to live it."51 It is through
actually 'doing' things that human beings demonstrate their being and, consequently,
receive a sense of delight.52 In his writing, Zhu identified his concept with the Mencian
doctrine ofjinxing JiiT [fulfilment ofone's nature]. He claimed that "the concept ofjiwcing
deeply and profoundly illuminates the significance of human life."53 This is probably
because in the light of Mencius, human activities are not merely directed by blind or
instinctive impulse for survival but purposeful, imaginative and creative transformations
ofhuman beings and nature. Human activities therefore show a holistic process of learning
that consists of thinking and feeling as well as 'action'. "One who has fully developed his
mind knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven. By preserving one'smind
and nourishing one's nature one has the means to serve Heaven. When neither the brevity
nor the length ofa lifespan engenders doubts, and one cultivates one's person in an attitude
of expectancy, one has the means to establish one's destiny."54
50 The Doctrine ofthe Mean, 1, trans, by Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p.
98.
51 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dong" ik% [About 'action'] (1929), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 12.
52 See ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Mencius, 7A: 1., in William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom comp., Sources ofChinese Tradition:
From Earliest Times to 1600, vol. 1, p. 155.
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To know and understand one's nature, one must learn to cultivate oneself so that one
can fully realise those human possibilities in human nature.55 The moral significance here
lies in the fact that "if he (junzi [the morally exemplary man]) reveres virtue and
delights in righteousness, he can be content.... In obscurity a man makes perfect his own
person, but in prominence he makes perfect the whole Empire as well."56 In TuWei-ming's
interpretation, this process "opens oneselfup to an ever broadening and deepening horizon
of values shared by the enlarging community of like-minded moral persons. This is a
concrete path leading towards a universalisable experience of personal identity and
communication."57
In the light ofTu's interpretation, Zhu's concept of'action' (doing) [dong%\ as making
a process of human natural existence must involve conscious learning since pursuing
progress and being creative are also a human being's given nature.58 In another essay, Zhu's
idea ofcombining 'action' with tranquillity \jing -%?] as an interrelated human experience
gave his readers a deeper understanding of his view of life: "Enjoyment of life can be
obtained half in 'action' and half in sensual and mental reflection.... Sometimes youmay
by accident rid yourselfofworldly affairs and indulge in imagination. You may suddenly
experience an inspiration and a stream of spiritual revelation."59 However, in Zhu's theory
tranquillity is not a gift but comes through intellectual cultivation. He cited the
Neo-Confucianist Zhu Xi (1130-1200)'s poem: "in a small pond the blue sky and
floating clouds can be seen; ifone asks how it can be, it is because the clear water comes
in."60 Zhu Guangqian explained that the pond symbolised the mind and the running water
symbolised taste.61 That is to say, one is able to understand the real beauty of life on a higher
55 See Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, p. 73.
56 Mencius, 7A:9., in D. C. Lau trans., Mencius (London: Penguin Book, 1970), p. 183.
57 Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, p. 73.
58 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dong" ikfy [About 'action'] (1929), p. 12.
59 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan jing" ifff [About 'tranquillity'], Gei qingnian de shierfengxin -f—
\t [Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 14-15.
60 Zhu Xi fcS;, "Guan shu you gan" tlllr#M [Feelings while reading], quoted from Zhu Guangqian,
"Tan jing" [About 'tranquillity'], in QJ, vol. 1, p. 15.
61 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan jing" [About 'tranquillity'], in QJ, vol. 1, p. 15.
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spiritual level because one constantly cultivates one's taste and taste has to be obtained
through learning. Therefore, tranquillity (tranquil observation) involves the constant
renewal of knowledge.
In another essay, Zhu urged young people to study and read as widely as possible
because reading helps one develop taste and resist vulgar material temptation.62 He
regretted that Chinese society was sick with hypocrisy, superficiality and insensibility.
As a result, the nation could not establish its dignity in the world. So he warned his young
readers of the danger at the "cross-road" and encouraged them to "sometimes look back
at the "ivory tower" after they graduated from school."63 He disagreed with a socialist
activist who claimed that two thousand years of study ofConfucius and Mencius had not
helped China at all and therefore, instead of studying, young people should join the
revolutionary movement.64 Zhu asserted that the success of the French Revolution was
not just because ofDanton and Robespierre's contributions but had also benefited from
Rousseau and Voltaire's thought. Zhu declared that "only if a revolution of thought
succeeds, can a revolution of the system turn into reality."65
In Zhu's philosophy of life learning plays a significant role in transforming the mind.
Yet, as observed above, in Zhu's view the learning process does not exclude 'action' (doing).
This is because Zhu did not treat tranquillity as a static state ofmind. He once noted that
a perfect form of life is "to attain the sublime while performing the common task."66 Thus,
62 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dushu" tkifi♦ [About reading], Gei qingnian de shierfengxin T
—iffs [Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 5-6.
63 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan shizi jietou" [Discussion of the cross-road], Gei qingnian de shier
fengxin [Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1929),
in QJ, vol. 1, pp.23-5.
64 This activist wasYun Daiying (1895-1931). He took an active part in the May Fourth
movement and was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. He was arrested
by the Nationalist government in May, 1930 and died in prison the next year. The comment he made
on Confucian studies was quoted by Zhu Guangqian in "Tan zhongxuesheng yu shehui yundong"
[Discussion of secondary school students and social movement], Gei qingnian
de shierfengxin +[Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian,
1929), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 18.
65 Ibid., p. 19.
66 Zhu Guangqian, "Dao Xia Menggang" [In mourning ofXiao Menggang], Lidaxueyuan
xiaokan [School magazine of Lida Academy] (May, 1926), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 76.
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'tranquillity' and 'action' are not separable and they both contribute to cultivate a personality.
In this way, both action and tranquillity are forms of knowledge which are achieved by
human beings through existential harmonisation between self and nature.
It would seem that Zhu's emphasis on the combination ofaction and tranquillity is
based precisely on the idea that through a human being's own physical practice and
theoretical reflection, they are capable of improving their own environment.
On the whole, the essays that Zhu wrote about the spiritual and emotional problems
ofyouth during the period from 1923 to 1926, showed his Confucian background as well
as Western influences. It is apparent that his faith in the intellectual transformation of
society through better education is very strong and his effort to establish a philosophy of
life in order to influence young people is also persistent. Although Zhu never explicitly
declared his underlying traditional attitude towards life as equilibrium and harmony
through his Middle Way inclination to Confucianism, it would become a starting point
for the future development ofhis thinking and affect both his Western studies and aesthetic
theorisation in later years.
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CHAPTER III
Studies in Europe and Encounter with European Thinkers
3.1. Subjects for Studies in Europe
After working a couple of years as an English teacher at Wusong State Secondary
School, near Shanghai, and Chunhui 4M? Secondary School in Shangyu -t-M, Zhejiang
province, Zhu had the opportunity to study in Europe after succeeding in an
examination sponsored by the Chinese government.1 In the summer of 1925 Zhu went
to Britain where he enrolled in the Faculty of Arts of the University of Edinburgh in
Scotland.2 He chose Edinburgh since not only had it been recommended by a Scottish
professor at Hong Kong University, Dr Simpson, whom he admired, as an excellent
academic institution for the humanities, but also because the university was located in a
non-industrial city which had a reputation as an academic centre.3
Zhu chose five subjects which he was most interested in: English literature,
philosophy, psychology, European ancient history and European history ofart.4 His choice
of subjects emphasised reading in the texts ofancient Greece and Rome, the Renaissance
and 19th century romanticism. Zhu's preference for European classicism revealed his lack
of interest in "modern culture" which, according to him, focused too much on "efficiency"
1 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zizhuan" # il# [Author's autobiography], in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 2-3;
Wang Youxin Xf&ttfc, Zhu Guangqian xueshu sixiangpingzhuan #T iflif [A critical
biography of Zhu Guangqian and his thought] (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999), pp.
20-25.
2 According to what he wrote in the First Matriculation Book 1925-1926, his contact address in
Edinburgh appeared as '7 Argyle Place.' He gave his permanent address as 'Lida Academy, Kiangwan'
(Jiangwan f), Shanghai. See First Matriculation Book 1925-1926, vol. 60, Edinburgh: The
University ofEdinburgh. Located in the Special Collections ofthe University ofEdinburgh Library.
No publication date and not paginated.
3 See Zhu Guangqian, "Huiyi ershiwu nian qian de Xianggang Daxue"
[In memory of Hong Kong University twenty-five years ago], Wewcue chuangkan vol.
3, no. 1 (May 1944), in QJ, vol. 9, pp. 185-186.
4 See Graduates in Arts 1928, Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh. Located in the Special
Collections Division ofEdinburgh University Library. No publication date and not paginated. Also
See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zizhuan" ff# # [Author's autobiography], in QJ, vol. 1, p. 3.
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and tended to show superficiality. He criticized the modern world for its loss of the specific
human elements of devotion and zeal, and expressed admiration for the spirituality,
harmony and tranquillity, deeply revealed in great works such as Venus de Milo,
Beethoven's concertos, Goethe's Faust and especially Leonardo da Vinci'sMona Lisa.5
In Zhu's view, although modern science brought convenience and happiness to the
humanworld, at the same time it produced the side effects of frivolity and perfunctoriness.
He thought what was missing in the modern concept of efficiency was an emphasis on
"human elements" embodied in the process ofan effort to achieve human ideals and hopes.
This process took not only the result but also the effort itself as the standard of success
because the effort affirmed human spirit and value irrespective of its success. And it was
in classical culture that such human efforts were cherished and flourished.6 He remarked
that what distinguished the cathedral of Notre Dame in Reims and the great Gothic
Cathedral ofNotre Dame in Amiens from the Empire State Building in New York was
that "the Empire State Building was merely commercial and functional whereas the
cathedrals built in the Middle Ages were infused with human efforts and enthusiasm."7
That was why it was in cathedrals not in steel buildings that people sought spiritual
consolation.
Zhu's preference for classical culture also extended to European romanticism. He
admired Goethe as well as the English romantic poets Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley
and Keats. He devoted much time and energy to the study of the theories of romanticism
and became increasingly convinced that human creativity not only "yielded beautiful
images (as emphasised by classicism) but also originated in true feelings (as emphasised
by romanticism)."8 Therefore, he dismissed the controversy between romanticism and
5 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan zai Lufuergong suode de yige ganxiang" JL'i"ftf#6'j —I®j®
[On an impression gained in the Louvre], Gei qingnian de shierfengxin .fY +—TMe [Twelve
letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 52-56.
6 See ibid., p. 52 and 55.
7 Ibid., p. 54.
8 Zhu Guangqian, "Shenme shi gudianzhuyi" ft&fL [What is classicism?], in Fu Donghua
ecL Wenxue baiti [One hundred questions of literature] (Shenghuo shudian, 1935),
in QJ, vol. 8, p. 388.
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classicism.9 Taking the approach of the Confucian "Middle Way," he saw mutual
complementarity between the two different literary trends in the same way that he found
balance in a combination of action and tranquillity. He claimed that classicism and
romanticism were correlated: "while classicism stressed harmony and unity in form,
romanticism emphasised emotional abundance and depth; while classicism focused on
discipline, romanticism admired freedom; while classicism sought tranquillity and
solemnity, romanticism sought inspiration and the free expression of emotions."10
As Nicholas V. Riasanovsky described, if romanticism was "linked especially to the
id in contrast to classicism which was linked to the superego,"11 Zhu believed that the unity
of the two in one holistic thinking being should not be epistemologically indescribable.
In fact, romanticism did not necessarily cut itselfclear of its classical humanist traditions
and vice versa. According to Zhu, "a first class artistic work should be a combination of
romanticism and classicism, that is true feelings expressed in beautiful forms."12 Itwould
seem then that Zhu's equal interest in both classicism and romanticism for their humanist
traits in their different aspects derives from his own intellectual inclination.
Since the May Fourth period, Zhu had harboured reservations about the ideas
proposed by prominent intellectuals such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Hu Shi, who
supported the superiority of science. Western positivism, pragmatism, materialism and
social Darwinism had been more popular than idealism in early 20th century China. On
the other hand, Zhu seemed to be equally persistent in his view ofsocial progress as amatter
ofpersonality refinement. Before going to Europe, he dedicated much time and energy
9 An antinomy between classicism and romanticism was "devised by Friedrich von Schlegel
(1772-1829) and expressed in Das Athenaeum (1798)." See J. A. Cuddon, Penguin Dictionary of
Literary Terms andLiterary Theory (Penguin Books, 1991 3rd edition), p. 150. There is an enormous
scholarly literature on the nature and definition ofclassicism and romanticism. Some scholars even
denied the validity of these terms. For a more general account of classicism and romanticism, see
Rene Wellek, Concepts ofCriticism, ed. Stephen G. Nichols Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963), pp. 128-221.
10 Zhu Guangqian, "Shenme shi gudianzhuyi" [What is classicism?], in QJ, vol. 8, in QJ, vol. 8, p.
387.
11 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, The Emergence ofRomanticism (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992), p. 69.
12 Zhu Guangqian, "Shenme shi gudianzhuyi" [What is classicism?], in QJ, vol. 8, p. 388.
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to the establishment of Lida Academy in order to promote his ideas not in external power
but in internal power, namely human initiative. This humanistic approach, which was
somewhat opposed to the scientific modernism advocated by many other Chinese
intellectuals, continued after Zhu arrived in Europe and influenced his choice of subjects
for study in Edinburgh. By attributing the value ofhumanity to European classical as well
as romantic literature and art, to some extent he found his native intellectual tradition
reinforced because both values adopted the human spirit of creativity.
The antinomy ofclassicism and romanticism seems to remind one ofZhu's ideal of
action complemented with tranquillity which is derived from the Chinese traditional notion
of the unity of knowledge and action.13 While reason, balance, objectivity, restraint and
adherence to form as pursued by classicism became the vital elements of tranquillity for
the purpose of comprehending the beauty of this world, emotion, imagination, individual
creativity and spirituality as emphasized in romanticism form the fundamental base for
action. Probably because of this similarity, Zhu did not seem to encounter problems in
treating both values in the same way. In one of the twelve letters to Chinese youth which
he wrote for Yiban — [Ordinary issues], the school magazine ofLida Academy, during
the first two years after arriving in Britain, he urged his young readers to read widely both
Chinese and European literature as a necessary step to intellectual and emotional
refinement ofpersonality.14 In the book list he made for young people, it is noticeable that
he put more weight on the classical and romantic literatures of both cultures. His
recommendations of traditional Chinese literature included the Guofeng HIS, [Airs of the
states] inShijing #!JL [The book ofsongs], Chuci [Songs ofChu], Shiji [Records
of the Grand Historian], Gushiyuan [The wellsprings of verse],15 Wenxuan XiH
13 Zhu's discussion of action and tranquillity can be found in his writings: "Tan dong" ik% [About
'action'] and "Tan jing" iMf [About 'tranquillity'], Gei qingnian de shierfengxin
[Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 11-13 and
pp. 14-17. For an account ofZhu's notion ofaction and tranquillity, see "2.3 Towards aNew Philosophy
of Life" in Chapter II in this thesis.
14 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dushu" t&if♦ [About reading], Gei qingnian de shierfengxin T"
—iHt [Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 5-10.
15 Gushiyuan is an anthology ofpre-Tang shi poetry compiled in the early Qing period by Shen Deqian
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[Anthology of literature],16 Shishuo xinyu [New account oftales ofthe world],17
Tao Yuanmingji %. [Collected works ofTao Yuanming], LiBaiji [Collected
works of Li Bai], Huajian ji jl fa] % [Among the Flowers Collection],18 Cixuan i*\it.
[Selections ofci poetry]19 and Honglou meng [The Dream of the red chamber].
Keats, Shelley, Coleridge, and Browning were his favourite European romantic poets and
the following European literary works were also included among his recommendations:
Sophocles' (495-405 B.C) seven tragedies,20 Shakespeare's Hamlet, King Lear and
Othello, Goethe's Faust, Ibsen's plays, Turgenev's Virgin Soil and Fathers and Sons,
Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, Flaubert's Madame Bovary and de Maupassant's
fiction.21
However, Zhu's interest did not seem to concentrate merely on the literary value of
these works. Since he had been preoccupied with ethical issues in China and had written
twelve letters for young people whom he expected to become the leaders of the future,
he appeared to be more concerned with finding an effective way for Chinese youth to save
themselves from spiritual crisis. Throughout the twelve letters, he tended to use European
(1673-1769). For a more detailed account, see William H. Nienhauser Jr. ed. and com., The
Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature (Bloomington, IL: Indiana University Press,
1986), pp. 491-492.
16 Wenxuan is a highly influential anthology of verse and prose compiled by Xiao Tong (501-531),
Crown Prince Zhaoming of the Liang dynasty which includes "thirty-eight genres and more
than 700 pieces written by 129 authors from the period of the Han through the Liang dynasties. The
work itself and its generic division provided models for subsequent anthologies." Nienhauser ed. and
com., The Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature, p. 891.
17 Shishuo xinyu is an anthology compiled under the patronage of the Liu-Song prince Liu Yiqing f'JALk
(403-444), which consists of "anecdotes, noteworthy conversations or remarks, and brief
characterisations ofhistorical persons who lived in the period between the declining years ofthe Latter
Han and the founding ofthe Liu-Song state (roughly A.D. 150-420)." Nienhauser ed. and com., The
Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature, pp. 704-705.
18 Huajianji is one of the oldest ci poetry collections, compiled during the Later Shu S] dynasty by
Zhao Chongzuo (934-965) and including five hundred poems, mainly concerning love and
separation. See Nienhauser ed. and com., The Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature,
pp. 441-442.
19 Cixuan, compiled by Zhang Huiyan 5l,|f (1761-1802) and his brother Zhang Qi ?fii# (1765-1833),
consists of 116 ci poems from the late Tang, Five Dynasties and Song periods. See Nienhauser ed.
and com., The Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature, p. 216.
20 The seven plays are Antigone, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, Ajax, The Trachiniae, Electra
and Philoctetes.
21 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dushu" f&it# [About reading], in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 8-9.
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examples in the context of his ethically oriented concerns. The fact that Zhu blended
European classical and romantic humanity with his ethical ideals indicates his inclination
to a universal aestheticism. With regard to the epistemological issue of romanticism,
Laurence S. Lockridge argues that many of the romanticists believed in "an
interdependency of the subjective and objective, of mind and nature."22 As Lockridge
points out, ifthe imagination emphasised by romanticists "is not an exclusively subjective
power; its sympathy leads the self towards the world," and if the sense of sympathy
"described by Coleridge and Shelley as an intense kind of knowing"23 can be therefore
identified with the humanist aspect of European classicism especially during the
Renaissance, it would seem that an appreciation ofuniversal beauty in any form ofhumanity
would help to create an aesthetic order of social existence 24 This seemed to be the message
that Zhu consistently tried to deliver in his twelve letters.
It may be worth noting that, like many of his contemporaries, Zhu had been
preoccupied with ethics in China before he went to Europe. Following his work at
the Lida Academy to help to heighten the state of mind through education in China,
and after arriving in Europe, he developed his view that life was a combination of
dong WJ [action or doing] and jing Sf [tranquil observation or tranquillity] which he
believed to be a harmonious mode of existence especially in an environment of political
and moral turmoil like China.25 His selection of undergraduate courses in European
classical and romantic literature showed his intellectual tendency to search for an answer
to human existence and human value. The intellectual environment in Europe in the
1920s provided him with an opportunity to implement his view of life through Western
thought, a desire which had grown since his days at Hong Kong University. Zhu became
22 Laurence S. Lockridge, The Ethics ofRomanticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
p. 70.
23 Ibid., p. 71.
24 For a more detailed account of the humanist aspect ofEuropean classicism, see Frederick B. Artz,
From the Renaissance to Romanticism: Trends in Style in Art, Literature, andMusic, 1300-1830
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), Chapter II and III.
25 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dong" tkfh [About 'action'] (1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 11-13 and "Tan
jing" iMf [About 'tranquillity'], in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 14-17.
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particularly interested in two philosophers in European modern history, namely Benedetto
Croce (1866-1952) and Friedrich W. Nietzsche (1844-1900).
3.2. Zhu Guangqian and Croce's Aesthetic Theory
During Zhu's first years in Europe, Croce was probably the first philosopher who
profoundly attracted his attention and affected his intellectual life. A lecturer in British
history, Mr Thomson who shared the same accommodation in Edinburgh, introduced
Croce and his theory. Thomson's discussions ofCroce's ideas impressed Zhu greatly.26
Zhu expressed his respect and admiration for Croce in an article of 1927. Ele claimed that
while he did not necessarily agree with Croce on every issue, he had never been so inspired
before.27 He stated that "since Aristotle Croce is the first philosopher to combine
philosophy brilliantly with literary criticism."28
Concerning this inspiration obtained from Croce, Mario Sabattini argues that "what
mainly interests Chu Kuang-ch'ien [Zhu Guangqian] is not so much their [Western
theories] specific content but the way they are broadly seen to hark back to ideas and notions
that are an established part ofChinese classical thought."29 There is no doubt that Sabattini's
comment illuminates the link between Zhu's Chinese background and his interpretation
26 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zhu Guangqian jiaoshou tan meixue" [Professor Zhu
Guangqian's talk on aesthetics], Meiyu Jiff, vol. 1 and 2 (1981) in QJ, vol. 10, p. 530.
27 See Zhu Guangqian, "Ouzhou jindai san da piping xuezhe (san) - Keluoqi" Hbflii/Eft-H-
(.H.) - itIf [Three great critical scholars ofmodern Europe - One: Benedetto Croce], Dongfang
zazhi HMfe [Eastern Miscellany], vol. 24, no. 15 (Aug 1927), in QJ, vol.8, pp. 229-246.
28 Ibid., p. 229.
29 Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsiieh," East and West, vol. 20,
no. 1/2 (March/June 1970), p. 179. For Sabattini's general view on Zhu Guangqian's aesthetic theories,
also see his two articles below: Mario Sabattini, "The Concept of'Aesthetic Experience' in the Theory
of Chu Kuang-ch'ien," Papers Presented to the XXI International Congress ofChinese Studies,
Senigallia 7-13 September 1969 (Roma-Napoli: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente
and Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1971), pp. 204-211; Maliao Sabadini "Lun
Zhu Guangqian xiansheng duiyu jianli xin jiazhi tixi de gongxian" iff jcikMPtifsLjj'in -fiiff
£ 6-JKHf [Zhu Guangqian's contribution to the construction ofa new value system], Zhongguo ren
de jiazhi guan - Guoji yantaohui lunwen ji (xia ce) T HAA-j/f-fiS-SS. - H ffPHj ijimX%. (Tflf)
(Taibei: Hanxue yanjiu zhongxin, 1992), pp. 769-781; "Chu Kuang-ch'ien and Croce," Tamkang
Review, vol. 23, nos. 1-4 (1992/93), pp. 601-626.
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ofWestern thought. However, Zhu's specific interpretation ofCroce's theories may suggest
something more than mere "formal" relation.
First ofall, as Wang Yuxiong points out, "Zhu's general approach is evidently based
on his way of thinking in which he is critically synthesising contending thoughts in order
to reach a common truth."30 This approach tends to embrace things in change and hence
see truth in many-sided instead ofone-sided reality.31 This means that Zhu's way of looking
at ideas was not motivated by an isolated and absolute truth, as traditional Chinese
philosophy believes rather in relative and correlative truth.32 In this way, it is quite possible
that the internal logic ofCroce's system is broken in order to establish a bigger truth. But
this does not mean that the truth adopted from Croce's system becomes invalid.
Secondly, Zhu's traditional intellectual background was not a static and unchangeable
state ofmind; it had extended to awider range ofthinking as a result ofhisWestern studies
at Hong Kong University. It seemed that Zhu's continuing concern about the condition
ofethics in China led him to seek the truth ofhuman existence and human value from both
East and West. His initial interest in human reality rather than metaphysics in the West
seems to explain why he was inspired by Croce's thought.
Croce's theories were unique in the early 20th century because in the development
ofWesternmodem thought they endeavoured to change the philosophical thinking mode
from dualism to monism, from otherworldly to this-worldly, from mysticism to realism,
from the static to the dynamic, and from the abstract to the concrete. On the whole, Croce
highlighted the freedom of humanity and endeavoured to criticise the tradition of
metaphysics.33 Therefore, as Angelo Crespi observes, "through the instrumentality of
30 Wang Yuxiong "Zhu Guangqian lun shenmei duixiang: 'yixiang' yu 'wuyi'"
'~st-1*.'#'#/ Zj' [Zhu Guangqian's discussion of the aesthetic object: 'image' and 'object B'], Fuyin
baokan ziliao: Meixue flTPfiU'l'^Th vol. 4 (1997), p. 9.
31 See Cheng Chung-ying, "Chinese Metaphysics as Non-Metaphysics: Confucian and Taoist Insights
into the Nature of Reality," in Robert E. Allinson ed., Understanding the Chinese Mind: The
Philosophical Roots (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 173-177.
32 See Wang Yuxiong if§Tj£, "Zhu Guangqian lun shenmei duixiang: 'yixiang' yu 'wuyi'" (1997), pp.
7-9.
33 Douglas R. Anderson, "Benedetto Croce," in David Cooper ed.,A Companion toAesthetics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992), pp. 96-99.
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Croce... man, as spirit, always carries his freedom and destiny within himself and, through
making nature and history the objects ofour thinking, we break their spell, we make them
ours."34 Croce dismisses metaphysics and materialism by saying that "ifbeing is conceived
as external to the human spirit, and knowledge as separable from its object, so much so
that the object could be without being known, it is evident that the existence of the object
becomes a position, or something placed before the spirit, given to the spirit, extraneous
to it, which the spirit would never appropriate to itselfunless itwould courageously swallow
the bitter morsel by an irrational act of faith."35
In the early decades of 20th century Europe where metaphysics faced a dilemma in
its search for the truth ofhuman existence, Croce's proposal to depart from the dualistic
way ofthinking toward amonistic approach was naturally appealing to a Chinese thinker
like Zhu. For Croce, the relation between spirit (mind) and nature is "no longer a dualistic
one ... but a unity in which spirit, for its own purposes, fashions the idea ofnature or the
external world, and thus any intrusion of transcendence is absolutely excluded."36 Zhu
similarly held a realistic point ofview toward life although it was more ethically oriented
than epistemologically focused. In another aspect, Zhu treated spiritual life as the creative
interaction of human beings with nature.37 Zhu's perception of nature may be different
from Croce's as the former accepted nature as homogeneous with human beings whereas
the latter regarded nature as a subjective category.
However, while Zhu's monistic concept ofhuman beings as an integral part ofnature
derives from traditional Chinese thinking which regards human beings and nature as an
organic whole regenerating itself through a dynamic process of infinite potential for
activity, development and creativity,38 Croce sheds light on the role that human beings
34 Angelo Crespi, Contemporary Thought ofItaly (London: William and Norgate Limited, 1926), p.
37.
35 Benedetto Croce, Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept, trans, by Douglas Ainslie (London:
MacMillan and Co. Limited, 1917), p. 172.
36 Benedetto Croce,MyPhilosophy and Other Essays on the Moral andPolitical Problems ofOur Time,
trans, by E. F. Carritt (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1949), p. 18.
37 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dong" ikfh [About 'action'] (1929), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 12.
38 For an assessment ofChinese traditional concepts of human beings and nature, see Tu Wei-ming,
54
play in forming the concrete world of experience at a different level of this complex
integration.39 In essence, Zhu's concept of human beings is not necessarily opposed to
Croce's. Since both theories are based on human reality excluding external or
transcendental causes, it may be more appropriate to mention that the common ground
between Zhu and Croce was to establish the value of humanity within the arena of
this-worldly affairs.
It seems that on this basis Zhu was most impressed with Croce's aesthetics, which
reflected his own view of life at a deeper level. Zhu's view of life aimed at a harmonious
combination ofaction and tranquillity which together formed the wholeness ofhuman life.
Croce's aesthetic theory intends to support the primordial and yet expressive mode of
human relationship with the world. In Croce's view, human beings intuit a particular image
through an actual experience and fulfil their nature ofbeing active and creative. By doing
this, human beings are afforded the concrete basis for conceptual thinking. Conceptual
thinking or theory and aesthetic activity or praxis form an interrelatedmovement pattern.
According to Crespi's interpretation, "praxis ever provides art and knowledge with new
material for expression, and philosophy and theory ever provide praxis with a new
groundwork for creating deeds, and so on ad infinitum through an historical process in
which the system of the ever recurrent forms and degrees of experience is cyclical, but
in which the content admits of indefinitely progressive enrichment."40 This reciprocal
connection of theory and praxis constructed in Croce's aesthetics gives logical foundation
to Zhu's concept of action and tranquillity which derives also from the ideal ofunity of
knowledge and action.
Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (New York: State UniversityOfNew York
Press, 1985), pp. 35-47. Also see Cheng Chung-ying, "Chinese Metaphysics as Non-Metaphysics:
Confucian and Daoist Insights into the Nature ofReality," in Robert E. Allinson ed., Understanding
the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, pp. 173-191.
39 See H. Wildon Carr, The Philosophy ofBenedetto Croce: The Problem ofArt andHistory (London:
MacMillan and Co. Limited, 1917), pp. 3-4.
40 Angelo Crespi, Contemporary Thought ofItaly, p. 64.
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On the other hand, Croce's notion of intuition as expression also gives Zhu confidence
about his own idea ofemotion as the fundamental application for human activities. Zhu's
notion ofemotion is also in association with Chinese traditional thought manifested both
in Confucianism and Taoism. In Kuang-ming Wu's words, emotion in Confucianism and
Taoism yields "a pervasive attitude and atmosphere in which one moves and has one's
being,"41 It also attracted attention in modern psychology such as abnormal psychology
and Freud's psychoanalysis for scientific evidence.
Zhu took a particular interest in abnormal psychology with its focus on the study of
the unconscious as opposed to the conscious. In an introductory essay on the subject in
1929, he claimed that "what abnormal psychology discovered by searching deep in human
mind was that the motive force \yuandongli tj] of the mind was not intellect but
instinct and emotion."42 This reconfirmed his view that emotional cultivation was the
fundamental step to spiritual wholeness because "emotions deep-rooted in the unconscious
were sublimated at the level of consciousness and formed inner mental motive force....
Rationality, on the other hand, floated on the surface of the conscious, unable to match
the dynamic shifting of feelings."43 After studying Freud's psychology, Zhu became
convinced that ifemotions, as the unconscious instinctwhich is suppressed in the id, are
not allowed cathartic discharge or sublimation [shenghua they will emerge in the
distorted form of physical symptoms such as hysteria and depression. As a result, the
dynamics and equilibrium of the mind will be inhibited.44
Zhu's belief in emotional cultivation as the initial requirement for a better society
was not only formed during the process ofhis involvement in the Lida Academy in China
41 Kuang-mingWu, "Chinese Aesthetics," in Robert E. Allinson ed., Understanding the ChineseMind:
The Philosophical Roots (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 236.
42 Zhu Guangqian, Biantai xinlixue paibie ^>A^'J [Schools of abnormal psychology]
(Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1930), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 85.
43 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan qing yu li" [Discussion of emotion and rationality], Gei qingnian
de shierfengxin 6([ T—TH& [Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian,
1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 41-42.
44 See Zhu Guangqian, "Fuluoyide de yinyishi shuo yu xinli fenxi"
[Freud's theory of the unconscious and psychoanalysis], Dongfang zazhi J&. dj vol. 18, no. 41
(July 1921), in QJ, vol.8, pp. 2-10.
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but reinforced by his study ofWestern culture, especially romantic literature and art. In
one of the twelve letters, he urged his readers to pay more attention to the cultivation of
the emotions because the emotions lead one to a better human existence and a better society
by fostering the mind. Therefore, he said "humanity \ren f—] as encouraged in Confucian
doctrine ismore morally truthful than the sense of righteousness £yi 4k] in Mencian doctrine
because whereas the latter is accompanied with rationality, the former appeals to the
emotions."45
Considering the context of the development ofZhu's notion of the emotions, it can
be said that he became attracted to Croce's aesthetics primarily due to the fact that Croce
tried to prove from an epistemological as well as historical point ofview that imagination
is the root of human knowledge and this theory supports Zhu's own conception of the
emotions. If in Croce's theory, "intuition is ... the kind ofknowledge which is aroused by
artistic nature which every man in some degree possesses by reason ofhis human nature,"46
Zhu's ideal of emotional cultivation for a better society receives more philosophical
support. In this sense emotional cultivation is not just amoral and psychological expedient
for a better society or for individual mental health, but indicates the great potentiality of
human beings. Moreover, Croce's notion of intuition as an image-forming activity which
fuses emotion and image into an organic whole47may have beenmore attractive to Zhu.
His strong interest in Chinese classical poetry afforded him more intellectual room to
understand the importance ofCroce's idea. The holistic characteristic ofChinese classical
poetry requires the structural entirety of an ideographic pattern including sound, vision
and rhythm. As Kuang-mingWu observes, "Chinese literature is a composition patterned
after music and dance; it is something rhythmic and auditory, in sympathy with the natural
rhythm inside our body and outside it.... There is, then, a felt unity of seeing and hearing
in Chinese literature."48 In On Poetry [Shi lun one ofhis important works completed
45 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan qing yu li," in QJ, vol. 1, p.46.
46 H. Wildon Carr, The Philosophy ofBenedetto Croce: The Problem ofArt and History, p. 70.
47 See Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science ofExpression andGeneral Linguistic, trans, by Douglas
Ainslie (London: Transaction Publishers, 1995), pp. 1-11.
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as a draft in Europe and published in the 1940s, Zhu tried to prove in the light ofCroce
that emotion or feeling is not some kind of vague perception or pure subjectivity but a
concrete process ofexpression.49 This means that, for emotion to be felt or expressed, it
has to be infused with image; "it has to be objectified. Poetic feeling, as alleged by some,
which cannot be expressed in language in a broad sense is not real emotion, but illusion
or vain fancy." According to Zhu, "if one is clearly aware of his emotions, he naturally
has the language to express it either directly or symbolically."50
Zhu did not deny that he had differences with Croce, although he did not fully
understand the theoretical conflict until later. One thing that Zhu could not accept in Croce's
theory was that intuition as expression becomes complete at the moment of infusion of
the emotion and the image. For the time being, he seemed to think that Croce's system could
be compromised by treating willing, feeling and thinking as different categories. Before
long, however, Zhu realised that such a compromise would notwork without taking human
beings as an organic being into consideration. Zhu recognised later that what could be
separated in theory were in fact inseparable.51 Thus, "aesthetic experience is not necessarily
pure intuitive knowledge without inter-relation to concepts."52
The problem is that while Croce intended to overcome the dualism that had dominated
Western thought for centuries, in the fundamental structure of Zhu's thinking things
external to the mind were not excluded in a dualistic sense. In Chinese traditional thought,
expressed in both Confucianism and Taoism, human beings are an integral part ofnature,
hence human beings and nature are treated holistically as two parts ofone entity, blending
with each other dynamically and constantly.53 Croce's idea that related nature to the
48 Kuang-ming Wu, "Chinese Aesthetics," in Robert E. Allinson ed., Understanding the Chinese Mind:
The Philosophical Roots, p. 243.
49 See Zhu Guangqian, Shi lun [On poetry] (Chongqing: Guomin tushu chubanshe, 1943), in QJ,
vol, 3, pp. 51-59.
50 Ibid, p. 62.
51 Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zibai" [Writer's preface]," Wenyi xinlixue [The
psychology of literature and art] (Shanghai: Kaiming Shudian, 1936), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 197-199.
52 Ibid, p. 198.
53 See Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit ofChinese Philosophy, trans, by E. R. Hughes (London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner, 1947), pp. 81-111.
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absolute area ofhuman mind may not have seemed perfect to Zhu because the empirical
side of thinking was not recognised. Zhu found some solution inmodern psychology with
which he was also enthusiastically involved. Although after some years of study he
expressed doubts if any school of psychology could provide defensible arguments for
spiritual phenomena,54 Zhu hoped to "form a comprehensive synthetic view in which
prejudices are wiped out and contradictions reconciled."55
Nevertheless, Zhu's preference for introspective psychology over experimental
psychology is clear. He complained that the Behaviourist and Gestalt schools of
experimental psychology relied exclusively on stimulus-response without any
consideration for the initiative of the mind.56 On the other hand, he took an interest in
subjective psychology, which dealt with sensations, perceptions, ideas, emotions and
volition despite being aware that such introspective psychology was vulnerable as theory
since it lacked physiological data as verifiable evidence.57 It can be seen that Zhu's interest
in modern psychology was one of his pragmatic projects to develop his concept of
humanity. However, since psychology was science and yet still struggled to answer the
questions ofhuman emotions in association withmind, Zhu was not satisfied with relying
on psychology.
3.3. Zhu Guangqian and Philosophy of Nietzsche
The other philosopher who caught Zhu's attention in Europe was Friedrich Nietzsche
(1844-1900). Many Chinese intellectuals from the May Fourth period onwards were also
54 See Zhu Guangqian, "Wanxingpai xinlixue zhi gailue ji qi piping" it%
[A critical introduction to Gestalt psychology], Dongfangzazhi ffM&, vol. 23, no. 14 (July 1926),
in QJ, vol.8, p. 155.
55 Chu Kwang-Tisien [Zhu Guangqian], The Psychology of Tragedy: A Critical Study of Various
Theories ofTragic Pleasure (Strasbourg: Librairie Universitaire d'Alsace, 1933), reprinted in Chu
Kwang-Tsien, The Psychology ofTragedy (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1987), p. 9. Unless
otherwise indicated, footnotes refer to the latter edition.
56 See Zhu Guangqian, Biantai xinlixuepaibie [Schools of abnormal psychology], in Q.J, vol. 1, p. 85.
and "Wanxingpai xinlixue zhi gailiie ji qi piping" [An introduction to Gestalt psychology and
criticism], in QJ, vol. 8, p. 168.
57 See Zhu Guangqian, Biantai xinlixuepaibie [Schools of abnormal psychology], in QJ, vol. 1, p. 147.
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drawn to Nietzsche although their interpretations and what they appreciated from
Nietzsche were various.58 It seems that the relations between West and East, Nietzsche
and Chinese intellectuals, may well indicate two possibilities. Apart from the possibility
that Nietzsche developed his system under the influence of traditional Chinese philosophy,
as his mentor Schopenhauer was influenced by Eastern ideas such as Taoism as well as
Buddhism,59 it is also possible that the cultural context of nineteenth-century Europe
fostered a certain philosophical idea. With the dehumanisation of industrialisation, the
corruption of religious authority and rationalism as opposed to romantic individualism,
Nietzsche's deep concern for the problem ofhuman existence and values in a transitional
time may havemany similarities with the concerns ofChinese intellectuals as China was
a nation in moral and spiritual crisis as well as political and economic turmoil.
Admittedly, Zhu's encounter with Nietzsche may show these possibilities, as with
other Chinese intellectuals of the May Fourth era, but on closer examination, we may
discern Zhu's original interpretation ofNietzsche's conceptions. By the mid-1920s when
Zhu became interested inNietzsche, Nietzsche's theories had for almost a decade inspired
writers such as Shen Yanbing (Mao Dun yf-M), Li Shicen ^45 Guo Moruo
!(LijGilr, Li Dazhao Lu Xun KiL and so on. According to Galik, they mainly drew
fromNietzsche a passion for the individual infused with a strong Darwinist influence:60
"shortly after Ch'en Tu-hsiu [Chen Duxiu and Lu Hsiin [Lu Xun], values, in
particular "ethical" and "aesthetic" values, became forgotten in China. The vision of a
happy future ofsocial and political progress dimmed everything else. The important aspect
ofmaterial existence overshadowed the not less important aspect of inner life."61 In Galik's
58 For instance, according to Raoul D. Findeisen, the Nietzsche whom Lu Xun read was the cultural
critic rather than the philosopher and Wang Guowei i HI (1877-1927)'s interest in Nietzsche could
be seen as pessimistic. See Raoul D. Findeisen, "The Burden of Culture: Glimpses at the Literary
Reception ofNietzsche in China," Asian andAfrican Studies, vol. 6 (1997), p. 77 and p. 84.
59 See Christopher Janaway, "Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator," in Christopher Janaway ed.,
Willing andNothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
60 See Marian Galik, "Nietzsche in China (1918-1925)," Nachrichten der GesellschaftfurNatur und
Volkerkunde Ostasiens, vol. 110 (1971), pp. 46-47.
61 Ibid., p. 47.
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view, Chinese intellectuals invariably failed to understand Nietzsche's concept of
Ubermensch [overman].62 Hence it was inevitable that some bias and distortion resulted.63
Galik maintains that Nietzsche's overman cannot be explained in terms ofDarwinism for
the overman "at any rate cannot be dissociated from the conception ofUberwindung, of
overcoming. Only the man that overcomes himself can become an overman."64 As a
consequence, "the will to power," as W. Kaufmann observes, "is a striving which cannot
be accurately described either as a will to affect others or as a will to realise oneself: it
is essentially a striving to transcend and perfect oneself."65 Therefore "Nietzsche does not
use the words "noble," "strong" in their currently accepted sense, but as expressing the
inner substance of life."66 It is probably on this point that Zhu differed significantly from
many other Chinese intellectuals.
As Jaroslav Prusek suggests, if "subjectivism and individualism, joined with
pessimism and a feeling for the tragedy of life, along with an inclination to revolt and even
the tendency to self-destruction, are the most characteristic qualities ofChinese literature
from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the outbreak ofwar with Japan,"67 then Zhu
appeared to be relatively calm. In terms ofthe way he set up Lida Academy and his views
of life expressed in the letters he wrote to Chinese youth, Zhu was more interested in seeking
balance and harmony in one's inner life despite the crisis ofreality. This led him to Nietzsche
in a different way from these iconoclasts in China.
62 Although in Galik's article and many other places, 'superman' is still used to denote the German term
Ubermensch, 'overman' will be used throughout this thesis as the translation of Obermensch as
'superman' may cause misunderstanding. Uber is the german equivalent ofthe prefix over- or trans-.
One ofthe examples ofprefixed words is Uberwindung [overcoming]. It is also because the meaning
of the Ubermensch in Nietzsche's works is that human beings need to overcome themselves and combat
nihilism.
63 See Marian Galik, "Nietzsche in China (1918-1925)," p. 13.
64 Ibid., p. 17.
65 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (New York: Meridian Books,
1966), p. 215.
66 Marian Galik, "Nietzsche in China," p. 24.
67 Jaroslav Prusek, The Lyrical and the Epic: Studies ofModern Chinese Literature, ed. by Leo Ou-fan
Lee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 3.
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While Zhu studied the cultivation of the individual mind to improve society,
Nietzsche was "a passionate believer in the capacity of the human mind to undergo
fundamental change and in the possibility of seeing things - all of life, all ofhistory, all
ofmen's relations with each other and with nature - in a fundamentally newway."68While
the sublimation of the emotions formed the key point ofZhu's view of life, for Nietzsche,
"art served to prepare for the emergence of a sensibility and manner of life reflecting the
highest potentiality ofhuman beings."69 Both Nietzsche and Zhu held a view of life that
accepted reality as imperfect on the one hand and embraced it wholeheartedly on the other.
In 1928, Zhu graduated from the University of Edinburgh with a Master of Arts
Ordinary degree.70 After a short period of further study at University College, London
(UCL), he went on to Strasbourg University, where he started to read for his doctoral
dissertation on the psychology of tragedy. The thesis was developed from a paper entitled
"Pleasure in Tragedy" which he read in 1927 to a discussion group ofadvanced students
in psychology at the University of Edinburgh. His professor of psychology, Dr James
Drever was so impressed that he suggested Zhu extend the paper into a thesis.71
It seems that Zhu's intellectual inclination and especially his view of life became
clarified in the process ofhis study of theories of tragedy, which marked a turning point
in his intellectual life.72 The reason Zhu gave for taking a special interest in theories of
tragedy was that "tragedy is infused through with a deep sense of fate, yet it exalts strenuous
efforts and heroic resistance. It shows the greatness and nobility ofman at the very moment
when it depicts his feebleness and his insignificance. There is in it an unmistakable note
68 J. P. Stern, A Study ofNietzsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 47.
69 Richard Schacht, "Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900)," in Robert Audi ed., The Cambridge
Dictionary ofPhilosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 2nd ed.), pp. 616-617.
70 In Scotland this was and still is the equivalent ofa B.A. in England. Zhu followed a three-year general
arts curriculum and did not take the degree with Honours, which required a fourth year. See Graduates
inArts 1928, Edinburgh: The University ofEdinburgh. Located in the Special Collections Division
ofEdinburgh University Library. No publication date and not paginated.
71 See Zhu Guangqian, "Preface," The Psychology ofTragedy (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1987),
p. 1.
72 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zhongyiben zixu" Ttf^ i) Jf [Writer's preface ofChinese version], Beiju
xinlixue [The psychology of tragedy] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1983), in
QJ, vol. 2, p. 209.
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ofpessimism and melancholy, and yet it inspires and uplifts us with its profound truth,
magnificent poetry and heroic grandeur."73
In studying theories of tragedy, Zhu encountered the writings ofArthur Schopenhauer
(1788-1860) andNietzsche. Zhu found Nietzsche's theory of tragedy especially inspiring
because he could identify with it more intrinsically than with other theories such as that
of Schopenhauer. Zhu pointed out that although both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche held
similar propositions that while "art reflects life, art is an escape from life," Nietzsche
surpassed Schopenhauer by "regenerating life in the wake ofartistic events with a higher
form of vitality and humanity."74 Unlike Schopenhauer who understood tragedy as the
depiction of the worthlessness of life and artistic contemplation as the resignation of
individual's will-to-live, Nietzsche combined an individual's will as a resource ofpain in
life with the experience obtained in art and treated the pain as a dynamically interactive
element.
Zhu explained that this is because "Nietzsche makes the distinction between the
universal primordial will which is reality and the individual objectification ofwill which
is phenomenon. The primordial will which animates the individual wills is always in the
state ofchange: its being consists in becoming... In the perpetual destruction of individual
wills we can see the eternal force of the primordial will, for destruction always leads to
regeneration."75 In this discussion, Zhu distinguished Nietzsche's concept of tragedy from
Schopenhauer's and claimed that Nietzsche's theory "is the utmost antithesis and antipode
to a pessimistic philosopher"76 like Schopenhauer. Impressed by Nietzsche's aesthetic
justification of life, Zhu declared that "life, though eternally rooted in pain, is after all worth
living, when you regard it with the eye of an artist."77
73 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 21.
74 Ibid., p. 144.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p. 145.
77 Ibid.
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Nietzsche's affirmative attitude towards life reassures Zhu's view of life which
derived from the Confucius notion ofzhi tianming [knowing Heaven'sWill or the
Mandate ofHeaven]78 and the Taoist notion ofqiwu [the equality of things].79 Similar
to Nietzsche who warned that when human beings used their energy for "egoistic aims
of individuals and peoples, then we realise that in that case universal wars ofannihilation
and continual migrations of peoples would probably have weakened the instinctive lust
for life to such an extent that suicide would have become a general custom,"80 Zhu regarded
the pains in life as human being's own consciousness of self-importance which caused an
off-balance with nature and asserted that "we are not born into this world for pleasure and
happiness; we are here to live a life following our heavenly endowed nature."81 In this
sense, Zhu's thinking was implemented by human active involvement as he also
emphasized that "the happiest event in one's life is the achievement of success after diligent
effort. If the world were flawless and perfect, one would not enjoy one's own creative
success."82
While Roger Ames observes an analogy between Nietzsche's "field and focus"
relationship of self and the cosmos and the Chinese traditional concept of dao-de itUi-
[the Way and its virtue], he points out that "de [personal virtue] is a means of interpreting
dao and making it determinate and unique. Hence, it is discriminatory. But it is also a
principle of synthesis and integration. While de is most often used to define dao as a
particular focus, this focus is elastic, and can be extended from its centre even to the extent
of embracing its whole."83 In the Confucian social and political model of humanity,
78 To know the Mandate ofHeaven is to follow the Way embedded in human nature and to cultivate
one's personal life by perfecting the universal virtues of wisdom, humanity and courage. See the
Doctrine oftheMean, 20, in Wing-tsit Chan trans, and comp., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy,
pp. 104-107.
79 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan rensheng yu wo" [About life and the self], Gei qingnian de shier
fengxin (1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 58-59.
80 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth ofTragedy, in Walter Kaufmann trans, and ed., Basic Writings of
Nietzsche (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), 96.
81 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan rensheng yu wo" [About life and the self], in QJ, vol. 1, p. 58.
82 Ibid., p. 60.
83 Roger T. Ames, "Nietzsche's 'Will to Power' and Chinese'Virtuality' [de]: A Comparative Study,"
in Graham Parkes ed., Nietzsche andAsian Thought, p. 137.
64
personal activity is consciously directed at integration with one's community, but humanity
starts from individuals. As the Analects states, "to discipline oneself and practise ritual
action is to realize one's humanity ... one's humanity emerges out of oneself: how could
it emerge out of others?"84 In this regard, "the particular person is the focus, and the
community is the field. As the pattern of one's relationships is extended and deepened,
one becomes increasingly definitive of humanity."85 "It is the person who extends dao,
not dao that extends the person."86
Taoism, which shares the same cultural origin as Confucianism,87 illuminates the
relationship ofdao and de, or the world and the self. Zhuangzi holds that "this man and
this kind ofde will enfold all things within itself as one."88 And this oneness, according
to Ames, "is the coherence discernible in the concrete particular rather than some systemic
unity. It is a harmonious order, a regularity, a discernible pattern that is emergent in the
process ofexistence which brings coherence to diversity, oneness to plurality, similarity
to difference."89 Based on Ames' interpretation, it is highly probable that Zhu was able
to adopt Nietzsche's system without having to negate his concept ofwill to power because
ofunderlying affinities between the Chinese traditional view ofhumanity held by Zhu and
Nietzsche's view of humanity. Zhu was able to integrate his own general view with
Nietzsche's. As Zou Shifang Uf-irZT and Wang Desheng observe, "Zhu's attraction
to Nietzsche was more spiritual than philosophical; it was his strong Confucian spirit that
84 Analects, 12:1, quoted from Roger T. Ames, "Nietzsche's 'Will to Power' and Chinese 'Virtuality'
[de]: A Comparative Study," p. 139.
85 Roger T. Ames, "Nietzsche's 'Will to Power' and Chinese 'Virtuality' [de]: A Comparative Study,"
p. 139.
86 Analects, 15:29, quoted from Roger T. Ames, ibid.
87 The divergence between Taoism and Confucianism does not lie in humanist inclination but distinctive
methods ofhow humanity is realised. As Hall and Ames observe, "The focus ofTaoism is to understand
humanity from the perspective of the unfolding pattern of existence, while the Confucian direction
is to pursue an understanding ofall existence from the human perspective." See David Hall and Roger
T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (New York: SUNY Press, 1987), p. 57.
88 Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi, in Burton Watson trans., The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 33.
89 Roger T. Ames, "Nietzsche's 'Will to Power' and Chinese 'Virtuality' [de\. A Comparative Study,"
p. 138.
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led him to Nietzsche." Zou further argues that "this spiritual link was based on a common
desire to elevate human life from the ethical to the aesthetical."90
Nietzsche's aesthetic attitude towards life was embodied in the dynamic duality of
the Dionysian and the Apollonian.91 Similarly, Zhu's aesthetic attitude towards life
belonged to a harmonious unity ofaction and tranquillity. The similarity between the two
approaches brought Zhu closer to Nietzsche, from whom he drew not only intellectual but
also emotional inspiration. In the Dionysian, Zhu noted that "man gives full rein to his
primitive instincts, and abandons himself with his fellow-revellers to riotous orgies of
wine, song, dance and sexual licence." Once human beings are engaged in such ecstatic
art "in a state ofmind akin to drunkenness," "all barriers between man and man are broken,
and once more man becomes one with nature and sinks himself in the mysterious primordial
unity."92
Zhu's notion ofaction, which is originally based on the Mencian concept ofjinxing
[fulfilment of one's nature],93 fulfils the purpose of illuminating the true value of
human life as expressing feelings through creative activities. Combining the concept of
jinxingwith Nietzsche's Dionysian power, Zhu found an aesthetic perspective to life and,
at the same time, a psychological aspect to art, namely empathic emotion \yiqing zuoyong
#'1If]]. This empathic emotion later became a part ofhis basic aesthetic theory later.
On the other hand, from the Apollonian, Zhu saw the other side of human beings:
"thoughtful, conservative and rational." In the state of intellectual harmony, Zhu says,
human beings "take a quiet though intense delight in contemplating the beauteous
appearance of the dream world. The follies ofmen, the tricks of fortune, indeed the whole
Divine Comedy of life, pass before him like entrancing shining pictures. The sight gives
90 Zou Shifang ilp-Tzr and Wang Desheng Zhu Guangqian, Zong Baihua lun f,
[On Zhu Guangqian and Zong Baihua] (Hong Kong: Xianggang xinwen chubanshe 1987), p. 26.
91 For a detailed assessment ofNietzsche's duality of the Dionysian and Apollonian, see Peter Putz,
"Nietzsche: Art and Intellectual Inquiry," in Malcolm Pasley ed., Nietzsche: Imagery and Thought,
A Collection ofEssays (London: Methuen, 1978), pp. 18-21.
92 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 138.
93 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dong" ikth [About 'action'] (1929), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 13.
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him delight and liberates him from the pain ofbecoming."94 By creating aworld of images
"in the state of rapt repose," human beings "value above all things measured limitation,
harmony, freedom from wider emotions, and philosophical calmness."95 It seems that
Nietzsche's idea of the Apollonian was again in tune with Zhu's notion of tranquillity
(tranquil observation). Tranquillity is a state ofmind without practical interests and focuses
on images. In this moment, one can come to apprehend nature and a sense of beauty.96
In his interpretation ofNietzsche's concept of the duality of the Dionysian and the
Apollonian, Zhu asserted that while Dionysian art involved human beings subjectively,
"Apollonian art objectifies the Dionysian feelings and holds them before the mind's eye
as pictures." In other words, "opposed in spirit as they are, they are yet complementary
each of the other."97 He also set his own notion of action and tranquillity to this type of
interactive relationship. He attributed the beauty of life equally to creative action and
aesthetic contemplation. However, Zhu was not interested in Nietzsche's metaphysics,
neither did he seem to be affected substantially by Nietzsche's speculation ofDionysian
art as escape from the pain ofbeing or Apollonian art as escape from the pain ofbecoming.98
Rather he was interested only in the ethical consequences of the two spirits and their
function in artistic appreciation. Therefore Zhu conceived the unity of the Dionysian and
the Apollonian in aesthetic contemplation in a more positive light. As suggested by Zhu,
the Apollonian, in uniting with the Dionysian, elevated human beings from a lower to higher
state ofmind. "Dionysus, the prototype of the tragic hero, is a symbol of the primordial
suffering as well as ofthe primordial unity. Touched by the magic wand ofApollo, he is
redeemed from suffering and becomes an Art-God."99
Itwas the concept ofaction and tranquillity in association with Nietzsche's Dionysian
and Apollonian powers that formed the foundation and boundary of Zhu's study of
94 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology of Tragedy, p. 139.
95 Ibid.
96 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan jing" [About 'tranquillity], in QJ, vol. 1, p. 15.
97 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 140.
98 See Peter Putz, "Nietzsche: Art and Intellectual Inquiry," p. 20.
99 See Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 142.
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aesthetics in the years to come. Affinities between his ideas and those of Croce and
Nietzsche are definite and far-reaching in the sense that a new humanist way of seeing
the world unites in their theories despite their different backgrounds. However, as soon
as a theory turns to abstract speculation, Zhu avoided its way of thinking.
Although Zhu began his study of aesthetics from as early as 1927, two years after
he arrived in Europe, he was later to claim in the preface ofhis book, Wenyi xinlixue xH'Ci
(1936), that he "had never dreamed of taking the road ofaesthetics."100 He explained
that he began to study aesthetics because his interest in literature, psychology and
philosophy logically led him to it. "Because I liked literature, I had to study literary criticism
as well as art and life, art and nature, content and form, language and thought; because
I liked psychology, I had to study the relations between imagination and feelings, the
psychological activities of artistic creation and appreciation, and individuality of taste;
because I liked philosophy, I had to study Kant, Hegel, Croce and so on. In this way,
aesthetics naturally became the medium for these studies."101
However, Zhu's analysis ignores the fact that his continuing emphasis on humanity
and emotional transformation for a better society since the early 1920s may well have
contributed to his adoption of the study of aesthetics. The subjects he chose, the
philosophers he preferred and his letters to Chinese youth show that by this time this move
to his study of aesthetics was not purely for academic reasons. His constant attention to
ethical affairs in China on the one side and humanist theories in the West on the other side
seemed to echo with each other around a certain category of intellectual inquiry.




Aesthetic Theory as Aesthetic Experience
4.1. Zhu's Pragmatic Approach to Aesthetics
While writing his doctoral dissertation on tragedy at the University of Strasbourg,
between 1929 and 1933, Zhu was simultaneously producing his most influential work,
Wenyi xinlixue [The psychology of literature and art] (1936).1 Zhu claimed
that his inspiration for writing a book about aesthetic theories was Professor Delacroix,
whose lecture on the psychology ofart in Paris led him to the study ofWestern aesthetic
theories.2 Although Zhu himself insisted that the book was intended to introduce Western
aesthetic theories to China,3 the book shows that he set up his own theoretical system, as
he selected particular Western theories to suit his own preferences.
The method that Zhu adopted to deal with aesthetic issues was of induction from facts
rather than deduction from pre-conceived premises. In his doctoral dissertation The
Psychology ofTragedy: A Critical Study ofVarious Theories ofTragic Pleasure (1933),
he provides a critical account of the prevailing European approach to the study of tragedy.
In the first place, tragedy is a concrete thing and not a mere abstract notion.
Consequently any adequate discussion of the problem of tragedy must be based
on facts, i.e. on the world's masterpieces of tragedy. It is a common mistake, however,
among philosophers to start at the wrong end. Instead of building up a theory
inductively from a careful examination of the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles,
1 The first draft of this book was completed in Europe while completing his doctoral dissertation. Zhu
Ziqing il >!", a renowned writer, wrote a preface for it in London in 1932. After returning to China,
Zhu revised it and added five more chapters during the period when he taught using this draft at Qinghua
University and Peking University. It was published in 1936. See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zibai" fT#
t\ & [Writer's preface], Wenyi xinlixue [The psychology of literature and art] (Shanghai:
Kaiming shudian, 1936), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 197-198.
2 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zizhuan" ff# £l # [Writer's autobiography], Yiwen zatan
[Informal talking about literature and art] (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1981), pp. 280-287, in
QJ, vol. 1, p. 4.
3 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zhu Guangqian jiaoshou tan meixue" [Professor Zhu
Guangqian's talk on aesthetics],Meiyu JCM, nos. 1 and 2 (1981), mQJ, vol. 10, p. 533 and "Guanyu
wo deMeixue wenji dejidian shuoming" [Some explanations to my
Collected Essays on Aesthetics], Shulin iSTf, no. 1 (1982), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 566.
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Shakespeare, Racine and other great tragic poets, they deduce it a priori from
some pre-conceived philosophical system. They set out with a major metaphysical
premise, and, to prove it, they give tragedy as a particular instance. But in doing
so, they use that very premise to explain the nature of tragedy, forgetting that
it is the premise itself which requires demonstration.4
In other words, Zhu argues that the problem with a major metaphysical premise is
that the premise itself has not been proved to be true and thus requires demonstration.
However, since human beings are restricted within their own physical form, they can never
prove, but can only assume, the truthfulness of a metaphysical premise; for Zhu, this is
unreliable. In particular, he notes that those theories which have major metaphysical
premises as points ofdeparture tend to be "ill at ease when they descend from Heaven and
try their strength at individual concrete problems," because these theories depend on "an
abstract logical notion of causality." However, "in a world like ours where every event
is inextricably related to an infinite mass ofother events and where the whole determines
the parts, there are no more isolated solitary causes than there are isolated solitary effects."5
Therefore, concrete and describable instances that are factually related are more
reliable sources for a general truth, whereas deductions a priori from pre-conceived
premises are, for Zhu, mere "phantoms" and cannot be trusted. Zhu claims that if he
followed "an abstract logical notion ofcausality," he would end up "taking sides with one
or the other and be left with no middle course." However, he believes that "truth lies
elsewhere" - namely in the overlapping area where the different schools refuse to
compromise. Zhu thus sees it as necessary for him "to form a comprehensive synthetic
view in which prejudices are wiped out and contradictions reconciled."6
Following this approach, he asserts in the preface of Wenyi xinlixue
(1936) that his intention is to "discard every philosophical prejudice and treat artistic
creation and appreciation as psychological facts from which theories are drawn inductively
4 Zhu Guangqian, "Chapter I Introduction: Definition ofthe Problem and a Forecast ofOur Programme,"
The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 8.
6 Ibid., p. 9.
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to be applied in literary criticism."7 Zhu's focus on psychological facts and distinctive
in-depth study of aesthetics, as Wen Rumin observes, was unusual and unique in 1920s
and 1930s China because most critics and theorists at that time concentrated more on
literary reviews and debates than on theoretical study of literary criticism, and their
approaches were dominated by abstract deduction based on metaphysical premises.8
Zhu's words in the introduction of The Psychology ofTragedy and the preface ofhis
Wenyi xinlixue indicate that Zhu made a conscious effort to develop his
methodology before starting his theoretical inquiry. This effort shows that his underlying
attitude was moulded in China and encouraged by the intellectual transition in 1920s
Europe.
On the one hand, Zhu's pragmatic methodology ofpreferring facts to pre-conceived
premises can be linked to traditional Chinese modes of thinking. According to Chung-Ying
Cheng, unlike Western philosophical traditions that were inclined to pursue ontological
being, the traditional Chinese philosophy searched for a balanced relationship between
nature and human beings, and whole and part.9 In light of this approach, all knowledge
starts from "the primordial existential situation of a human person when he finds himself
in a network of relationships. A human person in such a network finds that he is related
to other persons and things in the world, to nature (heaven and earth) and to the world as
a whole (including things he may not understand)."10 From the same perspective, Hall and
Ames also point out that it is through the process of interrelating with other individuals
and the world as awhole that human beings make sense ofhuman society. Classical Chinese
philosophy, in particular Confucianism, is "more concerned with an explication of the
7 Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zibai" [Writer's preface], Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol.
1, P- 197.
8 See Wen Rumin "Zhu Guangqian: zhijue lun meixuejianjiazhongde piping lilun"
$S.ik [Zhu Guangqian's literary criticism embodied in the aesthetic theory
of intuition], Zhongguo xiandai wenxue piping shi f tif jt [A history of modern
Chinese literary criticism] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1993), pp. 249-250.
9 See Cheng Chung-ying, "Chinese Metaphysics as Non-Metaphysics: Confucian and Taoist Insights
into the Nature of Reality," in Robert E. Allinson ed., Understanding the Chinese Mind: The
Philosophical Roots (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 167.
10 Ibid., p. 169.
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activities of specific persons in particular contexts," and does not propose any knowledge
beyond human events.11
On the other hand, the philosophical transition of methodology in 1920s Europe
provided an encouraging environment for Zhu to implement his practical approach. After
decades ofrationalist influence in the West under which reason was predominant over the
senses, apriori over aposteriori, deduction over induction, the 20th century schools of
philosophy shared a common feature ofdrifting away from those uncertain and "nebulous
assumptions about the ultimate nature of existence" and "disputable hypotheses of
metaphysics."12 Under the achievements of science in physics, biology, physiology and
psychology, the modern philosophical schools tended to give priority to the process of
events and hence incorporated all the facts in their theorisation.13 Moreover, modern
pragmatism from America, which represents this theoretical trend, was exerted on "the
reciprocity of theory and praxis, knowledge and action, facts and values."14 This indicated
a new perspective ofhuman experience in the Western mind. At the same time, experience
is construed as "the ongoing transaction of organism and environment, i. e., both subject
and the object are constituted in the process" of interrelating,15 in many ways resembling
traditional Chinese thought.16
These two intellectual backgrounds in methodology, namely traditional Chinese
thought and the newly developed inclination towards inductive and empirical studies in
Europe, provided Zhu with a significant opportunity for the development ofhis study of
aesthetics. Although Zhu never overtly acknowledged this environment, or may not even
have been conscious of it, the fact that he was able to adopt the prevailing theories of
11 See David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 15.
12 William Listowel, Modern Aesthetics: A Historical introduction (New York: Teachers College Press,
1967), p. xi.
13 See ibid.
14 Charlene H. Seigfried, "Pragmatism," in Robert Audi ed., The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 2nd ed.), p. 730.
15 Ibid.
16 For a comparative study of pragmatism and Chinese traditional thinking, see David Hall, The
Uncertain Phoenix (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 169-228.
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aesthetics as the constituent parts of his aesthetic theory, allows the possibility of some
theoretical connections.
As Sabattini argues, it can be seen that Zhu's proposal to maintain a 'middle course'
when confronting various aesthetic theories in order "to form a comprehensive synthetic
view in which prejudices are wiped out and contradictions reconciled,"17 is eclectic.18
However, Zhu defended his attitude in The Psychology ofTragedy (1933), which he wrote
at around the same time as he wrote the first draft ofWenyi xinlixue (1936),
by saying the following:
The enjoyment of tragedy is a complex phenomenon to which no single cause
can be assigned as sufficient. This explains the fact that, though none of the previous
theories of tragedy can be taken as satisfactory, yet almost every one of them
has some grain of truth in it. They are not so much false as inadequate. The realisation
of this fact has led us to the conviction that the best way of studying the problem
of tragic pleasure is to examine impartially previous theories and sift out what
is true in each of them.19
Methodologically, Zhu's open-mindedness appears to correspond to the Doctrine of
the Mean which assumes that all diversities are polarised and yet interrelated, and thus
mutually implementing, based on the traditional Chinese conception of yin Pli and yang
P#.20 In the Doctrine of the Mean, "the Way of Heaven and Earth may be completely
described in one sentence: they are without any doubleness and so they produce things
in an unfathomable way. The Way ofHeaven and Earth is extensive, deep, high, brilliant,
infinite and lasting."21
17 Zhu Guangqian, "Chapter I Introduction: Definition of the Problem and a Forecast of Our
Programme," The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 9.
18 Mario Sabattini believes that Zhu Guangqian's synthetic approach to various theories is eclectic and
he seems to disagree with Zhu's method. See Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's
Wen-i hsin-li-hsueh," East and West, vol. 20, nos. 1-2 (March-June 1970), p. 179. For an account
of Zhu's eclecticism, see also Bonnie S. McDougall, "The View from the Leaning Tower: Zhu
Guangqian on Aesthetics and Society in the Nineteen-twenties and Thirties," in Goran
Malmqvist ed., Modern Chinese Literature and its Social Context, Nobel Symposium No. 32
(Stockholm, 1977), p. 76-122.
19 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 9.
20 In David Hall's study, "yin does not transcend yang, nor vice versa. Yin is always 'becomingyawg'and
yang is always 'becomingym;' night is always 'becoming day' and day is always 'becoming night.'"
See David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 17.
21 The Doctrine ofthe Mean, 1, trans, by Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p.
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Adopting this traditional Chinese methodology, Zhu planned, in his book Wenyi
xinlixue to establish an aesthetic system that accommodates both
philosophical and psychological theories regardless of where they are from and how
controversial they may be, as long as they are reliable concrete aesthetic phenomena.22
That is to say, he would look at theories in terms ofaesthetic facts, rather than aesthetic
facts in terms of theories.
4.2. Aesthetic Experience as the Starting Point
After justifying the decision to base his theory on concrete facts instead ofabstract
premises, Zhu started his study of aesthetics by giving priority to an examination of
particular aesthetic experiences. Zhu stated:
As psychology is the science of mind as well as of external behaviour, introspective
evidences should never be ignored ... In aesthetic response especially, one can
never do away with the subjective element. ... Any aesthetic theory without some
personal aesthetic experience as its basis would be nothing short of dishonesty.23
To define an aesthetic experience, he first provided some examples which would pave
the way for further conceptualisation. He observed that aesthetic experience was actually
a series of psychological activities which occur when we appreciatively contemplate
natural scenery or an artistic work. He gave the following example: on a warm sunny day
with a soft breeze, one may feel relaxed. Then one may see a bright and colourful world:
flowers smiling at the sun, birds singing clear and melodious songs. Zhu explained that
the beautiful image that forms in the beholder's mind at this moment brings them to an
emotional enlightenment, that is, an aesthetic experience.24
109.
22 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zibai" [Writer's preface], Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ,
vol. 1, p. 197.
23 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 12.
24 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 205.
74
The same experience can also be achieved in art and literature according to Zhu. He
argued that "when one reads the lines ofWang Wei's (701-760) poem xing lan ti niao
huan, zuojiu luo hua duo#HI^ ^ [at dusk, the chirping birds disperse,
after sitting for a while, many flowers fall], one feels that one is in the same position as
Wang Wei and appreciating this tranquil atmosphere."25 This is also an aesthetic
experience. Zhu could see and, through his examples, indicated that aesthetic experience
achieved either through the appreciation ofnatural scenery or through art involves a number
of psychological moments: the moment of perception, the moment of intuition and the
moment of contemplation. Zhu observed:
If one feels something is beautiful, it is because one can see a concrete image
or a fresh picture with the mind's eye. This image or picture will suddenly occupy
one's whole consciousness, enabling one to focus one's attention on contemplating
it, so much so that one temporarily forgets other things normally related to it.26
Nevertheless, why human beings are suddenly able to attain a state of pure
contemplation and how this is related to other psychological moments require further
investigation.
At first, Zhu believed that Croce's notion of'intuition as expression' could solve this
problem, although he found later that the underlying differences between Croce's and his
fundamental approaches lay in the constant and dynamic interrelation of theoretical
knowledge and practical knowledge in human beings who are comprehended as an organic
being. Before he recognised these differences, Zhu seemed to be convinced by Croce's
theory in which the human way ofknowing the world comes in two forms, one intuitive
[zhijue de ut.'jft^J], the other logical [mingli de & 6-J]. While the former covers
knowledge ofparticulars or images, the latter covers universals or concepts. In Croce's
system, the intuitive way ofknowing is synonymous with aesthetic activity and regarded
25 Ibid., p. 206. The title of the poem by Wang Wei is "Cong Qi wang guo Yang shi bie ye ying jiao"
fk^ij [Written at the prince's command on the occasion of the prince ofQi's visit
to officer Yang's villa], in WangWei comp., Wang Youchengjijianzhu i [An annotated
collection ofWang Youcheng] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1972), p. 115.
26 Ibid., p. 209.
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as the autonomous degree of experience. Croce claims that from this point, human beings
undertake a spiritual mastery of the world which constitutes humanity.27
Most likely because ofCroce's affirmation ofthis-worldliness and the psychological
role ofhuman beings in aesthetic experience, Zhu was confident to apply Croce's concept
of 'intuition as expression' to aesthetic phenomena which are differentiated from
conceptual thinking and involve nothing but image.28 For instance, a plum blossom may
stimulate three different attitudes. Thinking of its name, biological category, shape,
features, growing conditions and growth period is a scientific attitude. Thinking of its usage
and commercial value for the purpose of either trading it for profit or presenting it as a
gift is a utilitarian attitude. However, differing from these two attitudes which apply logical
thinking, an aesthetic attitude treats the plum blossom as a pure and isolated image,
appreciating and contemplating it disinterestedly [wu suo wei erwei de guanshang %
rft "If], because what interests the aesthetic beholder is neither the characteristics
nor the value, but the beauty of the plum blossom.29
Zhu argues that because the consciousness of the beholder is fully occupied with a
whole but simple image, the beholder forgets not only the relational reality but also his
own self: "in pure intuition, there is no consciousness of self."30 Subsequently, the image
achieved in aesthetic experience becomes an independent and autonomous world.
However, Zhu's notion of intuition in aesthetic experience appears to be preceded by his
intellectual maturation. Although this concept was clarified some years later after he
returned to China,31 it seems that he took it for granted that intuition which produces the
image in aesthetic experience implies epistemological and practical unity. This is shown
in several of his remarks.
27 See Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science ofExpression andGeneral Linguistic, trans, by Douglas
Ainslie (London: Transaction Publishers, 1995), pp. 1-23. Also see Angelo Crespi, Contemporary
Thought ofItaly (London: William and Norgate Limited, 1926), pp. 70-73.
28 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 209.
29 See ibid., pp. 209-210.
30 Ibid., p. 213.
31 See Chapter V-3 and V-4 of this thesis.
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In one place, he maintained that what differentiates human beings from other living
creatures is that human beings not only follow the psychological pattern of stimuli [ciji
I'Jitf], perception [zhijue and reaction [fanying fO!|, but, more importantly, are
able to retain perceptions in the mind and to treat them as images . Zhu thought that the
ability of'introspection' [fawcing ] played a significant role in the process ofaesthetic
experience. In Zhu's account, "the ability of introspection is to hold back the instincts from
reacting to stimuli and instead contemplate the perceived. It is this ability ofhuman beings
that creates the beginning ofhuman civilisation, such as science, philosophy, religion, art,
and politics."32 The problem here is that this ability to introspection is applicable only on
empirical grounds, as Zhu claims that if introspection is "to contemplate an object as an
image" during the process ofperception, then the image must constitute the unity of the
object perceived and the feeling expressed.33
While intuition in Croce's theory excludes the interference of other knowledge such
as scientific, economic and moral concepts from an epistemological point ofview, Zhu's
concept of intuition, on the other hand, assumes other knowledge such as perception and
conception as its content. It therefore indicates the involvement of perception and
conception as assistants to attain a sense ofbeauty in the course of aesthetic experience.
Zhu's practical and empirical tendency is further revealed in another passage. Zhu
used a Taoist concept to present his comprehension of aesthetic intuition as if the Taoist
concept accommodates Croce's notion of intuition, and vice versa. Compared to the
Confucian ideal, Zhu seemed to think that the Taoist concept of intuition was more able
to fit the perfect unity of the subject and the object, human beings and nature.
This connection with Taoist tradition rather than Confucianism, which appears to
prevail in Zhu's theory, may require some justification, since the two seemingly different
ways of attaining the unity of human beings and nature may merge under one tradition.
The reason for this is that both Confucians and Taoists uphold the ideal of personal
32 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 211.
33 See ibid., pp. 210-211.
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cultivation by means of intellectual maturation. Xu Fuguan points out that in
achieving an elevated state of mind [fingjie htln], the Taoist idea in Zhuangzi
"philosophically and historically epitomises the emergence of aesthetic subjectivity in
China."34 Thus Taoism, as Wu Kuangming observes, "single-handedly influenced the
Chinese aesthetic experience more than anyone else."35 On the other hand, Confucian
tradition "swung between aesthetic subjectivity and moral subjectivity, namely the
goodness of benevolence (ren j—) and righteousness (yi Jk ) largely overpowering the
former."36
As a result, in order to prove the aesthetic experience as amoment of "disinterested
contemplation" [wu suo wei er wei de guanshang -^T/f r?rj 6-JMff ]37 of an image which
involves an elevated state ofmind, Zhu chose to cite Laozi s words by saying "wei
xue riyi, wei dao ri sun EI El jfi [the pursuit of learning is to increase day
after day. The pursuit of the dao it [the Way] is to decrease day after day]."38 Zhu
accordingly stated that to achieve aesthetic experience, one has to increase awareness of
the dao which makes intuitive image possible by decreasing intellectual knowledge. The
more one learns, Zhu claimed, the less easy it is to concentrate on the image itself. In
consequence, it is more difficult to achieve a real and pure sense ofbeauty.39 Paradoxically,
however, it is intellectual knowledge that enables human beings to make a deliberate effort
to increase awareness of the dao.
As Sabattini emphasised, the difference between Croce's concept of intuition and
Taoist intuition lies in the fact that whereas the former is something one begins with, the
34 Xu Fuguan M, Zhongguoyishujingshen T B [Spirit ofChinese aesthetics], quoted
in Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selflwod as Creative Transformation, p. 93.
35 Kuang-ming Wu, "Chinese Aesthetics," in Robert E. Allinson ed., Understanding the Chinese Mind:
The Philosophical Roots, p. 236.
36 Zhang Jiemo fklp "Daochan dui rujiameixue de chongji" [The impact
of Taoist Zen on Confucian aesthetics], in Zhexue yanjiu#%, vol. 9, (1998), p. 55.
37 This isZhu's own translation. Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p.
211
38 See ibid., p. 210 and Dao dejing iSTt-fi. [The Book oftheWay and its virtue], 48., trans, by Wing-tsit
Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 162.
39 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 210.
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latter is something one ends with.40 He explains that, in Taoist terms, the intuition in
aesthetic experience is substantiated with knowledge. It is knowledge of "a deeper sort,
a 'knowledge that is not knowledge' whichmay be obtained only by long preparation and
spiritual training. The ignorant person is incapable of achieving absolute happiness,
identifying himselfwith dao and thereby intuitively understanding the real essence of
things, because he is still sunk in his habitual existence, still fettered to certain instinctive
reactions that can remove him from truth, and still exposed to all the dangers inherent in
social life."41
However, this knowledge of a deeper sort does not mean that a long preparation and
spiritual training would transcend the intellectual knowledge in the aesthetic experience.
Since human beings and nature are considered in both Confucian and Taoist doctrines to
be a holistic entity and nature as in a flux of change, every phase of self-cultivation,
including a state of deepened subjectivity in aesthetic experience, is carried out in the
dynamic process ofuncertainty. Accordingly, aesthetic experience as intuitive knowledge
and other intellectual knowledge must continuously interact with each other.
Although Laozi's notion of forgetting knowledge and the consequent elevated state
ofmind seems to be anti-rationalistic, according to Chad Hansen, it designates a negative
form ofknowing, that is to say "knowing to do the opposite ofconventional wisdom" by
applying a reversal method.42 This means that interaction between the subject and the
object does not stop, even at the moment of intuition. Hence, Taoist intuition as a form
of knowing, especially in Zhuangzi, is still a practical rather than a cognitive process.
Hansen explains that "our actions involve constant feedback mechanisms which operate
at such speed and accuracy, that they resemble massive parallel processing."43 Hansen
draws an analogy between this cybernetic discovery and the traditional Chinese point of
40 See Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsiieh," p. 186.
41 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
42 See Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory ofChinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 224-225.
43 Ibid., p. 301.
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view that "focuses on guiding behaviour. The mind receives reality-feedback inputs and
processes them all at once (paralleling processing). The output is not a computational result
stored in some memory cell or reported out as information. The output is an action. When
we have learned to do anything like second nature, we constantly adjust our performance
to myriad clues in the environment."44
In the same way, aesthetic intuition involves the interchange of data concerning one's
intellectual accumulations of knowledge although one may not consciously be making
choices. This traditional way ofblending cognitive stages of knowledge into an organic
whole is present in Zhu's general view. For instance, Zhu's view of life, as discussed in
Chapter II,45 involves both the practical aspect (dong% [action]) and the theoretical aspect
(jing it [tranquil observation or tranquillity]) ofhuman experience. This also shows that
his comprehension of the aesthetic experience is based on an interrelated conception.
Sabattini therefore maintains that Zhu's concept of aesthetic experience does not mean
"an isolated and self-sufficient phenomenon, or ... an ingenuous way of seeing things."
He suggests that Zhu's concept also "presupposes a long spiritual preparation that may
vary from case to case, but will always directly or indirectly determine its varying degrees
of intensity."46
In yet another section, Zhu's inclination to treat aesthetic experience as an empirical
rather than epistemological category becomes even more apparent. He maintained that
image in aesthetic experience is not a static and fixed thing waiting to be contemplated
through intuition, but instead is the reflection of the contemplator's personality, emotion
and taste. Personality, emotion and taste vary from person to person, time to time and place
to place. The image therefore changes accordingly.47
Since Zhu looked upon aesthetic experience from the perspective ofhuman beings
associated with changing environments, aesthetic experience is no longer an independent
44 Ibid.
45 See "Chapter II 2.3. Towards a New Philosophy of Life" in this thesis.
46 Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsiieh," p. 182.
47 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 214-215.
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and autonomous realm as he had previously thought. Aesthetic experience becomes an
embodiment of concrete personality, emotion and taste which intertwines with life in a
dynamic manner. Such a relationship implies co-operation with other experiences to form
a unity of aesthetic phenomenon. Accordingly, so-called artistic intuition becomes a kind
of feeling of harmonious relation between contemplative human beings and the object
perceived. Zhu's realisation and acceptance of the correlation of these components in
aesthetic experience suggest an inseparability oftheoretical activity from practical activity
or, to be more specific, intuition from perception, conception and other human knowledge.
For Croce, intuition is independent and autonomous at any cognitive stage ofhuman
life. "Intuitive knowledge has no need of amaster, nor to lean upon any one; she does not
need to borrow the eyes ofothers for she has excellent eyes ofher own."48 As far as Croce
is concerned, intuition is conceived to be the most basic cognitive mode ofhuman spirit
and does not stand in a reciprocal position with other cognitive activities.
In Zhu's theory, however, theoretical activity and practical activity are interrelated
and the image can vary because of differences of personality, taste and emotion. If
personality, taste and emotion are closely associated with one's theoretical as well as
practical activities, then intuition that creates the image in aesthetic experience cannot be
perceived only as an apriori or fundamental cognitive form. Accordingly, intuition in
aesthetic experience has to be in constant exchange with other knowledge in order to
produce an image that contains the wholeness of one's personality, taste and emotion.
In other words, aesthetic experience is a process through which image is created by
intuition with the help of perception, conception and other knowledge. Zhu claimed:
Non-artistic image is not aesthetically synthesised. As a result, it is thrown
into chaos and shows a tendency to sudden mental or emotional instability. This
is normally called 'fancy' [huanxiang kjitS]- Artistic image that is aesthetically
synthesised, on the other hand, can develop from chaotic images to become an
organic entity, that is, a unity of variables. This is normally called 'imagination'
[xiangxiang itSIIFj. Non-artistic image is formless whereas artistic image has form,
48 Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science ofExpression and General Linguistic, trans, by Douglas
Ainslie, p. 2.
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which is the creation of the mind through communication with the object.49
Although Zhu may have been inspired by Croce, his understanding of aesthetic
experience was not in accordance with Croce's. This is because Croce's notion of intuition
is based on dualistic epistemology and is considered as a primitive and independent stage
ofknowledge. In addition, Croce's concept ofsubjectivity appeared to be inconsistentwith
Zhu's aesthetic theories, since Zhu's Confucian and Taoist inclination did not separate
subjectivity for amoment from objectivity. In his evaluation of the intellectual origins of
Zhu's thinking, Sabattini also emphasises the characteristics of Chinese thought: "the
Chinese conception of reality allows for no distinction between Man and Nature, between
theoretical and practical activity, between thought and action. In his inner development,
the individual moves pari passu with the organisation of society and the events of the
Cosmos in accordance with the laws regulating the harmony ofthe Whole ... This involves
an intimate union between thought and its practical expression, to such an extent that these
two stages seem logically indivisible."50 As a result, Zhu repeatedly showed variation away
from Croce's theory of pure knowledge as Zhu could not help relying on the Chinese
monistic view in order to rectify Croce's division of intuition and other cognitive ways
of human knowledge.
It is worth noting that, by the time he reached Chapter Six ofWenyi xinlixue
^ (1936), he shifted his attention to awider category ofartistic activity which possessed
reciprocal relationships with other cognitive activities. This is not, however, a drastic
change. The notion ofaesthetic experience as intuition of image [.xingxiang de zhijue If)
6\J ill'jfc] as an isolated phenomenon gradually evolved to the notion ofartistic activity as
expression ofemotion through a dynamic process, which seemed more suited to the deeper
structure of his thought.
49 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 354.
50 Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsiieh," p. 185.
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4.3. Psychological Theories for Aesthetic Experience
Zhu's approach to aesthetic experience as a process of constant exchange between
emotion and rationality, perception and conception, led his theory to the modem empirical
psychology which was inclined to study human consciousness and behaviour, inner
experience and outer experience, as an organic whole. Modem psychology tended to base
its discourse of the psychic state of individuals on a presupposition ofprevious experiences
since to empirical psychologists, experience offers facts which appear to them to be the
only way to approach human affairs.51 In relying on psychological data, Zhu believed that
he could eliminate passive sensual feelings from aesthetic experience and thus establish
the dominant position of reflective emotions. Subsequently, he would be able to mend the
flaw in Croce's notion of intuition although, according to Sabattini, Zhu's corrections to
some of Croce's key concepts "demolish the very foundations of Croce's theory."52
However, as Wang Yuxiong maintains, from Zhu's point ofview, Zhu would rather respect
psychological facts than be restricted by philosophical prejudice.53 In Zhu's own words,
"when 'plurality of causes' appears admissible, we shall not falsify concrete experience
by sticking to a particular abstract dogma that we have no interest to serve."54 Zhu may
have "demolished" the foundation ofCroce's system, but Zhu was nevertheless studying
aesthetic phenomena and trying to prove their credibility with what he believed to be sound
evidence. Therefore, it could be argued that Zhu's apparentmisunderstanding ofCroce's
theory of intuition paradoxically served to partly develop his own theory of aesthetic
experience. As for the theoretical incompatibility between Zhu and Croce's notions, Zhu
simply turned away from it to locate some more theories for support.
51 See Thomas Hardy Leahey, A History ofPsychology: Main Currents in Psychological Thought
(Englewood Cliffs (N. J.): Prentice-Hall, 1987 2nd ed.), pp. 13-25.
52 Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsueh," p. 180.
53 See Wang Yuxiong, "Buju xialou, zhanghuang youmiao - chongdu Zhu Guangqian xiansheng de
Wenyi xinlixue" JLftiBj' - if if [Mending the flaws to
illuminate the profundity - Reread Zhu Guangqian's The Psychology ofLiterature andArt], Wenyi
yanjiu vol. 6 (1989), p. 57.
54 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 10.
83
For Zhu, aesthetic experience is a complex process which involves all the qualities
ofthe beholder such as personality, taste and emotions within a social context. To illuminate
every aspect of the beholder as an organic whole being, Zhu adopted three psychological
theories ofthe 20th century, namely, 'Empathy' [Einfuhlung; yiqing zuoyong ffl ],
'Inner Imitation' [neimofang 1*3 #1151] and 'Psychical Distance' [xinli dejuli
4.3.1. Empathy: Emotional Sympathy for Aesthetic Experience
Zhu maintained that one derives perception, feeling, will and action only in the context
of one's own life experience and peculiar circumstances. To gain knowledge of others'
perceptions, feelings, will and action, one has to subjectively draw an inference from one's
own personal experiences.55 He borrowed an example from Zhuangzi to explain the
subjectivity of one's knowledge of the outside world:
Zhuangzi and Huizi were taking a leisurely walk along the dam of the Hao
River. Zhuangzi said, "The white fish are swimming at ease. This is the happiness
of the fish."
"You are not a fish," said Huizi. "How do you know its happiness?"
"You are not I," said Zhuangzi. "How do you know that I do not know the
happiness of the fish?"56
Zhu found that the psychology ofempathy or aesthetic sympathy [Einfuhlung; yiqing
zuoyong as expounded by Theodor Lipps (1851-19 1 4)57 explained the
phenomenon ofemotional projection which presupposes personal experience. According
to the psychology ofempathy, aesthetic experience is purely a psychological event in which
human feelings such as pride, melancholy, or longing are projected into an object which
expresses human spiritual life.58 This means that beauty exists solely in the contemplative
55 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 235.
56 Zhuangzi, Chapter 17, trans, by Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, pp. 209-210;
See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 235.
57 Theodor Lipps (1851-1914) is a "German philosopher, particularly interested in psychology and
aesthetics.... He is best known for his concept of'empathy' which he used in his theory of knowledge
and which played a central part in his aesthetics." Thomas Mautner, Penguin Dictionary ofPhilosophy
(London: Penguin, 1996), p. 318.
58 See Theodor Lipps, Asthetick, Psychologie des Schonen undder Kunst, vol. II, in William Listowel,
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mind at the aesthetic moment when the mood and feelings of the contemplator vibrates
sympathetically with the object.
Regarding the subjectivity of the aesthetic subject, Lipps insists that aesthetic
enjoyment is not enjoyment ofan object, but enjoyment ofa self; it is an immediate feeling
of a value that is lodged within oneself. "This is not a feeling that is related to an object.
Rather, its characteristic consists in this ... that there is no separation in it between my
pleased ego and that with which I am pleased; in it both are one and the same self, the
immediately experienced ego."59 For Lipps, the aesthetic character of an object is not "a
quality of the object, but rather an activity of our ego, an attitude we adopt towards it, a
particular way of envisaging it, of observing it, of hearing it, of interpreting it."60
Yet Zhu explained the mechanism between the subject and the object during the
course ofaesthetic experience in his own way, a way that not only showed his intellectual
tendency towards dynamic holism but also differed from the conception ofLipps: instead
of illuminating the subjectivity of the aesthetic subject by devaluating the function of the
object, Zhu chose to concentrate on the reciprocal relationship between the two. On the
one hand, he held that the reason why human beings feel that nature also has life and
emotions is because they psychologically project their own emotions onto the object they
perceive. So, "when we are happy and joyous, mountains and rivers smile with us; when
we are sad, flowers and birds are also gloomy; when we partwith friends, candles weep;
when we reunite with friends, greenmountains nod with joy."61 On the other hand, from
the animated [shengminghua i'nHb] or personalised nature in Zhu's words we can also
be emotionally affected: "feeling exuberance by looking at leaping fish and flying birds,
and in awe when facing a lofty mountain or the vast sea." Even when we are in a bad mood,
we can recover with the remedy of aesthetic appreciation. "Majestic bamboos and clear
Modern Aesthetics: A Historical introduction, p. 60.
59 Theodor Lipps, "Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense-feelings," in Morris Weitz ed., Problems in
Aesthetics: Book ofReadings, (London: Collier Macmillan, 1970 2nd ed.), pp. 375-376.
60 William Listowel, Modern Aesthetics: A Historical introduction, p. 57.
61 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 237.
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creeks ease our emotional pain; Beethoven's 5th symphony lifts up our low spirits. This
interflowing of human beings and the object [wu wo jiao gan the mutual
vibration [huxiang huihuan zhendang JLjfi IhJ 12. %|] ofhuman life and that ofuniverse,
derive from empathy \yiqingzuoyong
In affirming the initiative and projective vitality of the emotions with the help ofthe
psychology of empathy, Zhu seemed to be cautious of the trap of absolute subjectivity.
He let in the element ofmutuality between human beings and the object in the sense that
human beings voluntarily seek a relationship with the universe. Zhu stated:
As one contemplates an ancient pine one may project one's own spirit of sincerity
and courage to the pine on the one hand, and conversely, may be affected by
its peculiar features of huskiness and forcefulness on the other hand.63
As Kuang-ming Wumaintains, such mutual constitution ofthe subject and the object
in aesthetic experience can only be realised in polar motion. He writes: "as counterparts
are constitutively involved, the form and the content, the natal and the actualised, and the
like, realise their self-referential unity and consistency. It is then dispersed, and then
realised again, in a dancing rhythm."64 It can be seen then that empathy of aesthetic
experience in Zhu's theory is not amatter of illusion independent ofassociative thinking,
but more like a reflective state of mind which constantly communicates with past
experience in the process of communicating with the aesthetic object. As Zhu further
suggested, "the significance of an aesthetic object should be in direct ratio with the
contemplator's cultural background; the well-cultivated sees more while the
poorly-cultivated sees less."65 That is to say, personal experience and thus personal feelings
play an important role in aesthetic experience because the former is directly responsible
for the success or failure of an aesthetic experience.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 233.
64 Kuang-ming Wu, "Chinese Aesthetics," in Robert E. Allinson ed., Understanding the ChineseMind:
The Philosophical Roots, p. 239.
65 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 238.
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It seems that this holistic empirical approach kept the distance between Zhu's own
theory and empathy psychology, probably without his realisation. Althoughmost empathy
psychologists hold the view that perception and emotion, the object perceived and the
feeling expressed by it, constitute an indivisible unity, they reject the dynamic recurrence
between the two.66 Unlike Lipps and his supporters, Zhu regarded personal feelings as
a legitimate position in aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience in Zhu's theory not only
involves subconscious infusion with nature in a broad sense, but also conscious
interchanging with nature in a narrow sense.
This is probably why Zhu continued his conceptualisation with apparently
inconsistent evidence. For instance, Zhu agreed with Richard Muller-Freienfels
(1882-1949), who allowed two attitudes towards aesthetic experience: the participant
[Mitspieler\fenxiangzhe and the contemplator [Zuschauer; pangguangzhe
#]. These two attitudes represent the extreme attitudes of almost exclusively emotional
and almost exclusively contemplative appreciation in art. Zhu stated that while the
participatory type, like the Dionysian in Nietzsche's words, interprets art in the light of
personal feelings expressed in music or dancing, the contemplative type, like the
Apollonian, holds back and retains a cool observation ofbeauty found in art such as painting
and sculpture.67
Although Zhu did not dismiss emotional involvement with the object perceived and
still believed that emotional sympathy and emotional detachment as two types ofaesthetic
experience are both able to attain a lofty realm within their own states of minds, he
nevertheless did not hide his preference for the reflective mode of tranquillity or, simply,
intellectualism [Hzhi fl%].68 He argues that, in the state of emotional sympathy [zai
ganshou qingqu shi 'IrMSINf], joys and sorrows, hatred and love, remain
66 See Katharine Everett Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, A History ofEsthetics (New York: Dover, 1953),
pp. 538-539.
67 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 248.
68 See Zhu Guangqian, Shi lun [On poetry] (Chongqing: Guomin tushu chubanshe, 1943), in QJ,
vol, 3, p. 61.
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antagonistic feelings, whereas in the state of tranquil appreciation [zai chenjing zhong de
huiwei shi -ft tfLif^ 6^IhJ^H^], these conflicting feelings are elevated to a detached
artistic attitude. Therefore, "from emotional sympathy to tranquil appreciation, there is
an elevation from reality to the poetic realm, from the utilitarian attitude towards the
aesthetic attitude."69 That is to say, when an image \yixiangM $-] is infused with feelings
and becomes an aesthetic object, the weakness of the empathic state is not rejected, but
transcended. It can be seen then that aesthetic experience is primarily based on emotional
sympathy of the object and then, through reflective contemplation, attains an image. Zhu
hold that his approach stemmed from Nietzsche's notion of the antagonistic drives of
Dionysus and Apollo, claiming that image \yixiangM $.] is like Apollo, while emotion
[qingqu jpMfe] is like Dionysus. It is the Apollonian that illuminates the objects ofthe world
in their serenity and redeems the Dionysian from the feelings ofpain through the beautiful
images.70
Another way to understand Zhu's apparently ambiguous attitude towards emotion
as the necessary condition for aesthetic experience and tranquillity as the conqueror of
emotion is to set his theory against his Chinese background. InWang Yuxiong's view, Zhu's
approach is based on Chinese traditional thinking patterns, that is, from personal
experience to intuitive apprehension, from intuitive apprehension to introspective tranquil
self-questioning. These three stages present a self-recursive integral system evolving with
constant realisation of the truth of life.71 In other words, feeling and knowing are perceived
to be opposite in the sense that they unite in synthesis at a higher level. The correlative
relationship between tranquil introspection and emotional sympathy in aesthetic
experience also follows the pattern set up in Zhu's own view of life. Action [dong%] and
tranquillity \jing if] dialectically interchange for a better life. Action informs tranquillity
with ever-changing emotions and tranquillity plays the role of reaching deeper insights
69 Ibid., p. 64.
70 See ibid., pp. 62-63.
71 See Wang Yuxiong, "Zhu Guangqian lun shenmei duixiang: 'yixiang' yu 'wuyt" [Zhu Guangqian's
discussion of the aesthetic object: 'image' and 'object B'] (1997), p. 8.
88
into life which, by turn, are actualised in practical human activity. This is the dynamic
pattern of human life that Zhu had tried to illuminate and seemed also to have pursued
in his notion of aesthetic experience.
4.3.2. Inner Imitation: the Vitalistic Dimension of Aesthetic Experience
In Zhu's theory, as observed earlier, the polarities ofhuman activities are not treated
as an antagonism but as reciprocal processes following traditional Chinese thinking.
According to Hall and Ames, apart from the typical conceptual polarity which requires
related concepts to co-exist, each necessitating the other for adequate articulation, the
mutual interconnection of human beings and nature as it is maintained in Chinese
philosophy requires an attitude of treating human beings and nature as being constitutive
ofeach other.72 In this way, human reactions to the world must be of a two-way character:
projecting and receiving. Therefore, in an effort to complement Lipps' theory of the
relationship between emotion and the object, Zhu introduced the psychologist Karl Groos'
concept of inner imitation \nei mofang which emphasises the participatory aspect
of empathy.73 Zhu noted that Groos defines the aesthetic experience as 'sympathetic and
symbolic imitation' in terms ofphysiology, assuming that pleasure accompanies this. In
Groos' estimate, when one thinks of a tall pine-tree, one sweeps one's eye up and down
its length, and out to the ends of its branches; and ifone is forbidden to use one's eye muscle,
then one cannot think of the visual image. In short, human beings perceive an object in
space by carrying out its motor suggestions; more technically expressed, by virtue of a
complex ofmotor impulses aroused by it; more briefly, by imitating it. Therefore, aesthetic
contemplation is inner imitation.74
Zhu thought that while Lipps' empathy illuminated the aspect of the selfanimating
and humanising of the object, Groos' inner imitation revealed the other aspect of the self
72 See David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (New York: State University ofNew
York Press, 1987), pp. 17-18.
73 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue ^ (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 245-247 and p. 264.
74 See ibid., pp. 255-268.
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being symbolically reminded of past experience before reacting accordingly.75 He
defended Groos by saying that "when 'motor images' \yundong de yixiang iEtfr iMj Jt; $.]
such as 'standing high' [songli 'soaring up' [tengqi and 'physical resistance'
[chuli dikang ih dl -feTc] appear in the memory, past experience ofmotor movements is
at least partially revived. ... Such bodily change will be inevitably reflected in
consciousness and, as a result, influence aesthetic experience."76 This approach is echoed
in Ames and Hall's comments on the Chinese concept of reflecting. "Ssu [reflecting]
is not exhausted by its psychical dimension. That is, it does not exclude the physiological
apparatus involved in the process ofreflecting. We would argue that in the Chinese tradition
generally, and with respect to ssu specifically, the psychical and physiological are
perceived as aspects of a continuum."77
However, Zhu was also careful not to go to the other extreme, namely to give physical
response full credit for aesthetic experience. He made it clear that aesthetic experience
is primarily charged with emotions, and bodily or visceral response acts as an
accompaniment to or stimulus ofemotional changes. He criticised the James-Lange theory
for neglecting the 'affective side' [qing defangmian inTt-J 771S7] ofemotional feelings and
treating the emotions merely as a perceptual result.78 For instance, William James'
observation that it is bodily feelings [shenti qiguan ganjue that
emotionalise the consciousness, leads him to conclude that emotions or emotional states
are the effect rather than the cause ofbodily reactions.79 Zhu, however, insisted that an
impression has to affect our emotions before bodily changes can take place. He argued
that bodily feelings presuppose psychological activity, which means that it is emotional
75 Ibid., p. 257.
76 Ibid., p. 265. The English term 'motor image' for yundong de yixiang iE is used by Zhu
Guangqian himself in the text.
77 David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 47. For an estimation of the body
function in the process of thinking, see Roger Ames, "The meaning of Body in Classical Chinese
Philosophy," International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 24 (1984), pp. 39-54.
78 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 260-261.
79 See William James, "What is an Emotion?," Mind, vol. 19, no. 34 (Apr 1884), pp. 188-205. Also,
see ibid.
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feelings that cause bodily feelings but not vice versa: without emotional feelings, bodily
change would not occur.80
Zhu's adherence to the emotional character ofaesthetic experience either in the case
of the subject to the object or in the case of the object back to the subject derives, according
to Wang Yuxiong, from a Chinese traditional attitude towards humanism [renwenjingshen
AxflfTf7]. He maintains that Zhu respected humanity because human beings, in Chinese
traditional culture, are considered as the centre ofheaven and earth. Human beings take
an active part in world changes and act as the driving force in the whole process of cultural
development. Thus, sophistication in humanity does not rely on an external power such
as God, but on human beings themselves through the emotional cultivation ofpersonality
\yiqingyangxing EUffljCfT].81 It is in this sense that Zhu registered the overwhelming
power ofemotional feelings in aesthetic consciousness, as only emotional feelings account
for that human substance which differentiates human beings from mere animals. It seems
then that Zhu endeavoured to retain an adequate equilibrium in respect to the dynamic
organism ofthe human world by accepting the psychic aspect ofaesthetic experience (as
emphasised in Lipps' concept ofempathy) as well as the physiological aspect ofaesthetic
experience (as accommodated in Groos' notion of inner imitation).
4.3.3. Psychical Distance: Adequate Balance as Fulfilment of Aesthetic Experience
Maintaining balance or equilibrium was constantly adhered to by Zhu as his method
ofapproaching the formulation ofhis views of life, literature and philosophy. In the same
manner, he tried to find the middle course in his study of aesthetics, not as a compromise
but as harmony between the antithesis of reason and emotion, the psychological and the
physiological, the utilitarian and the contemplative, the subjective and the objective.
80 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 261.
81 See Wang Yuxiong, "Zhu Guangqian lun shenmei duixiang: 'yixiang' yu 'wuyf" ^ikifTw%M:if !<-:
'■& $.'$■'%&' [Zhu Guangqian's discussion of the aesthetic object: 'image' and 'object B'] (1997),
p. 11.
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Zhu was impressed with Edward Bullough's (1880-1934) theory of 'psychical
distance' \xinli de juli although Bullough's theory did not attract much
attention in the West.82 Zhu was convinced that Bullough's theory not only represented
an appropriate criterion for literary criticism, but also offered an adequate explanation for
aesthetic experiences.83 He thus enthusiastically introduced Bullough's concept of
psychical distance into his own system, claiming that the differences between idealism
[lixiangzhuyi and realism [xieshizhuyi % IfiJi] in art would effectively
dissolve once their defenders came to grips with the principles of psychical distance.
Although Bullough's theory is based on the presumption that the success ofaesthetic
experience lies in a psychic effort to maintain an aesthetic stance to the object by "putting
it out ofgearwith our practical needs and ends,"84 Bullough does not neglect the ambivalent
relationship between emotion in aesthetic experience and its genetic link with real life.
"Distance... is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one's own self.... But
it does not mean that the relation between the self and the object is broken to the extent
ofbecoming 'impersonal'... in the sense in which we speak of the 'impersonal' character
of Science.... On the contrary, it describes apersonal relation, often highly emotionally
coloured."85
Bullough explicitly accepts that "a work ofArt has the more chance ofappealing to
us the better it finds us prepared for its particular kind of appeal. Indeed, without some
degree of predisposition on our part, it must necessarily remain incomprehensible, and
to that extent unappreciated."86 This apparent contradiction, which Bullough calls "the
82 References to Edward Bullough's psychological insight are invariably brief and sketchy in Western
histories of psychology and aesthetics. For instance, in William Listowel's Modern Aesthetics: A
Historical introduction, Bullough's concept ofpsychical distance, apart from being given merely one
paragraph, is said to be "neither spatial nor temporal, but purely mental which is completely divorced
from the normal outlook." (p. 98) Zhu was attracted to this theory because he did not seem to stop
at the aesthetic moment, but evaluated the whole empirical process which enabled the distancing of
the contemplative subject and the aesthetic object. Bullough's theory provided the psychological
evidence needed for Zhu's holistic interpretation of aesthetic experience.
83 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 225 and pp. 216-217.
84 Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," British Journal
ofPsychology, vol. 5, part 2 (1912/1913), p. 91.
85 Ibid.
92
antinomy ofDistance," between the self which is the product of a personal experience,
and the aesthetic object which acquires distanced contemplation, is reduced to spatially
and temporally dynamic relationships in favour of an empirical psychology.
On the one hand, Bullough makes it clear that aesthetic experience is not an absolute
value attained apriori, but "stands in direct proportion to the completeness with which
it corresponds with our intellectual and emotional peculiarities and the idiosyncrasies of
our experience."87 Such flexibility in personal experiences extends to its spatial and
temporal sense. Psychical distance may vary according to an individual's capacity to
maintain a greater or lesser degree ofdifference in taste or temperament. Even the same
individual may differ from time to time due to different moods or intellectual progress.88
On the other hand, Bullough allows such variable subjectivity to interrelate with
objectivity, saying that psychical distance "admits naturally of degrees, and differs not
only according to the nature ofthe object, which may impose a greater or smaller degree
ofDistance,"89 but both "the actual spatial distance" and "the temporal remoteness" of a
work ofart also help produce Distance for the contemplator to develop a better appreciation
of it. Therefore, Bullough concludes, there exists "two different sets of conditions affecting
the degree ofDistance in any given case: those offered by the object and those realised
by the subject." Bullough particularly emphasises that "in their interplay they afford one
of the most extensive explanations for varieties of aesthetic experience."90
At this point ofequilibrium where the subjective and the objective are reciprocally
united, Zhu seemed to identify with his own dynamically organic approach. In his
theoretical system, the fact that Zhu chose to furnish Croce's notion of intuition against
Croce's intention with psychological instances such as empathy and inner imitation led
Zhu to a theory which mediates the apparent antagonism between the subject and the object
86 ibid., p. 92.
87 Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," British Journal
ofPsychology, vol. 5, part 2 (1912/1913), p. 92.
88 See ibid., pp. 92-94.
89 Ibid., p. 94.
90 Ibid., p. 94 and 96.
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not in absolute idealism, but in dynamic holism. Croce's idealist theory of aesthetic
experience yields an absolute value. As Croce remarks, "the beautiful does not possess
degrees, for there is no conceiving a more beautiful, that is, an expressive that is more
expressive, an adequate that is more than adequate."91
Yet Bullough's psychical distance, in accommodating variable degrees ofDistance
due to variable states ofmind, environments and circumstances, allows relative values
which, in turn, allude to an empirical intellectualism. For Zhu, psychical distance is not
just a psychological phenomenon but, more importantly, the manifestation of one's
intellectual cultivation. According to Zhu, what makes the artist and the poet different from
ordinary people is that they are able to keep a distance from their crude feelings to reflect
them as detached observers. Zhu added:
Those capable of appreciating a drama are more of a composed onlooker than
an emotionally involved participant, because only the composed onlooker who keeps
personal emotion curbed is able to see, for example, the whole plot of a drama
by carefully examining the details, evaluating the relationship between these details
and analysing the reasons behind the development of the characters.92
Zhu argued that, although this may appear too rational to be an aesthetic pleasure,
it nevertheless paves the way for the image in the artistic piece to appear more distinctively.
As a consequence, the beauty ofawork ofart becomes more accessible and thus the aesthetic
pleasure achieved from it is more powerful.93
This seems to imply that for Zhu, aesthetic experience is a process of conscious
knowing (jing if [tranquillity]), resulting in intuition of image. This process ofknowing
plays a decisive role in the success ofan aesthetic experience. Accordingly, it is the knowing
state ofmind which keeps the contemplator from being distracted by their personal emotion
and, more importantly, elevates them not through emotion but through rationalisation to
the intuitive state ofmind. It does however strike one that Zhu mixes perception [zhijue
91 See Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science ofExpression and General Linguistic, trans, by Douglas
Ainslie (London: Transaction Publishers, 1995), p. 79.
92 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 251.
93 See ibid., pp. 219-220.
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conception [gainian and intuition [zhijue {§.%] in such a way that it is difficult
to split them. In fact, he continued to tread the path of traditional Chinese thinking, which
is that body and mind, theory and praxis, human beings and nature, are perceived as
developing within the dynamically interrelating process. Therefore, knowing and intuition
do not perform in successive cognitive stages, but perform interchangeably in the same
psychological process: as Zhu admitted, the three forms ofepistemology, namely intuition,
perception and conception, cannot be treated separately in concrete experiences.94 He
maintained that during the course ofaesthetic experience, one's emotions keep interflowing
and communicating with the aesthetic object through which human beings and nature
merge into a whole.95
Zhu established a structure of aesthetic theory in Europe based on Croce's concept
of intuition as expression, Lipps' empathy, Groos' inner imitation and Bullough's psychical
distance. It can be seen that Zhu's peculiar way oforganising these theories into his own
aesthetic system corresponds to his intellectual propensity. In positively receiving and
synthesising these theories, Zhu created an aesthetic theory which incorporated the
traditional Chinese way ofthinking withmodern Western ideas and, consequently, gains
a unique perspective with which his epistemological and empirical emphasis on human
activity in aesthetic experience is developed.
94 See ibid., p. 207.
95 See ibid., p. 237.
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CHAPTER V
Defining Beauty with Associative Thinking and Morality
5.1. Towards a More Flexible Theory: Associative Thinking
As pointed out in Chapter IV, Zhu Guangqian developed his theory with the intention
of illuminating aesthetic phenomena from a psychological perspective. Croce's theory of
intuition as expression was regarded as an explanation for the instant of aesthetic
experience, independent ofother cognitive experiences. However, Zhu also implemented
psychological theories such as Lipps's empathy, Groos's inner imitation and Bullough's
psychical distance in order to help reconnect severed relationships among the experiences
of the human being as a whole.
As Sabattini points out,1 due to Zhu's lack of a deeper knowledge of Croce's
epistemology and thus aesthetics, Zhumade efforts to try to find a compromise with Croce's
approach until his knowledge ofCroce began to grow in the 1940s. Before he realised the
differences between his own theory and that ofCroce, however, Zhu struggled to relate
Croce's notion of intuition of image as a self-sufficient expression of other human
experiences in the context of social life.
In his preface he wrote in 1936 for Wenyi xinlixue Zhu appeared to be
convinced that the gap between aesthetic experience as intuition of image [xingxiang de
zhijue % iM.%] and other empirical elements that Croce ignored could be bridged
simply by superimposing psychological data onto the former:
I used to be bound by formalist aesthetics inherited from Kant and Croce
and believed that aesthetic experience entailed purely the intuition of image and
did not involve anything beyond the independent and isolated image ... Subsequently
abstract thinking [chouxiang de sikao associative thinking [lianxiang
8] and moral sense [daode guannian were all excluded from aesthetic
experience. Now I realise that human life is organic and inevitably involves all
1 See Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsiieh," East and West, vol.
20, nos. 1-2 (March-June 1970), pp. 179-180.
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of human activities of science, ethics and aesthetics. Although these activities can
be analysed in a logical sense, they are nevertheless inseparable in real life. Thus
what I cannot accept is Croce's mechanistic view of aesthetic experience.2
Throughout the 1930s, Zhu still seemed to support the notion of the disinterestedness
of aesthetic experience and was reluctant to abandon Croce's notion of intuition as the
epistemological backbone of aesthetics. At the same time, he nevertheless began to make
aesthetic experience more concrete and tangible to suit the reality ofpolitically and morally
troubled China. In addition to writing numerous essays in which aesthetics was discussed
in the context ofhuman life, especially the ethical issues, Zhu endeavoured to revise and
complete his representative work, Wenyi xinlixue (1936). The most
noticeable change was the addition of five chapters: Chapters Six, Seven, Eight, Ten and
Eleven.3 In the additional chapters, 'associative thinking' \liawciang Tip itE] and moral sense,
which he had previously rejected, were accepted as significant elements within the process
of artistic activity.4
In Tan mei MM: [Talking about Beauty] in 1932, Zhu insisted that although
'associative thinking' [lianxiang is the base for art-related perception and
imagination, it disturbs one's aesthetic appreciation ofart because it leads one to associate
one artistic image with another and thenmove from the second image to another image,
becoming ceaseless disordered thinking.5
During the moment of aesthetic experience, one focuses only on the isolated
image itself; no associative thinking occurs. Once the isolated image is interrupted
by associations, the beholder becomes distracted from the image and ... as a result,
the unity of the image disintegrates.6
2 Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zibai" If# il & [Writer's preface], Wenyi xinlixue ^ (1936),
in QJ, vol. 1, p. 198.
3 According to Zhu, Chapter Nine: Natural Beauty and Natural Ugliness was a part of the first draft.
See ibid., pp. 197-198..
4 See ibid., p. 197.
5 See Zhu Guangqian, Tan mei ikM [Talking about beauty] (1932), in QJ, vol. 2, pp. 34-35.
6 Ibid., p. 35.
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He argued that during the course of aesthetic experience, one should concentrate on
the image itself. Associative thinking would most likely distract the contemplator from
the image and lead them to a series of irrelevant perceptions that happen to be associated
with the image concerned.7
In order to explain the role of associative thinking in the process of aesthetic
experience, Zhu gave the example of the following ci iF\ poetry written by Niu Xiji
(?-925 AD):8
Chun shan yan yu shou,
Tian dan xing xi xiao.
Can yue lian bian ming,
Bie lei lin qing xiao.
Yu yi duo, qing wei liao, 'ft£7,
Hui shou you chong dao. ISJif'l&'iitL.
Ji de lu luo qun,
Chu chu lian fang cao. M.M
The spring mist above the mountains is dissolving,
The sky is tranquil, the stars are sparsely dotted.
The waning moon illuminates her face,
She weeps tears of parting until dawn.
Much has been said,
Love is not done,
She turns her head to say again.
"Please remember this green silk skirt,
Wherever you go cherish the green grass."9
7 See ibid., p. 35.
8 See Zhu Guangqian, TanmeiMM (1932), in QJ, vol. 2, p. 31. Niu Xiji was born in Longxi
Pti® in Gansu if 1$ province. He was a nephew ofNiu Qiao (850? - 920?) whose ci poems are
also included in Huajianji ftfal M [Among the flowers collection]. Niu Xiji became a member of
Hanlin Academy [Hanlin xueshi #Tk#dr], and President of the Board ofCensors during the Earlier
Shu Jg dynasty. "When the Earlier Shu dynasty fell to the later Tang dynasty (923-936), Niu Xiji
then entered the service of the new dynasty. He was appointed Assistant Military Governor of the
area around Chang'an." His eleven ci poems are included in Huajianji. See Lois Fusek trans., Among
the Flowers: The Hua-chien chi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 199.
9 Niu Xiji "Sheng zha zi" [to the tune "Mountain Hawthorns"], Huajianji, compiled
by Zhao Chongzuo (934-965) and annotated by Li Baomin et al. (Shanghai: Shanghai
guji chubanshe, 2002), p. 232. The translation is modified by myselfwith reference to the following
two translations: Xu Yuanchong if;)n| trans., Golden Treasury ofChinese Lyrics Tang Song ciyibai
wushi shou F\ 3L-\- "M" (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1990), pp. 48-49; Lois Fusek
trans., Among the Flowers: The Hua-chien chi, p. 113.
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Zhu claims that in this poem, the reader may be reminded of her/his lover's green
dress by the image ofgreen grass, and, from the image of the lover's green dress, the reader
can recall the lover's beautiful appearance. These three perceptive images, according to
Zhu, do not constitute the state ofan ideal aesthetic moment because the other two images,
namely the green dress and the lover, were not derived from aesthetic sense but associative
thinking. Thus, the other two images distract the contemplator from appreciating the beauty
of the green grass itself. On that account, Zhu commented that he favoured the formalist
approach, that is, aesthetic experience being derived purely from intuition and excluding
any other forms of conception.10
In fact, however, he had not been able to isolate the aesthetic experience from other
cognitive activities such as associative thinking. In particular, Zhu advocated living life
in the spirit ofart in which participatory and contemplative types were equally recognised
as psychologically valid options according to one's personality and taste. Therefore, Zhu
believed that it was theoretically impossible to ignore the psychological elements of one's
manifold past experiences which caused various cognitive activities during a total aesthetic
experience.
Zhu noticed this problem after he returned from Europe in 1933 and began to consider
the possibility of expanding the aesthetic experience to make it empirically more
acceptable. His more flexible attitude is embodied in the additional chapters of Wenyi
xinlixue (1936), in which he regarded artistic activity as a broader concept
while retaining aesthetic experience as an instant located coherently in the process of
artistic activity.11 Zhu stated that:
Aesthetic experience ... presupposes associative thinking because it helps
comprehend the image before aesthetic experience takes place, although those
associative connections cannot replace aesthetic experience itself.12
10 See Zhu Guangqian, Tan mei (1932), in QJ, vol. 2, p. 35.
11 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 197.
12 Ibid., p. 291.
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He considered that by expanding the concept of aesthetic experience, he would be
able to integrate associative connections without disturbing the integrity of aesthetic
experience.
Accordingly, Zhu started to take into consideration those cognitive and affective
factors thatmight contribute to the achievement of aesthetic experience. He assumed that,
as artistic activity is a process of imagination and more than just a moment of intuition,
it should involve associative thinking because "the latter functions as the fundamental
mechanism for all mental activities, including perception, conception, memory and
imagination."13 In Zhu's view, in the course ofartistic activity, "associative thinking affords
the artist or contemplator the opportunity of freedom from the restrictive force of reality"
to retrieve a vast array of images that comprehensively echo with the image directly
perceived.14
The best example of this is represented by poetry. Zhu stated that the key quality of
a poem lies in its suggestive characteristics which induce associative thinking and thereby
deeper sympathetic feelings. Thus, through a limited number ofwords with the appeal of
poetic overtones, a poem leads the reader from the particular to the whole or from the finite
to the infinite. A certain feeling is not articulated explicitly but signified sympathetically.
It then requires further imagination to approach the meaning of the poem. Thus, he
concluded that neither the poet nor the readerwould be able to create the beauty of a poem
without the assistance of associative thinking.15
It should be noted, however, that Zhu's acceptance ofassociative thinking in artistic
activity is not unconditional. He agreed with Francis Hutcheson's principle of'variety in
unity' \yu zaduo yu zhengyi ]16 and stressed that associative connections
13 Ibid., p. 280.
14 Ibid., p. 280-281.
15 See ibid., pp. 287-289.
16 Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) asserts that the quality which the sense ofbeauty consistently finds
pleasurable is a pattern of'uniformity amidst variety,' just as the quality which the moral sense
invariably approves of is grounded in the fact that humans are so constituted as to care about others
and take pleasure in benevolence. See Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of
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mustmove in the same direction to unificationwith the image represented. In his discussion,
Zhu distinguished between 'fancy' [huawciang and 'imagination' [xiangxiang
in the process ofassociative thinking. He borrowed Bullough's concept of'fused' [ronghua
de and 'non-fused' [bu ronghua de T*livfW-J] to argue that "if those associations
do not fuse with the image, they are mere fancies."17 "Fancies are chaotic, mutable and
not incorporated in variety in unity." Therefore, they are unable to harmonise the feeling
embodied in the image with the feeling that derives from the fancy.18
To put the point another way, the relationship between the image represented and
those images appearing in fancy is accidental and thus irrelevant. Zhu accordingly
eliminated fanciful associations from artistic activity and claimed that they undermine the
sense ofbeauty. On the other hand, associations arising in the imagination are encouraged
because they are alleged to be consistent and coherent with the image perceived. Both the
image perceived and its resultant imaginative associations interpenetrate each other to form
one totality: their relationship is thus internal and necessary.19 However, it should be noted
that Zhu did notmake it clear on what basis we are able to decide which are fanciful and
which are imaginative associations.
5.2. Sense of Morality in Aesthetic Experience
In Wenyi xinlixue Chapters Seven and Eight discuss moral sense in art.20
Zhu accepted that one's moral sense would inevitably affect one's sense ofbeauty because
these share one life. He held that human beings are both physically and psychologically
the Passion andAffections with Illustrations on theMoral Sense (1728), (Meston, Yorkshire: Scolar
Press, 1972).
17 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 293.
18 Ibid., p. 292.
19 Ibid.
20 See Zhu Guangqian, "Di qi zhang: Wenyi yu daode (yi) - lishi de huisuo" %-b)
- [Chapter 7: Literature, art and morality (1) - historical review] and "Di ba zhang:
Wenyi yu daode (er) - lilun de jianshe (—) - JEi&iMj[Chapter 8:
Literature, art and morality (2) - theoretical development], Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in
QJ, vol. 1, pp. 294-325.
101
organic beings, which means that every part of this being depends on every other part to
form an organic whole. Separation of the integral parts ofhuman life would invalidate one's
existence.21 Zhu presumed that human life as activity involves all sorts of experiences,
none ofwhich can be evaluated without reference to the others. In this regard, Zhu asserted
that aesthetic experience must cause or have a relationwith other experiences in spite of
its disinterestedness as intuition of pure image. With this view, moral sense could play
a contributory role in human beings' artistic activities and vice versa.
IfZhu's presumption that moral sense is able to affect or be affected by artistic activity
is sound, one wonders in what way the former is related to aesthetic experience.22 To put
it plainly, does moral sense affect aesthetic experience as it does artistic activity? In a similar
way to his treatment ofassociative thinking in relation to artistic activity, Zhu seemed to
apply two approaches to aesthetic experience and artistic activity and yet combined them
for the convenience ofhis theoretical assumptions. In Zhu's view, whereas artistic activity
is comparatively easily influenced by other experiences, aesthetic experience is somehow
capable of separating its link to artistic activity and claims an absolute autonomy in spite
of its momentary existence.
As far as aesthetic experience is concerned, Zhu would disagree that it is related to
morality. He declared his unreserved faith in Crocian formalism insisting that, during the
moment of intuition ofan image, one does not have time to ponder the moral value of that
image. All one can judge in a novel, for instance, is whether the characters, good and evil,
are adequately and artistically depicted.23
He cited Croce as saying that "since art is not born from the act ofwill, it likewise
is not subject to any moral evaluation, not because an exemption privilege is accorded to
it, but simply because no way is available to apply moral distinctions to it. An artistic image
can depict a morally praiseworthy or blameworthy action. But the image itself, as such,
21 Ibid., p. 315.
22 See ibid., p. 316.
23 Ibid., p. 320.
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is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, morally. Not only is there no penal code which
can condemn an image to prison or to death, but no moral judgment passed by a reasonable
person could ever address itself to it as its object. Otherwise, to judge Dante's Francesca
immoral or Shakespeare's Cordelia moral... would be just as valid as to judge a square
moral or a triangle immoral."24 Zhu assented to Croce's opinion and claimed that:
In a sense, to see whether an artistic work is successful or not depends on
whether or not it is able to divert the reader from his moral sense in order to
fully appreciate the image which should be interesting and adequate.25
That is to say, aesthetic experience itself is a self-rewarding activity and thus enjoys
value unrelated to any other principles.
On the other hand, Zhu was apparently reluctant to detach art from real life, as this
would be against his fundamental principle ofart reflecting life and living life in the spirit
ofart. He asked himselfwhether aesthetic experience counts as the whole process ofeither
artistic creation or artistic appreciation and expressed doubts as to whether the link between
art and life can be fully embodied in the instant of aesthetic experience. In Zhu's view,
artistic activity includes the relevant entire process in which "later events are the inevitable
result of former causes" [qianyin hon guo ^].26 He stated that artistic activity is
able to accommodate more empirical variables than aesthetic experience, which does not
have the capacity to do so.27
Based on this compromise, Zhu accepted that moral sense may affect an artist or a
reader prior to the aesthetic experience, which in turn may affect one'smoral sense. It seems
that he designated a wider range of such activities in an effort to illuminate his holistic
view. Yet he probably overlooked the fact that, by widening the range from aesthetic
experience to artistic activity, the former is included in artistic activity. As a result, aesthetic
24 Benedetto Croce, Guide toAesthetics, trans, by Patrick Romanell (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995; 1st
ed. 1965), pp. 12-13. See also Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. l,p.
303.
25 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue, in QJ, vol. 1, p. 320.
26 Ibid., p. 315.
27 See ibid., pp. 314-315.
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experience is also involved both in its cause and its effect within the field ofartistic activity.
His two approaches may thus prove to be less than sufficient to justify the actual link
between aesthetic experience and artistic activity.
Zhu claimed that the problem with those such as Theophile Gautier (1811-1872) who
defended 'art for art's sake'28 lies in their ignorance of the mechanism ofartistic creation
and appreciation.29 Zhu held that artistic activity is a process that does not focus merely
on the moment of aesthetic experience but also involves a long period of preparation
preceding the appearance of a perfect image. In the course of the period ofpreparation,
the artist is not only an aesthetic subject but also a person who lives a real life by which
they accumulate their experiences through observing and reflecting on things in this reality
such asmorality, religion, and politics, as well as art. While these activities are not explicitly
acknowledged in aesthetic experience, they unconsciously foreshadow a certain tendency
towards an artist's aesthetic intuition, which may eventually be translated as an aesthetic
object in the form ofcharacter or in the tone ofmood. Thus, in Zhu's view, for writers and
poets such as Shakespeare, Tao Yuanming, Tolstoy and George Bernard Shaw, their
respective backgrounds and even their moral attitudes may be assumed consciously or
unconsciously from their artistic creations. Zhu believed that because their moral sense
is entirely fused with artistic form, their creation does not remind one of any moral ideas
apart from the pure image at the moment of aesthetic experience.30
This means that moral sense, just like any other mode of feeling, seeks to express
itself in artistic image without the need for conceptual clarification. It is noticeable that,
as soon as Zhu addressed the issue ofaesthetic experience as an intuitive moment rather
than artistic activity in relation tomorality, he seemed to return to Croce's notion of intuition
28 Theophile Gautier (1811-1872) was a French poet, dramatist, novelist and literary critic. He sought
a new direction for lyric poetry by linking idealism with aesthetics. He thus became an advocate of
I'artpour I'art, or "art for art's sake"—a belief that art need serve no extrinsic purpose. See Charles
Harrison, Paul Wood and Jason Gaiger eds., Art in Theory 1815-1900 (Oxford and New York:
Blackwell, 1998), pp. 96-99.
29 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 301-302 and p.316.
30 See ibid., pp. 320-321.
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as expression. Similarly, Croce also preferred to dissolve various manifestations ofhuman
spirit into the moment of intuition, stating that "a work ofart may be full ofphilosophical
concepts; it may contain them in greater abundance and they may there be even more
profound than in a philosophical dissertation,... But notwithstanding all these concepts
the total effect of the work ofart is an intuition."31 What intuition reveals in a work ofart
is not the moral sense but, according to Croce, "its character, individual physiognomy."32
The problem here is not whether Zhu was correct in confirming aesthetic value, but
whether he accepted any possible intervention from various empirical elements such as
moral sense to modify the notion of aesthetic experience. In one part ofChapter Eight,
Zhu appeared to be more flexible than Croce about this, stating:
Intuition and conception keep swapping data and alternating accordingly in
a pattern of continuous line during the course of artistic activity.33
However, this acknowledged flexibility was inconsistent with the rest of the chapter.
As far as aesthetic experience is concerned, according to Zhu, it is nothing more than an
intuition of image [xingxiang de zhijue IM^J iM.%] and does not even have time for
conception. What then is the motivation for intuition to swap data with conception? He
may argue that artistic activity is a process ofcomposition during which the creator makes
conscious choices about a series of images he perceives until a perfect image is attained.
Yet he also proposed that the images perceived prior or posterior to aesthetic experience
are either chaotic fancies or imaginative associations: whereas chaotic and mutable fancies
do not fuse in unity, imaginative associations at best contribute to the achievement of a
perfect image but are not the same as aesthetic experience.34 This raises a question about
what makes an artist choose a certain image among others as the perfect one.
31 Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science ofExpression and General Linguistic, trans, by Douglas
Ainslie (London: Transaction Publishers, 1995), pp. 2-3.
32 Ibid., p. 5.
33 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 315.
34 See ibid., p. 291.
105
Despite his well-developed attempt to consider the influence ofmoral sense in art,
it is more likely that Zhu's view was actually still within the boundaries outlined by Croce.
To use Zhu's words, aesthetic experience as pure intuition of a perfect image remains
independent from other cognitive processes. Subsequently, one is still left wondering in
which way moral sense affects aesthetic experience in the context ofthe alleged reciprocal
processes of artistic activity.
Notwithstanding Zhu's effort to link moral sense to aesthetic experience, it is still
difficult to explain the integration of two seemingly irrelevant acts in artistic activity. If
aesthetic experience cannot carry any moral message, can it nevertheless affect one morally
after it is completed? The general tendency of his answer to this question appears to be
ambiguous, although his intellectual inclination is explicit.
Zhu agreed that some artistic products are successful not only in aesthetic excellence
but also in delivering moral principles, such as the Old and New Testaments, Christian
art ofthe Middle Ages, Dante's Divine Comedy, Bunyan's PlainMan's Pathway to Heaven,
Milton's Paradise Lost, Hugo's LesMiserables, Tolstoy's novels and the dramas of Ibsen
and Shaw.35 He thus accepted that one may have to take into consideration their moral
value togetherwith the evaluation of their aesthetic excellence. He quickly added, however,
that those which are intended to propagate morality but do not achieve aesthetic excellence
wouldmost likely fail in their purpose: "people rarely become more moral upon reading
a couple of books which present moral instructions."36 For instance, Wordsworth's
"Ecclesiastical Sonnets" written for the purpose ofteaching religious doctrine, the didactic
poems produced at the end of the 13 th century, the propagandistic dramas of the French
Revolution, and in China the so-called Shanshu -If-it" [Morality books],37 such as
35 See ibid., p. 317.
36 Ibid., pp. 317-318.
37 These books promote a moral sense that is highly syncretic, drawing values from the classics as well
as Taoism and Buddhism. "This type of book, which had made its appearance in the Song period,
became much more popular in the Yuan and Ming. Together with the encyclopaedias for daily use,
the morality books served a wide public, especially in the late Ming." The best-known representative
of this type is Taishang ganying pian AAildUi [Treatise of The Most Exalted One on moral
retribution]. See WM. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom comp., Sources ofChinese Tradition: From
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Yinzhiwen [The silent way of recompense],38 are typical examples ofpromoting
morality at the cost ofartistic value. For this reason, "art should not be judged simply by
virtue of the authors' moral intention but the aesthetic value which carries the moral
emotion."39 In other words, aesthetic value is the vehicle ofmoral value in the context of
works of art but not vice versa.
As far as Zhu is concerned, since art reflects life generally, moral sense which derives
from life is integrated in one's artistic activity. He noted that "most artistic works of the
first class do not necessarily have hiddenmotives but are nevertheless morally effective."
He argued that these works are effective because they "console the feelings, awaken the
soul and cleanse the mind by reaching a deeper level ofhumanity."40 It seems that what
Zhu questioned is notwhether art is able to affect moral sense, but whether it can do more
than just promote morality, which he claims is too narrow.41
With his notion of living life in the spirit of art in mind, Zhu probably endeavoured
to enlarge the category ofwhat he believed to be the narrowmoral sense ofart to embrace
the wider moral goodness ofart. This step is critical, as it would enable him to unify aesthetic
value with moral value once and for all. Zhu claimed:
The task of art is to reflect life sincerely but not to make judgements on it;
judgements on life are for ethics to undertake and are not directly assigned to
art.42
Following this view, he decided that art should and actually does encompass amuch
wider and deeper field of human life rather than restricting itself to serve conventional
Earliest Times to 1600, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999 2nd ed.), pp. 899-908.
For a more detailed account of the books and the rise of the genre ofmorality books, see Cynthia
Brokaw, The Ledgers ofMerit andDemerit: Social Change andMoral Order in Late Imperial China
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
38 This is one of the well-known Shanshu. The full title ofthebookis Wenchang dijun yinzhiwen xU 'jl"
^"PifllTx [The silent way of recompense of deity Wenchang; also known as The hidden virtues of
imperial sovereign Wenchang].
39 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue X#xiT4£ (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 317.
49 Ibid., pp. 318-319.
41 See ibid., pp. 246-248 and p. 325.
42 Ibid., p. 311.
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morality. Whereas morality in a narrow sense appeals to rationality for social obedience
and subsequently restricts feelings, art appeals to the feelings for a truthful love of life.
Although the two do not necessarily clash, because moral feelings expressed in art can
also be truthful, art, in Zhu's view, aims at expressing the more profound feelings ofhuman
beings.
Zhu pointed out that, apart from physical needs such as eating, human beings have
spiritual and emotional needs for truth and beauty as well as goodness. He was convinced
by his eight years of study of20th century psychology in Hong Kong and Europe that the
encouragement ofthe separation ofother cognitive experiences from artistic experience
would result in a deformity ofhuman nature as whole. Such a deformity ofhuman nature
can be found in Plato's denial of emotion in favour of rationality. Moral prejudice and
hypocrisy, for example, are the inevitable consequences of such suppression.43
Consequently, in accommodating the manifold nature ofpeople's physical, emotional and
spiritual needs, art reflects human life in quite a different dimension. Zhu noted:
Human life means activities. The more freedom these activities enjoy, the more
meaningful and valuable human life becomes. While economic activities tend to
be restrained by the actual environment, artistic activity enjoys disinterested freedom
of imagination. In utilitarian activities, human beings are the slave of the environment,
but in artistic activity, human beings are their own masters.44
Therefore, it is in artistic activity through 'disinterested contemplation' [wu suo wei
er wei de guanshang Jtj^ ]45 ofbeauty that human beings are able to express
43 See ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 324.
45 The term 'disinterested contemplation' was prominently used in Kant's discussion on aesthetic attitude
to objects. Kant explains the 'disinterested' attitude as one where the subject is "merely contemplative
... indifferent as regards the existence of an object,' and focusing rather upon its 'appearance' or
'representation.' See Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgement, trans, by J. H. Bernard (New York:
Hafner, 1966; originally published in 1790), p. 43. Although, strictly speaking, Kant himself did not
employ 'disinterest' to distinguish the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic, but to distinguish, within the
realm of what he called the 'aesthetic,' judgements of beauty and sublimity from those of mere
pleasantness, Kant's notion of'disinterest' inspired the most popular approach to aesthetic attitude.
For example, Stolnitz "defines the aesthetics attitude as disinterested and sympathetic attention to
and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever." See Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and
Philosophy ofArt Criticism (Boston (Mass.): Riverside, 1960), pp. 34-35.
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themselves without restrictions and accordingly realise their value as a human being to
the full. In terms ofhumanity, Zhu believed that this contemplation ofuniversal harmony
is of the highest morality, namely it is ultimate goodness.46
In the words of Zhu, it is art that is responsible for setting up the real and solid
foundation ofmorality by "extending sympathy, enlarging imagination and affording
human beings profound and true insights ofhuman life."47 In this sense, judgments of art
for its moral value have to be attached to judgements of its aesthetic value as well.
By defining art from a wider perspective in order to attain the ultimate goodness or
the highest morality, Zhu seemed to believe that he had found the answer for the autonomy
of aesthetic experience. However, he did not address in detail in what way the ultimate
goodness is achieved. The question remains as to whether the achievement of the ultimate
goodness is through artistic activity in the wider sense or through aesthetic experience in
the narrower sense, since his theory seems to retain both. If it is through the former, then
there is no reason to believe that one's moral sense does not contribute to the attainment
of the higher moral goodness in aesthetic experience, as Zhu had already acknowledged
that moral sense can affect one's sense ofbeauty or ugliness.48 Ifone's moral sense does
influence one's sense of beauty or ugliness, the notion of aesthetic experience as
independent pure intuition of a perfect image should be modified.
At this point, Zhu seems to be in a theoretical predicament, as though he is returning
to the stance ofCroce's from which he was trying to depart. Nonetheless, it is observable
that in comparison with his previous view in Europe, Zhu upheld human artistic activity
as an organic whole while he attempted to modify his view ofaesthetic experience as an
autonomous stage of cognition in the Crocian sense. Zhu maintained that it is through
artistic activity that a series of aesthetic experiences and other elements such as
psychological reactions and moral sense correlate with each other.
46 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 324.
47 Ibid., p. 325.
48 See ibid., p. 321.
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5.3. Evaluation of Beauty
Relying on the psychological evidence for aesthetic experience as a factual
foundation as described in Chapter Four and motivated by his inclination towards the
illumination of the social implication ofart, Zhu proceeded to give an assessment ofwhat
beauty is in the following chapters of Wenyi xinlixue (1936).
He was aware of difficulties and contentions in defining the concept because
divergent definitions are logically deduced from different philosophical premises. Since
his first study of aesthetics from as early as the beginning of the 1920s, he had been
determined not to be biased by what he called a 'metaphysical premise,' instead constructing
a theory which was grounded on human facts.49 This is probably why he commenced his
aesthetic theorisation with aesthetic experience in the light ofempirical phenomena rather
than a definition of beauty as many Western philosophers did. According to Zhu, the
evaluation of beauty becomes feasible only after individual concrete problems are
clarified. He would rather approve the aesthetic with psychological facts which are tangible
and thus verifiable, than with theoretical preconceptions which tend to depend on
metaphysics regardless of facts.50
Zhu's background of traditional Chinese thinking as well as Western intellectual
development in the 20th century led him to tackle the issue ofbeauty from a practical and
organically oriented humanist perspective. Instead ofdelivering a definition right away,
Zhu chose to start by clarifying some facts within the existing conceptions ofbeauty and
undertook to find an appropriate way of evaluating beauty.
First of all, Zhu illuminated the differences between the Western and traditional
Chinese modes of thinking. He intended to inform his readers of his intellectual position
49 See Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy: A Critical Study of Various Theories ofTragic
Pleasure (1933), p. 6. For a more detailed account ofZhu's criticism of'metaphysical premise,' see
"4.1 Zhu's Pragmatic Approach to Aesthetics," in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
50 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zibai" [Writer's preface], Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ,
vol. 1, p. 197.
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to indicate a different point ofdeparture. He remarked that the problem withWestern ways
of defining beauty as an entity derived from the Western dichotomous mentality which
had developed alongside more than a thousand years ofChristianity. As nature is conceived
to be the incarnation ofGod, it is set above human reality; human beings worship nature
with religious awe.51 Such a tradition attributes beauty exclusively to nature and, as a result,
separates it from the human world.
On the contrary, based on traditional Chinese perspective, Zhu viewed that nature
in China is not treated as separate from human beings but rather as interrelated. Zhu stated
that in ancient Chinese art and literature, such as The BookofSongs [Shijing nature
appeared to be depicted as background or an effective complement,52 in order to induce
an emotional state in the author and reader. Zhu further stated:
After the Jin i=f- and Tang M dynasties, admiration for nature became more
prevalent under the influence of poets, painters and Taoist monks. ... However,
Taoist mysticism did not exert substantial influence in China. ... The Chinese attitude
towards nature was grounded on the notion of le tian zhi zu [rest satisfied
with what you are], according to which human beings are an integral part of nature
and should seek mutuality with nature and to live in accord and at peace with
it.55
In order to examine the Western attitude towards natural beauty, Zhu introduced two
Western theories: naturalism [ziranzhuyi I] and idealism [lixiangzhuyi JlitSi
^].54 Zhu pointed out that because Western naturalism and idealism in art draw their
theories from the belief that human beings, being finite, are inferior to infinite nature or
51 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 327.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid. Zhu's comment about Taoism here may invoke criticism as it is common knowledge that Taoism,
especially Zhuangzi's notion of nature, does not necessarily set nature above the human world as
Western supernaturalism does. Despite the fact that Zhu did not explain what he meant by Taoist
mysticism, the term used here may indicate that the principle of Taoism is obscure and
incomprehensible to common sense. See for an briefaccount ofTaoism, Wing-tsit Chan trans, and
comp., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, pp. 177-179.
54 The notions of the two theories are not clear as Zhu does not give a conceptual explanation although
he mentions that the notion ofnaturalism used in his account is not the theory in literature which Zola
claimed, but an attitude to nature discussed in the book Introduction a I'esthetique, (Paris: 1912) by
a French critic Charles Lalo. See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1,
p. 327.
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God, they both represent a belief in absolute beauty in nature. In Zhu's understanding, some
writers and artists, such as Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1780-1867), John Ruskin
(1819-1900) and Auguste Rodin (1840-1917) are exemplary of this thought. Ingres, an
influential painter ofportraits in the nineteenth century, stated that since beauty can only
be found in nature, one "must copy what one can see in nature like an idiot or an obedient
slave."55 Perfect art, for Ruskin, "is to reflect nature in total; only imperfect art tailors nature
for the need of the artist."56 Rodin also admits his absolute faith in nature, asserting that
"for an artist worthy ofthe name, everything is beautiful inNature because his eyes, boldly
accepting every external truth, read in Nature without effort, as from an open book, every
internal truth." For Rodin, therefore, the primal task for an artist is to maintain a firm
confidence in nature as a perfect embodiment ofbeauty. Only when one keeps this principle
in mind is one entitled to open one's eyes to observe nature.57
Zhu did not agree with these views. From an empirical point of view, he believed
that beauty is a relative concept. He first ofall found a theoretical fallacy with the naturalist
approach and questioned whether beauty in nature is valid without reference to ugliness.
He argued that beauty and ugliness are a pair of relative concepts; without the other for
comparison, neither exists.58 Zhu's argument then indicates that, if beauty exists in
opposition to ugliness and each serves the other as a contrast, the purpose ofart is notmerely
to accept nature but to make a choice, and choice designates humane valuation. Zhu
suggested that to make a choice about nature in the form ofart is actually to borrow a certain
part ofnature to express one's feeling. Thus, beauty expressed in art is not to be exclusively
attributed to nature.59
55 Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres; quoted from Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue, in Q.J, vol. 1, p. 328.
This is my own translation from Zhu's book as I was not able to find the original text.
56 John Ruskin, Lectures on Architecture and Painting: Delivered at Edinburgh in November 1853
(London: Smith, Elder, 1855), pp. 8-9.
57 See Auguste Rodin, Art: Conversations with Paul Gsell, trans, by Jacques de Caso and Patricia B.
Sanders (London, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1984), pp. 11-20. Also
see Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 329.
58 See ibid., p. 329.
59 Ibid., p. 330.
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In this sense, he appeared to be more sympathetic toward classical idealism as it
accepts the beauty and ugliness antithesis and only imitates what it sees as ideal or beautiful.
It indicates that art can enjoy its own organic world in the sense that it involves the
imagination and feeling of the artist in the process of idealised imitation. In other words,
art is not the mechanical reflection of nature, but rather echoes the artist's personality and
creativity.60 Nevertheless, according to Zhu, classical idealism only allows the typical
subjectmatter in art that best represents its category and denies the validity ofthe individual
character of art. As a result, art loses its genetic link with nature through the individual
organism and returns to an inhuman imitation of nature. Zhu warned that idealised
stereotypes reduce art to a device that repeats rather than creates because such idealised
stereotypes are invariably portrayed as superman and superwoman and always described
as beauty.61
For Zhu, therefore, both naturalism and classical idealism are not acceptable because
neither of them incorporates beauty into the interrelation ofhuman beings and nature, but
treats it instead as a self-sufficient entity. Zhu stated that, despite their differences, both
naturalists and classical idealists presume that beauty belongs essentially and permanently
to nature: while naturalism trusts nature as one sees it, classical idealism endows nature
with an autonomous spiritual quality.62 Because of this presumption, naturalism and
classical idealism regard art as the imitation of nature.
In his criticism of the two attitudes, Zhu cited Henry Delacroix (1873-1937), the
professor ofphilosophy at Paris University whose lectures on aesthetics Zhu attended in
1929 while he was registered at University College London (UCL).63 Delacroix held that
"naturalism and idealism share a common presumption: beauty is the thing in itselfexisting
either in the phenomenal world or in the transcendental world; artists can just distinguish
60 Ibid., pp. 330-331.
61 See ibid., pp. 331-332.
62 See ibid., p. 333.
63 See QianNiansun . Zhu Guangqian - Chushi dejingshenyu rushi de shiye tUH - ill ftO-Un#
[Zhu Guangqian: the spirit of transcending the world and the undertaking of going
into the society] (Beijing: Wenjin chubanshe, 2005), p. 328.
113
beauty from nature. In fact, however, art can never be a thing in itself. It does not exist
either in the phenomenal world or in the transcendental world. Art is creation; it is the result
ofhuman ability.... It is human beings who see the image, contemplates it and projects
it onto an external object. It is a human product materialised in the outside world, not the
product ofnature itself."64 From this perspective, Zhu acknowledged and welcomed the
fact that, since the romanticismmovement ofthe 19th century, modern idealist artists such
as the poets Alfred de Vigny (1797-1863) and Paul Verlaine (1844-1896) shifted their
attention from the stereotype to individuality. The task ofart, on the other hand, is to create
concrete images and images are the embodiment of individual character.65
In Zhu's discussion, the issue now is whether or not art copies nature at all. Zhu's
answer is conditionally negative. First of all, Zhu affirms:
Nature is only formless matter; it is art that gives it a vivid form which makes
sense to human beings. The mind of an artist is like a furnace and a hammer
which shape the crude materials of nature into an artistic product. Only then do
form and beauty come into reality.66
He thought that the remarks made by Goethe in a conversation with J. P. Eckermann
best explained his own idea: "The artist has a twofold relation to Nature; he is at once her
master and her slave. He is her slave, inasmuch as he must work with earthly things, in
order to be understood; but he is her master, inasmuch as he subjects these earthly means
to his higher intentions, and renders them subservient."67 Therefore, Zhu concluded that
beauty which is created in art is not the result of copying nature, but rather of transforming
nature to human spiritual and emotional need. Even ugly things in nature, added Zhu, can
be transformed into beautiful art such as the depiction of old people by Rembrandt
64 Henri Delacroix, Psychologie de IArt: Essai sur lActiviteArtistique (Paris: F. Alcan, 1927), quoted
from Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 333-334. This is my own
translation from Zhu's book as I was not able to locate the original pages.
65 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue, in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 332-333.
66 Ibid., p. 334.
67 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "A Conversation with Eckermann on Rubens' Landscape in Engraving
on April 18, 1827," in J. P. Eckermann ed. Conversations with Goethe (London: J. M. Dent & Sons
Ltd., 1935), p. 196.
114
(1606-1669), the portraits ofdwarves and idiots by Velazquez (1599-1660), and Rodin's
sculpture of an old courtesan by Rodin.68
Since beauty, in Zhu's estimation, does not live purely in nature as claimed by
naturalists or in the mind as claimed by subjective idealists, then a middle ground
somewhere between mind and nature must be sought to provide a meeting point of the
two. Such a compromise, however, is not necessarily without theoretical problems if the
two are taken into further investigation against each other. Zhu's middle-way approach
seems to be able to sustain the fact that beauty appears both subjective and objective. It
may appear objective when certain things are characterised "symmetry [duichengMM],
golden section [huangjinfenge unity in variety \yu zhengqiyu bianhua %MM
and verisimilitude [ru qing ru li and tend to achieve agreeable
appreciation by the majority.69 In some other cases, it may be subjective when personal
values such as moral sense, view of life and propensities of feeling are attached.
Nevertheless, the burden that Zhu's theory had to bear was to conjoin the subjective and
the objective in a genetic way so that neither side would be able to claim an exclusive right
to beauty without the help of the other.70
First ofall, as Zhu pointed out earlier, any effort of looking for exclusive authority
either in the object or in the subject is invariably due to a dichotomous mode of thinking.
Zhu commented that, in light of dualism, many Western philosophers are inclined to set
their theories above facts and to indulge in pure abstract speculation. They endeavour to
fix beauty either with the object or with the subject and fail to consider them as a whole.
Subsequently, "they can only arrive at pure concepts such as 'idea' [gainian 'freedom'
[ziyou ft tij] or 'infinitude' [wuxian In real terms, however, these concepts are not
applicable as they are intangible in real aesthetic experience and one "would not entertain
the concepts of freedom and infinitude before feeling that something is beautiful."71
68 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 336.
69 Ibid., p. 341.
70 See ibid., pp. 340-341.
71 Ibid., pp. 344-345.
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While criticising this view, Zhu chose to rely on aesthetic facts themselves rather
than onmetaphysical concepts. He believed that, in the determination ofbeauty, even when
the subject and the object are apparently in conflict, a compromise could be reached if one
evaluates beauty in terms of fact. To look at concrete and individual aesthetic phenomena,
then, is to logically adhere to human reality. In actualising an aesthetic consciousness,
human beings involve not only their ownmind in the form of feeling internally, but also
the object in the form of an image externally.72
During the course of aesthetic experience, the subject and the object establish
an interrelationship; and this reciprocal relationship has to be activated by the subject
which needs expression of its feelings through the object. ... Artistic creation is
to express feelings in external image while artistic appreciation is to sympathetically
apprehend the feelings expressed in the image. In this way, beauty designates an
adequate and pleasant feeling on the part of the subject through an image which
adequately expresses the emotion harboured in the mind of the subject.73
Zhu argued that, once the subject and the object are genetically united in an aesthetic
experience, there should no longer be any problems with content and form: content is
feeling [qingqu and form is image \yixicing M . Without either, aesthetic
experience would be void. It also follows that beauty, no matter whether it is in art or nature,
has to be the adequate expression of feeling through an image and the subject invariably
creates the image. In other words, what is embodied as beauty both in art and in nature
is not an abstract generalisation but concrete individuality. It is through the successful
74
expression of individual personality and emotion that art or nature appears to be beautiful.
It is worth noting that Zhu did not treat beauty as an attribute or characteristic ofeither
mind or matter. He did not resort to the analytical conceptualisation of beauty by
dissociating it from the totality ofhuman experience. All he had offered so far, in defining
beauty, was but a method or a way of looking at the relationship between the subject and
the object. For Zhu, beauty is a pervasive attitude involving human beings and nature rather
72 Ibid., pp. 346-347.
73 Ibid., p. 347.
74 Ibid., pp. 348-350.
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than a specific subjectmatter ofpure speculation. Zhu, borrowing the words ofEdgar F.
Carritt (1876-1964), remarked that beauty "is not a quality of things or of the mind, but
a relation between us and an expressive object."75 This means that basically there is no
ready-made beauty in nature waiting to be represented. Zhu held that beauty, being a value,
has to be created through the mind, namely that the subject expresses their feelings through
the image of the object.76With this presumption as an affirmation ofhuman subjectivity,
Zhu added that since the concept ofbeauty is set against the relationship between the subject
and the object rather than the abstract speculation, and since the subjectivity is deep-rooted
in the variety of individual attitudes towards aesthetic object due to their varied
backgrounds and experiences, then beauty, being the product of the subjective, must be
a relative value given in accordance with one's emotions and tastes.77
5.4. Re interpretation of Croce's Theory
In another added chapter, Chapter Eleven ofWenyi xinlixue (1936), Zhu
Guangqian endeavoured to clarify how he differed from Croce to justify his attaching
'associative thinking' [lianxiang IfrjS-] and moral sense to aesthetic experience. While
admitting that his theory accepted Croce's notion of aesthetic experience as only intuition
of image [xingxiang de zhijue ffj |M\J Zhu claimed that aesthetic experience is
temporally and spatially inadequate for containing perceptual as well as conceptual
associations. Since human beings, who are the agents of aesthetic experience, are
simultaneously agents ofethical activity and scientific activity, Zhu was convinced that
Croce's aesthetics, in isolating aesthetic experience from other activities, is flawed on
psychological grounds. Zhu thus modified Croce's mechanical explanation oftheoretically
distinguishable stages of aesthetic experience in order to incorporate other psychological
75 Edgar F. Carritt, An Introduction toAesthetics (London: Huchinson's University Library, 1949), p.
124.
76 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue ^ (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 347.
77 Ibid., pp. 347-352.
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aspects (perception, empathy, inner imitation and associative thinking). Zhu affirmed that
Croce's aesthetics would be closer to the truth if it were flexible enough to treat art as a
process of deliberation rather than a mere moment of intuition.78 Thus, he held that his
work was not to deny Croce's theory, but to 'amend' the flaws engendered by Croce's
mechanical conception.79
With this view in mind, Zhu left Croce's notion of aesthetic experience as intuition
intact and the only problems which he found with Croce's aesthetics by this stage
concentrate on such issues as whether intuitive image is mere physical fact and whether
artistic value is absolute. In Chapters Six, Seven and Eight of Wenyixinlixue
(1936), as has been discussed in the previous sections in this chapter, he had already given
his assurance that he regarded art as the product of aesthetic experience and associative
connections, including moral sense. While endeavouring to justify his view on the holistic
nature of art, Zhu appeared inclined to amethodological approach respecting all facts and
the relativity of aesthetic experience to associative connections. He was willing to give
priority to facts even at the cost of logical credibility. Zhu announced in his preface to Wenyi
xinlixue (1936) that he intended to "ignore any preconceived philosophical
premises and to treat artistic creation and appreciation purely as psychological facts and
phenomena."80
By referring to larger contexts and the complex process of artistic activity, Zhu
opposed Croce's conviction that the externalisation of intuition is mere empirical fact and
irrelevant to successful art.81 Not realising that he would contradict some of his own
fundamental points established in earlier chapters ofWenyi xinlixue (1936),
such as the independence of aesthetic experience in the context of artistic creation, Zhu
78 Ibid., pp. 361-362.
79 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zibai"## t\ & [Writer's preface], WenyixinlixueX. |Tc; tf (1936),
in QJ, vol. 1, p. 198.
80 Ibid., p. 197.
81 For Croce's argument on this issue, see Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science ofExpression and
General Linguistic, trans, by Douglas Ainslie, pp. 111-117. In Croce's account, the notion of
externalisation ofaesthetic experience is "to preserve or communicate to other practical activities."
See ibid., p. 111.
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claimed on the basis of facts that it is common practice that artists imagine images with
the help ofcertain media [chuanda meijie "A painter imagines bamboo in lines,
hues and shadows; a poet imagines bamboo in words, their sounds and meanings, and a
musician imagines bamboo in tunes and melodies."82 He argued that artists are simply
not able to carry out their imagination without the support ofexternal media; in the absence
of linguistic signs, for example, a poet cannot compose a poem. He therefore declared
therefore that "Croce's intuition or artistic creation and practice of materialisation of it
cannot be dissociated from each other as a matter of fact."83
Moreover, Zhu claimed that the media employed by the imagination may in return
exert an influence on artistic practice (imagination, creation and appreciation) and, by
saying so, took a step further away from Croce's system. Zhujustified his argument through
observable facts:
The history ofart reveals how architectural style varies because ofavailable materials
as well as historical reasons: ancient Greek architecture used stone slabs and thus columns
prevailed; Roman architecture used a mixture ofmud and pebbles and thus walls and
ceilings were dominant features; the Gothic architecture ofthe medieval era, on the other
hand, paid more attention to arches to compensate for high windows and pointed roofs.84
In allowing both sides into artistic creation, Zhu established an interrelated
mechanism by which the artist incorporates images (inner environment) with the medium
(outer environment) in a flux of feedback and adjustments before the artistic product as
the final goal is achieved. That is to say, artists remain in a state of purposive
intercommunication with certain media. The important implication of this exposition,
according to Zhu, is that the motivation of applying external media to express internal
feelings is itself one of human beings' basic social actions. He added:
82 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyixinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 363.
83 Ibid. For an account of identity ofthought and linguistic symbols, see Zhu Guangqian, "Sixiang jiushi
shiyong yuyan" JH t§If [Thinking is to use language] (1948), in QJ, vol.9, pp. 383-395.
This essay was written in English as a contribution to the 50th Anniversary of Peking University in
1948. The essay was translated into Chinese by Zhang Jinyan t in 1988 and published in Zhexue
yanjiu vol. 1 (1989).
84 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 363.
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Human beings are social creatures. By the time people are able to distinguish
their own selves, as opposed to and in association with others, they long to extend
their selves to society for sympathy and recognition. ... It is in terms of such mutual
orientation that language is given birth. As a form of language, art thus becomes
a medium for artists to express themselves. Although it is true that artists sometimes
show contempt for society for its lack of taste for higher art, they cannot help
craving for ideal sympathisers \lixiang de tongqing zhe EEitSG-J Is] 'fa"#"]-85
After Zhu Guangqian translated Croce's Aesthetic as Science ofExpression and
General Linguistic into Chinese in 194786 and studied Angelo Crespi's Contemporary
Thought ofItaly around 1947, Zhu's knowledge ofCroce's theory deepened.87 At the same
time Zhu started to re-evaluate Croce's philosophical system in his monograph on Croce
published in 1948.88 With the help ofCrespi's criticism, Zhu became convinced that the
problem with Croce's theory did not lie in Croce's mechanical separation of aesthetic
experience from the context ofartistic activity, but in his very concept of intuition as art.
Zhu started to query whether all forms ofintuition could be subsumed to art. In other words,
Zhu started to tackle the weak point of Croce's aesthetic theory.
Zhu realised that Croce's premises, such as intuitive knowledge [zhijue de zhishi
being expressive knowledge and thus art, are deduced from his idealist
epistemology. Croce's epistemology, in an effort to seek to overcome the traditional
philosophical dualism of the object and the subject, resolves the object into an experience
of the subject. That is, it attributes all sensible matter to human spirit. Zhu noted that Croce's
concept ofmatter [wu $h] is very dubious in terms of its cognitive relation with the human
mind [xin 'Cj:].89
85 Ibid., p. 364.
86 Zhu's translation ofCroce's workAesthetic as Science ofExpression andGeneral Linguistic published
in 1947 included Part I, the first halfofthe original. See Keluoqi JlIS# [Croce], Meixueyuanli
3, trans, by Zhu Guangqian (Shanghai: Zhengzhong shuju, 1947), in QJ, vol. 11.
87 Zhu acknowledged Angelo Crespi's Contemporary Thought ofItaly (London: William and Norgate
Limited, 1926) and admitted that he owed his views on Croce's aesthetics to Crespi's work. See Zhu
Guangqian, Keluoqi zhexue shuping T .IT## [A study ofCroce's philosophy] (Shanghai:
Zhengzhong shuju, 1948), in QJ, vol. 4, p. 306.
88 See Zhu Guangqian, Keluoqi zhexue shuping TIS###iLlf (1948), in QJ, vol. 4.
89 See ibid., pp. 379-381.
120
On the one hand, Croce transfers a relation between human spirit and something
outside it into a relation between the two forms of knowledge and their activity in
hierarchical degrees encompassing all the human experience in order to overcome
traditional dualism. On the other hand, Croce has to assume the existence ofmatter as a
limiting concept [xianjie de gainian and admits that withoutmatter no human
knowledge or activity is possible.90 Zhu observed that the ambiguity ofCroce's concept
ofmatter betrays a hidden dilemmawithin his philosophical system. That is, ifmatter is
believed to derive from the humanmind, it would mean that matter is already synthesised
by the human spirit as the latter is considered as bonafide activity. In this case, matter cannot
be treated as formless and passive sensation or impression which, in Croce's view,
explicates nothing but animality. Ifmatter is accepted as existing outside the humanmind,
then Croce's idealist system would defeat itself as yet another form of dualism.91
Having disagreed with the domination ofmind-derived intuitive activity in cognition
and replaced it with mind-matter reciprocal perceptive activity, Zhu then looked at
aesthetic experience in a different light. Instead of treating it as an autonomous moment
out of the mind's intrinsic faculty, as he did under the influence of Crocian intuition as
expression in the 1930s as in Tan meitfcfk [Talking about beauty] (1932), Wenyi xinlixue
[The psychology of literature and art] (1936) and Shi lun [On poetry]
(1943), he placed aesthetic experience within the context ofhuman cognitive activities
as a whole. Accordingly, aesthetic activity in art is differentiated from intuitive perception
[zhijue &%] (sensation [ganjue iS'jfe]) at the primordial stage of cognition.92
Since it seems that aesthetic activity takes place only at a relatively mature stage of
cognition, Zhu held that the fundamental difference between intuitive perception [zhijue
jL%\ and aesthetic activity lies in the different types of forms they produce.
Whereas intuitive perception, in recognising qualitative differentiation [zhi de
90 See Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science ofExpression and General Linguistic, p. 6.
91 See Zhu Guangqian, Keluoqi zhexue shaping °TJ!.##(1948), in QJ, vol. 4, pp. 377-378.
92 See ibid., pp. 380-381.
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fenbie of matter, attributes epistemic forms as mere acknowledgment,
aesthetic activity in art, based on cognitive yields, creates forms in unity [wanzheng
through imagination. ... If intuitive perception is postulated as primordial
cognitive activity, the aesthetic experience, on the other hand, contains not only
sensation [ganjue $&%], intuitive perception [zhijue iM.%] but conception [gainian
as well.93
Zhu explained that, in the process of aesthetic activity, the subject is not merely in
a state of being aware of the shape of a certain object, but actively uses imagination to
transfer the feeling to an artistic form that adequately expresses the former. Because feeling
is unequivocally interpreted as being the result ofempirical experience, Zhu felt entitled
to include the knowledge achieved at every stage of cognitive activity within aesthetic
expression.94
In this way, aesthetic experience is no longer treated as of primacy and hence of
absolute value, despite its recognised relative value in artistic activity. Instead, he evaluated
artistic creation by degrees, not just for the convenience of categorising artistic types,95
but according to their content being harmoniously blended with form. Zhu added:
When we claim that a certain artistic work is better than another, apart from
judging if it is adequately expressed in artistic form, we at the same time take
into consideration the moral profundity it reaches. Deeper and more profound content
brings us more truth about life and it must involve more effort to attain a unity
of form and such content.96
Thus, artistic value is proportional to what (content) as well as how (form) the feeling
ofthe subject is expressed. The more adequately truth of life is revealed, the more valuable
or more beautiful the work becomes.
Although Zhu admitted his appreciation of Croce's holistic attempt to establish a
theory, which is probably the very point he found particularly compatible with his own
93 ibid.
94 See ibid., p. 384.
95 In Wenyi xinlixue (1936), Zhu accepted degrees of artistic value only for the sake of
differentiation of artistic types; content or morality though does not affect artistic value.
96 Zhu Guangqian, Keluoqi zhexue shuping "Til## [A study ofCroce's philosophy] (1948),
in QJ, vol. 4, pp. 388-389.
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traditional Chinese approach,97 the completion ofhis book Keluoqi zhexue shuping "T
[A study ofCroce's philosophy] in 1948 marked a significant departure in Zhu's
aesthetic theory from Croce's idealist epistemology. By re-evaluating Croce's theory, Zhu
clarified his real difference from Croce. That is, if knowing is such a dynamic process
through which the selfor subjectivity interflows with the matter or objectivity (to use Zhu's
terminology, wuwo jiaogan ^/^x.^98), it is incomprehensible and thus impracticable
in real life to isolate a cognitive stage such as intuition. By doing this merely for the sake
of emphasising its cognitive status as primordial and initiative in a logical sense, the
dynamic movement and mechanism in the whole process of human cognition are
subsequently obscured.
It seems then that the real incompatibility between Zhu and Croce's theories resides
in their different interpretations of the relationship between human beings and nature.
Whereas Croce's theory ofaesthetics focuses on the subjective aspect ofhuman activities
to the extent of subsuming the object to the subject, Zhu's aesthetics is inclined towards
a holistic interrelationship between human beings and nature. As far as Zhu is concerned,
there is no doubt that human beings, naturally endowed to be creative, are the subjective
initiators ofhuman cultural activities such as art. However, human beings are at the same
time taken for granted in Zhu's theory as a part ofnature and thus never stop communicating
with nature.
While Zhu's theory, which inherited the traditional Chinese viewpoint,
accommodates both human beings and nature as cognitive polarities to form a holistic
process and accordingly proceeds to the empirical interpretation of human experiences,
Croce's theory relies solely on the self-introspective presumption at denial not ofthe object
but of the objectivity of the empirical data. Croce's epistemology leaves neither temporal
nor spatial room for a concrete subject or individual to effectively communicate with the
object. As a result, the reciprocity of the subject and the object as the phenomenal
97 See ibid., pp. 318-331.
98 See Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 237.
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occurrence of the dynamic totality becomes unattainable. As M. E. Moss comments, in
Croce's theory, "this act ofmind that created a synthesis among feelings and also provided
the sine qua non for knowledge was an apriori one."99 In Croce's ownwords, "We have
intuitions without space and without time: the colour of a sky, the colour of a feeling, a
cry ofpain and an effort ofwill, objectified in consciousness: these are intuitions which
we possess, and with theirmaking space and time have nothing to do."100 The discrepancy
between Zhu and Croce, then, illuminates the fundamental difference in the notion oftruth
between traditional Chinese thought and that ofthe West. While truth in traditional Chinese
thought, is realised through the process of interrelation between human beings and nature,
it is considered by the Westernmind to be the substance discernible through pure thinking.
Just as Donald H. Bishop points out, "the point here is that, while the Chinese view advocates
seeing as a whole, it rejects epistemological, as well as metaphysical and theological,
absolutism and exclusivism. It does not demand ultimate explanations but is contentwith
functional ones enabling man to live the best that time and circumstances allow."101
It seems that, by the time Zhu made his second effort to re-evaluate Croce's
epistemology in the late 1940s, his theoretical approach was more clarified. If, at the first
stage from the 1920s to the 1930s, Zhu's aesthetic theorisation merely showed a propensity
without obvious intention for an holistic approach echoing traditional Chinese thinking
despite his theoretical affiliation with Croce's absolute idealism, then, by the second stage
in the 1940s, his theorisation appeared to endeavour deliberately to illuminate human
activity in aesthetic experience through an ever-present interrelationship between the
subject and the object. In this way, various aspects ofhuman knowledge such as intuition,
sensation, perception and conception are legitimately included in artistic activity and, as
a result, his aesthetics breaks away from the epistemological category in the Crocian sense.
99 M. E. Moss, Benedetto Croce Reconsidered: Truth andError in Theories ofArt, Literature, and
History (London: University Press ofNew England, 1987), p. 24.
100 Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science ofExpression and General Linguistic, p. 4
10' Donald H. Bishop, "The Chinese Contribution to World Thought," in Donald H. Bishop ed., The




6.1. Social and Intellectual Background in the 1940s and 1950s
After the eight years of the War of Resistance against Japan ended in 1945, Zhu
returned to Beijing and became Head of the Department ofEuropean Languages at Peking
University in Aug 1946.1 Although Zhu was not particularly interested in politics and saw
his role as being to teach well and to write,2 the situation soon deteriorated again as civil
war erupted. After years ofwar, the Nationalist government was faced with enormous
economic, political and social problems. In particular, corruption, internal schisms and
widespread inefficiency accelerated its decline. The Nationalist government began to take
extreme measures to suppress political unrest by threatening dissent with harsh action from
the secret police. By the late 1940s, not only leftist intellectuals who had turned to the
Communist Party since the 1920s, but even many intellectuals who favoured non-violent
reform had lost confidence in the Nationalist government. With over 70 percent of
population living in utter poverty and the educated elite disillusioned, by 1948 the
prevailing sentiment in the country was in favour of change ofany kind and peace at any
cost.3
In this climate of anti-government sentiment, the Red Army successfully gained
control of vast areas of China with one victory after another. In addition to its human
sacrifices in the War of Resistance against Japan, the Communist Party made a strong
1 See Qian Niansun Zhu Guangqian - Chushi dejingshenyu rushi de shiye - tb 4pj4t
[Zhu Guangqian - the spirit of transcending the world and the undertaking ofgoing
into the society] (Beijing: Wenjin chubanshe, 2005), p. 288.
2 See Zhu Guangqian, "Ziwo jiancha" il [Self-criticism], Renmin ribao CR 3 4k [People's
daily] (12 Nov 1949), in QJ, vol. 9, p. 536.
3 For an analysis of the reasons why a drastic change was preferred in 1940s China, see Jonathan D.
Spence, The SearchforModern China (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999
2nd ed.), pp. 473-488 and A. Doak Barnett, Communist China: the Early Years, 1949-1955 (London:
Pall Mall Press, 1964), Part I.
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impression on the people with its ability to show responsibility. While the Nationalist
government had lost the people's support in rural areas due to its failure to recognise the
overwhelming rural crisis, the Communist Party committed itself to the most urgent matters
such as land reform and thus gained support from the peasants who accounted for the
majority of the Chinese population. Support for the Communist Party expanded when it
appeared that the Communists were adopting a strong nationalist stance in their political
practice, as the Chinese had not only reached a psychological breaking point under harsh
living conditions, but had also long been disappointed with China's continually weak
position in the world.
According to H. G. Creel, writing in 1953, "even Chinese who are strongly
anti-Communist can not avoid being gratified that their country againwields an influence,
in world affairs, such as it has not enjoyed inmany, many years."4 Generally, what seemed
to have impressed Chinese people is that the Communist Party was enthusiastic and
efficient whereas the Nationalist government was impotent and corrupt. Through this big
contrast the Communist Party gained an unquestionable advantage over the Nationalist
government.5
Zhu was aware of problems such as corruption in the Nationalist government and
even protested against some of its policies. For instance, he had encouraged the students
ofSichuan University to walk out ofclassrooms in 1938 when the Nationalist government
interfered in academic appointments for political purposes.6 In a series ofcritical articles
written around this period, he maintained that the problems were caused by the
government's undemocratic policies and that the suppression ofopposing opinions would
kill the vitality of the nation, strongly urging the government to give people freedom of
4 H. G. Creel, Chinese Thoughtfrom Confucius toMao Tse-tung (Chicago: University ofChicago Press,
1953), p. 252.
5 See Peter S. H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China: The Domestic Scene 1949-1967 (South
Orange, New Jersey: Seton Hall University Press, 1967), pp. 72-73.
6 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zuozhe zizhuan" IT# £l # [Writer's autobiography], Yiwen zatan
[Informal talking about literature and art] (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1981), pp. 280-287, in
QJ, vol. 1, p. 6.
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speech.7 However, towards the late 1940s, he became increasingly disillusioned with the
Nationalist Party, of which he had been a member since 1942, not only because of its
totalitarian policies, but also because of its reckless attitude towards the livelihood of the
people. In 1948, he and sixteen other professors from Peking University wrote to the
Chairman of the Nationalist Party, Chiang Kai-shek, pleading with the government to
consider the people's hardships and misfortunes.8 The request failed to draw any response
and the government itselfwas soon forced to flee to Taiwan. In the following year, when
he was invited by the Nationalist government to fly to Taiwan, Zhu declined and decided
to stay.
One might argue that Zhu's decision to stay with the Communist government was
merely due to his bitter disappointment with the Nationalist government. However, when
his view of life and especially the development of his aesthetics over the years are taken
into consideration, his decisionmay not on balance seem surprising. One can see that what
the Communist Party achieved in China in the late 1940s, in term of boosting national
dignity, creating a new order and unifying the nation, was not necessarily out of the tune
with Zhu's aesthetically derived social ideal which seeks humanity in harmony, dignity
and unity. In other words, Zhu's thinking, hitherto established and embodied in his study
ofaesthetics, did not appear to him to have to be abandoned because of its "reactionary"
propositions. The ideological struggles that Zhu was later forced to be involved in did not
corrupt his intellectual integrity. On the contrary, Zhu was able to find other theoretical
angles and developed his aesthetics to a new stage in which the emphasis on humanity
in his theory was to some extent politically as well as academically justified.
7 See Zhu Guagnqian, "Xianzheng cujin yu yanlun ziyou" &j&fSLit."j"£] th [Promotion of the
constitution and freedom of speech], Da gong bao (9 Apr 1944), in QJ, vol. 9, pp. 172-175.
8 See Qian Niansun Zhn Guangqianyuzhongxi wenhua tkibi'aTf T 3? X-fb [Zhu Guangqian
and East-West culture] (1995), pp. 410-411.
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6.2. The Influence of Thought Reform
In the Summer of 1949, shortly before the establishment of the communist
government, Mao Zedong stated that merely gaining political power by no means
completed the Long March. "In the twenty eight long years of the Party, we have done
only one thing, and that is, we have won the basic victory and a victory in a large country
like China. But there is plenty ofwork before us, and, as on amarch, what work has been
done in the past is like the first step on amarch of 10,000 li. Remnants of the enemy still
have to be wiped out, and the grave task ofeconomic reconstruction still lies before us."9
He believed that the mentality of the people, especially the intellectuals ofold China, had
to be cleansed ofbourgeois and individualist liberalism in order for them to offer loyalty
to the new ideology. He asserted that "ideological remoulding, primarily that of all types
of intellectuals, is an important condition for the completion ofdemocratic reforms in all
fields and gradual industrialisation."10 Thus, intellectuals were urged to change their
political attitudes to become completely in tune with the Communist Party's official
ideology. Accordingly, the Thought Reform movementwhich involved over sevenmillion
intellectuals was launched in 1951 throughout China.11
As estimated by Barnett, the campaign was "amazingly effective, particularly since
'individualism' was considered a cardinal sin."12 Intellectuals were organised into study
groups to study Communist ideas and policies on a daily basis and continuous criticism
and self-criticism were practised until every member of the group achieved a "correct"
9 Mao Zedong, "Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng" f&vCRRA-f-jEC [On the people's democratic
dictatorship] (1949), the translation is based on XinhuaNews Agency translation in China Digest,
vol. 16, no. 7 and reused in Tony Saich ed., The Rise to Power ofthe Chinese Communist Party:
Documents andAnalysis (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 1374.
10 Mao Zedong, "Great Victories in Three Mass Movements," opening speech made at the Third Session
of the FirstNational Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held on
23rdOctober 1951, in Selected Works ofMao Tse-tung, vol. 5 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1977), p.
60.
11 For an account ofthe effect of the thought reform movement in the 1950s China, see A. Doak Barnett,
"Part I," Communist China: the Early Years, 1949-1955, pp. 29-116.
12 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China: the Early Years, 1949-1955, p. 20.
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understanding of the Party's policy or point of view.13 Because the campaign put into
practice a method of indoctrination which took advantage of subtle psychological
techniques and the principles of collective dynamics to serve political purposes, it
effectively submitted intellectuals to ideological conformity. Helmut Callis remarks that
"by their indoctrination methods - group discussion, self-criticism, public confession - the
Chinese communists often generate a fervor in their converts comparable with that
observable in fanatical religious sects. In all of these techniques they make use of the general
craving in human beings to find personal recognition in a group and the corresponding
fear ofbeing shamed. Hence conformity has a high value in the Communist state."14 In
addition to that, however, various external factors should also be taken into consideration
as part ofthe explanation ofthe readiness on the part of intellectuals to submit to ideological
conformity.
Since the Reform Movement of 1898, Chinese intellectuals had been widely involved
in various activities aimed at saving China from its ongoing troubles, both culturally and
politically. Despite political differences, many Chinese intellectuals, who, like most
ordinary Chinese, possess what Benjamin I. Schwartz calls an absolute faith in the
universality of their kinship founded on a much firmer cultural base than in some other
cultures,15 preferred the idea of a centralised politics supported by the duty-oriented
individual-family-community foundation of the society akin to the Confucian ideal. The
success of the Chinese Communist Party, according to Helmut G. Callis, was partly due
to the fact that "they are set on transforming the pattern of Chinese society from one of
family loyalty to one ofnational and community responsibility."16 Especially, under the
rule of an incompetent government, first the Qing and then the warlord governments and
then the Nationalist government, both the intellectuals and ordinary Chinese people had
13 See ibid.
14 Helmut G. Callis, China: Confucian and Communist (New York: Holt-Dryden, 1959), p. 317.
15 See Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception ofWorld Order, Past and Present," in John K.
Fairbank ed., The Chinese WorldOrder: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge (Mass.):
Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 281.
16 Helmut G. Callis, China: Confucian and Communist, p. 314.
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developed a psychological urge for unity and security provided by a strong and competent
government. Since the establishment of the Communist Party, Chinese intellectuals had
witnessed its impressive achievements and growing confidence. Its eventual victory was
genuinely celebrated, first by leftists but later also by moderate intellectuals, as the
autocratic but efficient leadership of the new government was not necessarily opposed
to their social ideals. This was particularly the case as the Communist Party went through
over a decade during which people's interests genuinely seemed to be placed uppermost
and turned into reality in policies such as land reform.
Zhu did not feel (or at least he did not declare) that he was trapped when he found
himself involved in the mass campaigns of ideological reform. After the Communist Party
took Beijing in early 1949, he had the opportunity to see Chinese communism with his
own eyes for the first time. He was grateful that despite his previous membership of the
Nationalist Party, the Communist government did not treat him as the enemy. On the
contrary, he was allowed to continue teaching at Peking University and believed himself
to be politically trusted, although he resigned from his position as Head of the Department
of European Languages.17 He expressed his favourable opinion of Communist Party
members thus: "tenacious, conscientious, hard-working, modest and prudent; they showed
genuine enthusiasm in serving the people and a dauntless spirit in the face ofdifficulties."18
These moral qualities were precisely what Zhu sought to achieve as his own ideal when
he was at Hong Kong University.19 He declared that "since the Revolution of 1911, we
have had a lot of frustrations and always ended up in disappointment. Now we have finally
been led to the correct path and regained our vitality."20
Zhu's favourable response to the new policies had a positive effect on his attitude
in the study group to which he was assigned at Peking University. He seems to have taken
17 See Zhu Guangqian, "Xinchunjiyu Taiwan de pengyoumen" [Some words
at New Year to our friends in Taiwan], Dagong bao (19 Jan 1974), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 423.
18 Zhu Guangqian, "Ziwo jiancha" it] [Self-criticism], Renmin ribao AR 0 [People's daily]
(12 Nov 1949), in QJ, vol. 9, p. 537.
19 See Chapter I of this thesis.
20 Zhu Guangqian, "Ziwo jiancha" £] (1949), in QJ, vol. 9, p. 537.
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an active part in the group discussions, although itmust be pointed out that his fear ofbeing
politically incorrect due to his sense ofguilt about his own bourgeois past must have also
occupied much ofhis mind.21 In the course of five years of ideological reform 1949-1954,
he did not engage in any academic studies, but instead he delivered several articles of
criticism and self-criticism which were either published in newspapers or read to the study
group.22 As these articles often contained new political expressions and superficial
rhetoric, they could be seen to discredit his sincerity. For a time, he may not have been
able to fully comprehend his new situation. Like most ofhis contemporaries, he was perhaps
overwhelmed by the new authoritarian ideology.
On the one hand, under such impact, Zhu was willing to conform to the Party's line
and display shame about his past. On the other hand, he was suspect as a symbol ofbourgeois
liberalism and was hence suppressed. Zhu stated in an article entitled "Self-criticism"
published in The People's Daily in 1949:
From the perspective of my new understanding of the Communist Party, I
have realised that my fault does not lie merely in the fact that I used to be a
member of the Nationalist Party, but in the fact that my old education cultivated
a liberal individualist, an intellectual divorced from reality, conservative and
weak-willed. I am willing, however, to study hard and correct my shortcomings
in order to catch up with the times and with the masses and become a useful
person in the new society. I do have some good points to offer. I am conscientious,
modest and optimistic; these good points may be able to give me the seeds of
new life.23
It seems on the surface that Zhu's past ideology was opposed to his new self in terms
of the orthodox view. The guidelines of the ideological reform campaign were based on
the thought of Mao Zedong and Marxist-Leninist historical materialism with a Soviet
21 Zhu admitted some years later that, when the Communist government launched another campaign
called "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools ofThought Contend," he did not
do any academic research for fear of social pressure. See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong qieshen de jingyan
tan baijia zhengming" [On the policy of "Let a Hundred Schools of
Thought Contend" from personal experience], Wenyi bao vol. 1 (1957), in QJ, vol. 10, p.
79.
22 All these articles are collected in QJ, vols. 5, 9 and 10.
23 Zhu Guangqian, "Ziwo jiancha" i] fSfKHf [Self-criticism] (1949), in QJ, vol. 9, p. 538.
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interpretation. Any other ideas were considered unorthodox and reactionary. As Marxist
historical materialism was based on the concept of class, that is, class struggle being the
prime mover of history, Zhu was given the impression that his aesthetic theory, which
sought common ground in human activity focusing on humanity, was certainly not in tune
with Marxism. Besides, his confidence in his own moral intention was shaken when he
realised that his social existence in the old China had placed him in the category of the
exploiting class. In another article written in 1951, Zhu maintained that his "bourgeois
ideas" were caused by his class status as well as by "feudalist" and foreign imperialist
education. He claimed that the fact that his father had become a landowner in old age and
his wife had bought land during the War ofResistance against Japan logically put him in
the landlord class, and declared that this must have contributed to his reactionary
consciousness.24 From 1949 Zhu then abandoned his research on aesthetics for about six
years, yielding not only to social pressure but also to his own sense of class guilt.
However, the irony is that while he was stricken with a sense of guilt for being
anti-Marxist, he knew next to nothing about Marxist theories. He admitted some years later
that he had fallen silent about his own theories only because he realised that his idealist
aesthetics, as labelled by himselfunder pressure during the campaigns, were opposed to
Marxism.25
6.3. Similarities between Zhu Guangqian and Karl Marx
After six years of intensive ideological campaigns, at a special conference of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party on January 14 of 1956, the Premier and
Secretary of the Party Central Committee Zhou Enlai delivered a report entitled "On the
Question of the Intellectuals." The report stressed that ideological rectification was still
the primary task but gave assurances that the Communist Party would trust most
24 See Zhu, Guangqian, "Zuijin xuexi zhongjidianjiantao" T[My confessions in
recent group study], in QJ, vol. 10, pp. 19-24.
25 See ibid.
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intellectuals politically and try to improve their working conditions, living standards and
academic placements.26 Following Zhou's report, Lu Dingyi, the secretary of the
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, made
a speech to a meeting of scientists, social science researchers, doctors, writers and
university scholars in May entitled 'Bai hua qi fang, bai jia zheng ming' Hf 15"
[Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend], promising
his audience that the Party encouraged freedom ofthought, debate, creation and criticism.
He told them that China should learn from the entire world, even from her enemies, rather
than mechanically transplanting Soviet experiences.27 Although the majority of
intellectuals were very cautious about his speech at first, they gradually started to voice
their opinions with reduced fear of a backlash.28
The new policy of the Hundred Flowers movement brought considerable relief to
Zhu, who expressed his pleasure not because he would be able to revive his bourgeois
idealism, but because he would be able to reassess it in a rational and convincing way.29
In other words, he was content that he would be able to study issues in an academic way,
free of political coercion. Thus, despite becoming a target of criticism in a debate on
26 See Zhou Enlai M "On the Question of the Intellectuals" (14 January 1956), in Communist China
1955-1959: Policy Documents withAnalysis, prepared at Harvard University under the joint auspices
of the Centre for International Affaires and the East Asian Research Centre (Cambridge (Mass.):
Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 128-144. According to the forward by Robert R. Bowie and
John K. Fairbank, the author-editor of this collection was a visiting fellow of the Centre for
International Affairs at Harvard University, who edited this volume and wrote the introductions to
the chapters and commentaries preceeding the documents. However, for unknown reasons, the author
remained anonymous.
27 See Lu Dingyi, "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools ofThought Contend" (26
May 1956). This article was revised by the author and published in the People's Daily on 13 June
1956, in ibid., pp. 151-163.
28 During this time, some intellectuals at Peking University did challenge the domain ofMao Zedong
Thought and Marxism-Leninism. See Rene Goldman, "The Rectification Campaign at Peking
University, May-June 1957," in Roderick MacFarquhar ed., China Under Mao: Politics Takes
Command (Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1966), pp. 255-270. However, since radical views were
only on a comparatively small scale and mainly concentrated among university students, I choose
not to treat them as influential to the main trend among the intellectuals during this period.
29 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong qieshen de jingyan tan baijia zhengming"
(1957), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 80.
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aesthetics launched soon after the new policy was announced in 1956, he felt it was safe
to express his views.
It should be noted that the seeming freedom extended to intellectuals was not without
limitations: the Party's official ideology was seen as faultlessly correct and accordingly
the only standard for thought, debate, creation and criticism. In particular, the Communist
Party was intolerant of appeals for democracy by liberalist intellectuals, in many
universities in the wake ofthe policy of the Hundred Flowers campaign. The Anti-rightist
campaign in 1957 constituted exactly a direct reaction to this political dissidence.30
In comparison, the debate on aesthetics appeared to be less political and thus more
flexible in terms ofcontroversial issues, or to put it another way, the ideological battle lines
were less exclusive and Zhu was able to join the debate and defend his views. Perhaps due
to the fact that aesthetic issues were less politically sensitive than other issues such as human
rights and freedom of speech, Zhu's arguments against his critics were not considered as
being opposed to the Party. Besides, his willingness to conform to the Party's line allowed
him to undertake a serious and relatively independent study ofMarxist aesthetic theories,
for example Marx's The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, "Theses on
Feuerbach," The German Ideology, and Engels's Dialectics ofNature.31 At the same time,
he started to translate the first volume ofHegel's Aesthetics, whichmust have given him
an opportunity to review the real context ofMarxism from the perspective of the history
ofWestern ideas rather than of Soviet orthodoxy. The fact that Zhu's interpretation of
Marxist aesthetics differed from the orthodox one widespread among aesthetic theorists
in the 1950s must be related to his positivist way of studying Marxist philosophy. The
30 For a general account of the application of the Hundred Flowers policy, see Roderick MacFarquhar
ed., The Hundred Flowers (London: Stevens, 1960).
31 Marx's early work Economic andPhilosophicManuscripts of1844 was written between April and
August of 1844. Marx "produced the rough draft ofwhat, judging by his preface, was to have been
a book. He did not finish it for publication, however, and it lay unpublished formore than eighty years.
The surviving parts, comprising four manuscripts, were given the name shown above. An incomplete
version in Russian translation was published in Moscow in 1927. The first full edition in German
... was published in Berlin in 1932." Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (New York and
London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978 2nd ed.), p. 66.
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translation of the first volume ofHegel's Aesthetics published in December 1958 may have
contributed to his study ofMarx, since the philosophy of Hegel largely influenced the
development ofMarx's views on human beings and human history as well as aesthetics.32
A year later, Zhu claimed that it was the study ofMarxist aesthetic theories that had
led him to do some serious thinking on aesthetic issues and that as a result, he had become
aware ofproblems such as the social aspect ofaesthetics which he had not thoroughly dealt
with before.33 Zhu admitted that he used to treat aesthetic factmainly from a psychological
point of view, neglecting the social aspect which would have provided helpful support
to his effort to attachmorality to art in his work Wenyi xinlixue (1936). Zhu
also realised that he had struggled to justify the unity of the subject and the object through
Croce's aesthetics because Croce regarded the relationship between the two solely from
the perspective of epistemology, whilst Marx treated it as a matter of praxis.34 He was
convinced that aMarxist interpretation of the relationship between subject and object in
virtue ofpraxis would offer a better explanation of aesthetic facts. According to Zhu, his
discoveries ofMarxist theory brought him and his aesthetic theories closer to Marxism.
Thus he confidently predicted that Marxism rather than idealismwould come to dominate
his thinking.35
Regarding Zhu's change of thinking in the 1950s, some aesthetic theorists such as
Cai Yi H-fH, Hong Yiran TflT.fL and Li Zehou (who were his most severe critics
32 See Heige'er W.feM [Hegel], Meixue [Aesthetics], vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe,
1958) in QJ, vol. 13. The second and third volumes published in 1979 by Commercial Press are
included in QJ, vols. 14 and 15. For an account ofHegel's influence upon Marx, see Nancy S. Love,
Marx, Nietzsche, andModernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 20-32.
33 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong qieshen de jingyan tan baijia zhengming"
[On the policy of "Let a Hundred Schools ofThought Contend" from personal experience] (1957),
in QJ, vol. 10, p. 81.
34 Praxis is an important concept in Marxism and can be interpreted as action, doing, or activity. In
the Economic andPhilosophicManuscripts of1844 which appeared to be largely influential in the
development ofZhu's idea in the post-1949 era, Marx "sometimes contrasts it with mere labour; it
is for him and later Marxist writers the free, conscious, creative, essentially human activity, alone
capable of generating knowledge and a new and better social order." Thomas Mautner, Penguin
Dictionary ofPhilosophy (London'. Penguin, 1996), p. 442.
35 See Zhu Guangqian, "Cong qieshen de jingyan tan baijia zhengming"
(1957), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 81.
135
in the 1950s debate on aesthetics) denied Zhu's interpretation of Marxist theories and
argued that his more favourable attitude towards Marxism was merely a false impression
which glossed over his idealist essence. In some recent studies, Yan Guozhong and Zhu
Shirong have maintained that Zhu's adaptation of Marxism was the sign of a thorough
conversion from idealism.36 Even Zhu himself declared that he "had pulled himselfout
ofthe swamp of decadent thought through primary studies of the Marxist-Leninist theory
of literature and art."37 It is generally accepted amongst aesthetic theorists in the People's
Republic of China that Zhu's earlier aesthetics was incompatible with Marxist ideas, or
at least irrelevant to them.
However, it seems thatmany critics overlooked the reason for Zhu to feel particularly
comfortable with Marxist theory after he had gained a deeper knowledge of it. As Sabattini
suggests, it seems reasonable to assume that Zhu's general aesthetic ideas do not necessarily
deny Marxism-Leninism.38 It should be pointed out that the academic atmosphere in 1950s
China, especially during the ideological reform process, was overshadowed by the
orthodox interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, which were
treated as unquestionable dogma and thus unaffected by historical and theoretical contexts.
As a consequence of this, any ideas which were not explicitly recognised as orthodox
were discarded as anti-Marxist. This environment was so overwhelming that even the
carriers ofunorthodox ideas themselves believed that their ideas could not possibly share
anything with the approved dogmas. However, internal similarities and historical and
36 These two studies are typical examples of the popular view ofZhu's adoption ofMarxism as ideological
conversion rather than intellectual assimilation. See Yan Guozhong K1 0&, Zhu Guangqian meixue
sixiangji qi lilun tixi Tit;"TA^ ®-15Afl-ifS $. [The aesthetic thought and theoretical system
ofZhu Guangqian] (1994), Chapters. 5, 6 and 7 and Zhu Shirong and Xu Daoming ifii
Zhu Guangqian - congmitu dao tongjing Tib if* - [Zhu Guanqian - from a wrong
path to a coherent road] (1991), Chapters. 4 and 5.
37 Zhu Guangqian, "Wo de wenyi sixiang de fandongxing" 4%Yj A#Zbtj.&j jZf/j[The reactionary
nature ofmy thinking on literature and art], Wenyi bao xHTH, vol. 2 (Jun 1956), in QJ, vol. 5, pp.
38-39.
38 Mario Sabattini, "Tra critica e autocritica: Zhu Guangqian e il dibattito sull'estetica negli anni
Cinquanta" [Between criticism and self-criticism: Zhu Guangqian and the debate on aesthetics in
the 1950s], in Raoul Findeisen and Robert Gassmann eds., Autumn Floods: Essays in Honour of
Marian Galik{Bern: Peter Lang, 1997), p. 363.
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theoretical associations in ideas often tended to justify themselves in spite of apparent
mechanical separations. Thus, while Zhu willingly accepted that he had to abandon his
"bourgeois idealism" in order to adopt Marxist historical materialism, he was able to defend
his ideas by borrowing arguments fromMarxist theories. As D. W. Fokkema observes,39
this paradoxical attitude is reflected in his article "Wo de wenyi sixiang de fandongxing"
•$16-JX#ill66 (1956)." While he dismissed his ideas for being non-Marxist in
the general sense, Zhu tried to justify his ideas by looking for moral support from Marxism
in individual cases.40
Zhumay have not realised or chosen to explain that he was able to identify at times
with Marxist ideas although there were in fact similarities between his own ideas and
Marx's. Since the academic environment ofChina in the 1950s was restricted within a single
ideological orthodoxy, this sense of comparison certainly could not emerge. Nevertheless,
if there were similarities, it was by no means surprising that they reflected the common
concerns of nineteenth and twentieth century intellectuals about human existence and
human value in the wake of industrialisation, inhumanity, warfare, social turmoil and moral
deterioration which overshadowed modern society both in the West and in China. This
may help explain why Zhu was able to turn to Marxism so quickly and to adhere to it for
the rest of his life.
6.3.1. Human Value and Art in Zhu and Marx's Thinking
As discussed earlier, Chinese traditional thinking, especially Confucianism and
Taoism, appeared to be greatly influential upon Zhu Guangqian's ideas in his formative
years. This influence was then blended with European humanist trends when he undertook
39 Fokkema observes that "throughout the essay, however, very little and perhaps only formal regret
is shown. The question of the degree ofhis sincerity can be left aside here; the important fact is that
Chu Kuang-ch'ien actually gives much information which generally was not presented to the readers
ofWen-ipao." Under these circumstances, Zhu's self-criticism and even some self-degrading remarks
should probably be taken at the semantic level and assessed contextually. See D. W. Fokkema, Literary
Doctrine in China andSoviet Influence, 1956-1960 (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), pp. 93-94.
40 See Zhu Guangqian, "Wo de wenyi sixiang de fandongxing" X !§• 66 iCiGi [The
reactionary nature ofmy thinking on literature and art] (1956), in QJ, vol. 5, pp. 11-39.
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Western studies. Almost inevitably, he followed the evolutionary path of Western
emphasis on human value, namely to see human beings as part ofnature and interrelating
with nature with their specific gifts for creating their own reality. In an effort to find a perfect
combination of idealism and naturalism to explicate the true nature of human beings in
th
a Chinese way, he traced Western thinking from Greek Classicism to 19 century
Romanticism, from Romanticism through German idealism to Nietzsche and Croce.41
Itmay be worthwhile to note that Zhu's attraction to Nietzsche and Croce may have
stemmed from the fact that both of these thinkers endeavoured to overcome Kantian
transcendentalism and Hegelian mystical tendencies. As observed earlier, Zhu was
impressed by the notion of the this-worldliness and unreserved affirmation ofhuman value
illuminated in the theories ofboth Nietzsche and Croce. Nietzsche especially impressed
Zhu with his notion of the Dionysian reconciling with the Apollonian. This notion set up
a sensible value ofhumans as rational beings in nature and, at the same time, echoed Zhu's
paradigm of'action' interrelating with, and being directed by, 'tranquillity'.
Marx was born in times when the growth of capitalist production was degrading
human value. He was passionate about the value of human beings and their fate, and his
concern about the alienation of humanity under the capitalist mode of production
preoccupied his entire intellectual life. In his earlier writings, on which Zhu focused
particular attention, Marx characterised his position as 'humanist' and 'naturalist.' He
studied from Romanticism to the philosophy ofHegel, then through left-Hegelianism and
a briefperiod ofbourgeois liberalism, to the agnostic materialism ofFeuerbach, developing
his philosophy of dialectical historical materialism. His theory gives full recognition to
the dynamic, ever-changing character of existence and to the infinite interrelatedness of
phenomena in both nature and society. While human thought is considered a function of
the bodily organism, the mind is seen notmerely as a passive reflector of the external world
41 For the development of Zhu's thought, see his own summary in the article, "Wo de wenyi sixiang
de fandongxing" (1956), in QJ, vol. 5, pp. 12-38.
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but as possessing a fundamental initiative and creativity, a power of working upon and
re-moulding the environment through the force of new ideas.42
On the one hand, Marx tried to show that human consciousness is held in bondage
by the relations of capitalist production and thus advocated the abolishment of private
property. On the other hand, he stated that human beings are dominated by the total product
of their own labour. Since conscious existence is associated with human beings' actual
life-process, consciousness is able to indicate beforehand changes in the mode of
production, for instance in forms of the superstructure such as law, philosophy, religion
or art. For Marx, "Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.... real, active
men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of
the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms."43 In this way, although
consciousness is shaped by the material base, it is able to transcend its material base and
accordingly change history. Therefore, as Maynard Solomon suggests, Marxism not only
allowed for the heightening of consciousness as a necessary precondition for historical
progress, but also demanded it.44
In an article published in 1941, Zhu Guangqian did not develop his perspective of
consciousness from a politico-economic point ofview, although he did affirm politics as
the other important element for social progress, alongside education.45 However, Zhu
already sharedMarx's confidence in regard to the affective role ofconsciousness and gave
priority to the transformation and cultivation of the individual mind for the betterment of
society. He acknowledged that social progress needs change in external conditions, in other
words in the material base ofMarxist theory, but warned of the danger ofmaterialist
determinism, which may deprive human beings of freedom ofwill, moral responsibility
and subsequently human value. He asserted that human power is able to transform society
42 See Robert C. Tucker, "Introduction," The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. xix-xlii.
43 Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 36.
44 See Maynard Solomon, "Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels," in Maynard Solomon ed.,Marxism and
Art: Essays Classic and Contemporary (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), p. 15.
45 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zheng yu jiao" AftIf [Politics and education], Sixiangyu shidaiyuekan
TJ, vol. 3 (Oct 1941), in QJ, vol. 9, pp. 87-93.
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and that it is therefore everyone's responsibility to organise society for the satisfaction of
human ideals.46 Based on this assumption, he placed considerable emphasis on the
cultivation ofconsciousness ofhuman being's own value as creator by means ofeducation,
especially aesthetic education.
Zhu and Marx both regard aesthetic feeling achieved through art as the highest form
of consciousness. Although Marx discusses art under the category of the material base
of the superstructure and considers that it is closely related to class consciousness, he
nevertheless sees the transcending power of art as being able to transport human beings
from the negative reality ofan alienated class society to a different stage ofreality by means
of its consciousness-transforming essence. This means that art as the historical product
of labour in the environment ofmaterial production does not necessarily run parallel with
the development ofmaterial basis. In Marx's words, "it is well known that certain periods
of the highest development of art stand in no direct connection with the general
development of society, nor with the material basis and the skeleton structure of its
organisation."47 This is because, instead of ideological consciousness, art appeals to the
universal awareness ofhuman essence. A work ofart, then, is an embodiment of something
new born out ofthe old, or, to be more specific, assumes a deeper dimension out ofsocially
inherited materials.48
In Marx's view, therefore, art or artistic activity is a process ofhumanisation rather
than ideological transformation. Art, in the course of revealing the inner truth of nature
and society, educates human senses. According to Sidney Finkelstein's interpretation, such
a process ofeducation involves first the humanisation ofnature by progressively revealing
the secrets ofnature for human being's benefit, then humanisation ofhuman relations which
have suffered dehumanisation due to profit-oriented production. In progressive discovery,
46 See Zhu Guangqian, Tan xiuyang f&f'f-fi- [Discussion of self-cultivation] (Chongqing: Chongqing
zhongzhou chubanshe, 1943), in QJ, vol. 4, pp. 38-39.
47 Karl Marx, The Grundrisse (Foundations ofthe Critique ofPolitical Economy) (1857-58), in Robert
C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 245.
48 See Sidney Finkelstein, "Art as Humanisation," in Maynard Solomon ed., Marxism andArt: Essays
Classic and Contemporary (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), p. 278.
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understanding, mastery and reshaping of the laws governing the organisation of society,
human relations become more humane in the sense that destructive antagonisms are
replaced by cooperation, and ignorance and fear by kinship and understanding, and through
cooperation the individual is enabled to develop more freely.49
In Mikhail Lifschitz's account, the ultimate purpose ofMarx's aesthetic is to offer
the resolution of the contradictions between the growth of productive forces and the
increasing alienation ofthe productive classes, and to provide a means ofabolishing the
contradictions between oppressors and the oppressed and between physical and mental
labour, thus making possible the creation of a classless, un-alienated, universal culture.50
In a similarmanner, Zhu saw the transcendental side ofart in human life and possessed
a high ideal ofaesthetic cultivation to achieve a state ofmind in human beings where the
sense ofbeauty [mei J4] unites with the sense oftruth [zhen It] and goodness [shan #].
From the very beginning ofhis studies on aesthetics, Zhu was clearly more interested in
the expressive aspect of aesthetic phenomena. Placing human emotions in the critical
position within aesthetic activity, he claimed that without emotions aesthetic experience
is void. In his writing published in the 1930s, he demonstrated that human beings relate
to the outside world through their own emotions:
Emotions are projected onto things as if things possess an inherent propensity
to cause certain emotions. We treat lifeless objects same as ourselves as being
full of life, just like ourselves, feeling that they also have personality, emotions
and actions.51
This does not mean, however, that human emotions are the the prior source for
aesthetic images. In aesthetic activity, Zhu added, so-called empathy is an interflowing
process between the subject and the object mediated by subjective emotions,52 and yet
emotions are derived from nowhere but real life.53 The underlying claim is that human
49 ibid., p. 279.
50 See Mikhail Lifshitz, The Philosophy ofArt ofKarlMarx, trans, by Ralph B. Winn (London: Pluto
Press, 1973), p. 68.
51 Zhu Guangqian, Tan mei ikTk [Talking about beauty] (1932), in QJ, vol. 2, p. 22.
52 See ibid.
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beings, with unique mental capacities and an active way of living, are able to communicate
with the objective world with full confidence of their own value. Zhu asserted that "human
life is a form ofart in a broad sense because, in actively living life, human beings create
their own history."54
Zhu was acutely aware, however, that life in China had in reality been far from his
ideal status for many years. Nevertheless, his confidence in humans' ability to improve
their social existence never weakened. In numerous essays written between the 1920s and
1940s, Zhu endeavoured to make the point that "it was human nature to pursue truth,
goodness and beauty,"55 and attributed the decline ofmorality, human value and dignity
to the impotent political system and general ignorance. Therefore, apart from hoping for
better politics, he applied his efforts to education and especially aesthetic education in order
to awaken people's self-knowledge ofhuman creativity.56 He held that once one achieves
internal harmony and order through aesthetic education, one is emancipated from basic
sensuousness, narrow-mindedness and the restrictions of nature. That is to say, human
beingswill reach a level ofmental and emotional freedom, and total humanity where they
may attain the sublime experience of self-consciousness through art.57
Although Zhu did not reach the same conclusion as Marx in terms of seeing the
alienation of human beings as a consequence of the capitalist mode of production, his
humanist inclination equals that ofMarx as regards its concern for the human condition,
expectations ofhuman society and confidence in human value. Expectations ofhumanity
and concerns about the fragmentation ofmodem society characterise their theories ofboth.
In Zhu's case, the social evils that hamper human progress are ignorance and social injustice.
Marx, on the other hand, maintained that it is the commoditisation of labour that is guilty
53 See ibid., p. 91.
54 Ibid.
55 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan meiganjiaoyu" If [About aesthetic education ], Tan xiiiyang ttlfif-jf
(1943), in QJ, vol.4, p. 143.
56 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zheng yu jiao" [Politics and education] (1941), in QJ, vol. 9, pp. 87-93.
57 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan meiganjiaoyu" tl f [About aesthetic education ] (1943), in QJ, vol.4,
pp. 143-151.
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ofdenying human beings the full enjoyment of their creative potential. Despite differences
in perspective, Zhu and Marx seem to share a similar interpretation ofhuman happiness
as the emancipation of the consciousness.
6.3.2. Pragmatic Approach
Since their theories are based on human reality and put human destiny in human hands,
both Zhu andMarx reject the method ofdeductive reasoning. They adopt an approach which
draws conclusions not from preconceived premises but rather from tangible human facts:
social relations in Marx's case and daily activities in Zhu's. Both make similar efforts not
to be trapped in either crude materialism or absolute idealism, but instead find a middle
ground where the object and the subject come into a meaningful relationship through
human activities.
Marx states that "it will be seen how subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and
materiality, activity and suffering, lose their antithetical character, and thus their existence,
as such antitheses only within the framework of society; it will be seen how the resolution
of the theoretical antitheses is only possible in apractical way, by virtue of the practical
energy of men. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a problem of
understanding, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could not solve precisely
because it conceived this problem as merely a theoretical one."58 So, "in direct contrast
to German philosophy that descends from heaven to earth," Marx claims that he only seeks
to "ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from whatmen say, imagine,
conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive
atmen in the flesh"59 For Marx, it is by virtue of the living and concrete individuals that
consciousness is assigned to.
58 Marx, Economic andPhilosophicManuscripts of1844, in Robert C. Tucker ed., TheMarx-Engels
Reader, p. 89.
59 Marx, The German Ideology, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 154.
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Similarly, in his The Psychology ofTragedy, Zhu expressed his disapproval of the
speculative philosophies of either materialism or idealism which, in his view, ignore
individual concrete problems and start their speculations at the wrong end.
Instead of building up a theory inductively from a careful examination of the
works of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Racine, and other great tragic poets,
they deduce it a priori from some preconceived philosophical system. They set
out with a major metaphysical premise, and, to prove it, they give tragedy as a
particular instance. But in doing so, they use that very premise to explain the nature
of Tragedy, forgetting that it is the premise itself which requires demonstration.60
Zhu criticised Hegel for affording "a typical instance of such arguing in a vicious
circle" by starting "with the general philosophical notion of the Absolute,... and that every
thing in this world, evil and misfortunes not excluded, may be ethically explained and
justified."61
In order to avoid what he saw as theoretical inversion, Zhu ensured that his views
derived directly from below and that all his arguments were backed up with factual
evidence. It seems to be his style to appeal to facts and common sense no matter whether
in scholarly theses or in advisory letters to young people.
In Wenyi xinlixue (1936), Zhu explicitly declared that his purpose in
writing the book was not to deduce an aesthetic theory out of a philosophical principle,
but to induce some applicable theories from psychological facts occurring in aesthetic
creations and appreciations.62 His initial approval of Croce's notion of intuition as
expression seemed to be grounded in evidential data from the psychological fact of
"empathy." His disapproval of the same concept in relation to other artistic activities, on
the other hand, was also supported by the psychological fact of "associative thinking." This
is probably the reason for which Sabattini criticises him for being ready to "respond to
any type of inquiry" in order to "bring unity to theories that may seem wholly contrasting
at first sight."63
60 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, pp. 6-7.
61 Ibid.
62 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 197.
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Zhu, however, would rather rely on observable facts, no matter how distracting they
may appear to be, than on what he called an abstract logical notion of causality. He once
argued:
In a world like ours where every event is inextricably related to an infinite
mass of other events and where the whole determines the parts, there are no more
isolated solitary causes than there are isolated solitaiy effects. ... both isolated causes
and isolated effects are phantoms created by formal logic and atomistic psychology;
they never exist in actual mental life.64
6.3.3. Praxis and Action/Tranquillity
Since Zhu and Marx both agree that theorisation must derive from fact, it logically
follows that they both see human activities which engender facts as the fundamental
standpoint for making sense of the world. In Marx's view, the notion ofpraxis is applied
to show that "the coincidence of the changing ofcircumstances and of human activity can
be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising practice."65 In Zhu's case,
the action/observation paradigm was adhered to as his perspective for evaluating a
cultivated way of life. For Zhu, life consists ofa flux ofmoments of realisation that involves
actual action and reflective thinking. In interacting with the objective world both physically
and mentally, human beings' selves are obtained.66
In Marx's theory, praxis is the central concept for his historical materialism because
it constitutes the meeting point ofand the unity between human beings and nature, the social
and the material, consciousness and reality. Granted that human beings are part ofnature
and that human essence is somewhat conditioned by external objects,67 Marx nevertheless
63 Mario Sabattini, "'Crocianism' in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsiieh," East and West, vol. 20,
no. 1/2 (March/June 1970), p. 179.
64 Zhu Guangqian, The Psychology ofTragedy, p. 8.
65 Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 144.
66 See Zhu Guangqian, "Kan xi yu yan xi - liang zhong rensheng lixiang" A4SM
[Watching and performing a drama - two different ideals of life], Wenxue zazhi vol. 2,
no. 2 (Jul 1947), in QJ, vol. 9, p. 257 and "Shengming" £.■$?- [Life], Wenxue zazhi vol.
2, no. 3 (Aug 1947), in QJ, vol. 9, p. 274.
67 In Marx's own words, "as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is suffering, conditioned
and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his impulses exist outside
him as objects independent of him; but these objects are objects of his need, essential objects,
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stresses that "to say thatman is a corporeal, living real, sensuous, objective being full of
natural vigour is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the objects ofhis being or of
his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects."68 In other words,
it is human nature to externalise or express oneself in changing ways and forms.
Accordingly, "it is just in the working-up of the objective world, therefore that man first
really proves himself to be a species being... Through and because of this production, nature
appears as his work and his reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification
ofman's species life: for he duplicates himselfnot only, as in consciousness, intellectually,
but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has
created."69
This perspective ofMarx's, which positions human beings in an organic relationship
with their environment, with various human activities acting as mediating agents, coincides
with Zhu's fundamental attitude towards human beings and human life. Originally, Zhu
did not doubt either that human beings are a part ofnature in the sense in which human
beings are physically limited or conditioned by nature like other creatures such as animals
and plants.70
However, he also stressed that it is human nature to be creative, expressive and
assertive of one's vitality at any possible moment. That is why Zhu adopted Mencius'
concept of practical fulfilment of one's nature [jinxingm'li] as the explanation for his
viewpoint. For Zhu, human life is not to predict or to reduce repeatedly in the same way,
but to take an actual part in the process of realising or doing because the purpose of life
is embedded in living itself. In giving shape to a goal, human beings simultaneously realise
indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation ofhis essential powers." See Marx, Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of1844, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 115.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p. 76.
70 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan rensheng yu wo" [About life and the self], Gei qingnian de
shier fengxin Mit [Twelve letters to young people] (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian,
1929), in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 57-58.
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their being.71 To use Zhu's own words, "happiness is achieved through the process ofaction
[dong #/;]."72
It seems that both Marx's concept of praxis and Zhu's concept of action claim
all-rounded human experience which includes not only the activity of the five senses like
other living creatures, but also thinking, wanting, loving and willing. The paradigm of
action/tranquillity [dong/jing f-hlnf] which characterises Zhu's theories assures that actual
human involvement with nature is not blind and instinctive but rather intentional and
purposive. Thus, apart from action, tranquillity is integrated to form the whole experience
ofhuman life. However, Zhu's notion of tranquillity does not transcend beyond this world
but, as a process ofgaining knowledge of this world, it returns to serve in the actual doing
[dong #/;].73
InMarx's view, labour or production transforms nature in two ways: it changes natural
objects to suit human needs but, in changing the objective world, human beings also change
their subjective condition. When human beings are satisfied with their needs, this
satisfactionwill challenge the subject to perceive new need, in a never-ending process of
dialectic development between the subject and the object. The constant challenges then
require human beings to develop their powers, perceptions and ideas in order to adapt a
more complex labour process. Therefore, human beings' essential power developed in the
process indicates the maturation of human mental capacity which is acquired through
creative production. As Marx says, "only through the objectively unfolded richness of
man's essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye
for beauty of form - in short, senses capable of human gratifications, senses confirming
themselves as essential powers ofman) either cultivated or brought into being. For not
71 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dong" ikM [About 'action'] (1929), Gei qingnian de shierfengxin iAAAifJ
+—Mit, in QJ, vol. 1, pp. 11-13. and "Shengming" ftA [Life], in QJ, vol. 9, p. 274
72 Zhu Guangqian, "Tan dong" f&tfr [About 'action'] (1929), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 13. For the concept of
dong it) [(actual) doing], see "2.4 Towards a New Philosophy of Life," in Chapter II above.
73 See Zhu Guangqian, "Kan xi yu yan xi - liang zhong rensheng lixiang" A4JlitS
[Watching and performing a drama - two different ideals of life], in QJ, vol. 9, pp. 258-259.
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only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses - the practical senses ... - come
to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanised nature."74
6.3.4. Reciprocity of the Subject and the Object
Since the theories ofMarx and Zhu maintain a comprehensive view ofhuman reality
whose multiple aspects, to borrow Henri Arvon's words, can be understood only if they
are consistently dealt with from the point ofview ofthe whole,75 they both apply the method
ofdrawing evidence from the interrelationship between the subject and the object or, more
specifically, between human beings and their environment. That is to say, as far as human
reality is concerned, human beings and their external existence are interpreted to be in the
process ofholistic, dynamic and reciprocal interactions and neither side may claim absolute
autonomy from the other. While Marxist doctrine focuses more on the socio-economic
aspect of reality by emphasising the interrelationship between the forces ofproduction
and social relations, the social infrastructure and the superstructure, Zhu's theories tend
to scrutinise the individual state ofmind or emotion as related to his way of living. The
former tends towards sociology, economics and politics whereas the latter inclines to
physiology, psychology and aesthetics. Nevertheless, bothMarx and Zhu reject looking
at human reality in fixity, either from the perspective of social relations in the Marxist sense
or daily life in Zhu's sense.
Marx's methods which deny Hegelian mystical ideas and at the same time avoid
Feuerbach's materialism, are intended to affirm the development of human beings and
society as reciprocal historical interactions between economic and superstructural forces.
Although Marx's doctrine takes the view that economic production is the ultimate element
which determines historical development as its point of departure, it does not deny the
reaction of the superstructure to the economic base; the totality which Marxist doctrine
74 Marx, Economic andPhilosophicManuscripts of1844, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels
Reader, p. 89.
75 See Henri Arvon, Marxist Esthetics, trans, by Helen R. Lane (Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press,
1973), p. 24.
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pursues does not allow it to take sides and give credit to only one side at the expense of
the other. As Engels explains, "political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary
evolution, etc., is based on economic evolution. But they all react on each other, and also
react on the economic base. The economic situation is not the cause, it is not the sole agent
and all the restmerely a passive effect; rather there is a reciprocal effect stemming from
economic necessity which ultimately is always the determining factor."76
However, in setting the economic base and superstructure ormaterial condition and
consciousness in a perspective of historical evolution, Marxist theory also accepts that
human consciousness may transit to the stage where the processes of thought are not
traceable with precision from material conditions. When consciousness develops to the
higher stage of abstractions, it enjoys a relative autonomy.77
Accordingly, art and literature come into the Marxist concept as cultivating activities
that raise human beings above their animal state through an enlightenment which develops
the potential ofhumankind and offers people a vision of the future inherent in the world.
Thus, in comprehending the truth ofart, human beings become aware oftheir internal value
or self in the context of the whole of humanity.78 Engels highly appreciated the artistic
perspective of Balzac's Comedie humaine and claimed that these stories provided "a
complete history of French society" from which he had "learned more than from all the
professional historians, economists and statisticians of the period together."79 Therefore,
as an intellectual production, unfolding social truths, revealing the inner workings of
society and piercing the veil of false consciousness, art is able not only to surpass material
76 Engels, "A letter to W. Borgius on Jan 25, 1894," in KarlMarx, FrederickEngels: Collected Works,
vol. 50, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2005), p. 264.
77 The evolution ofMarx's parallelism of material base and consciousness reflected in the German
Ideology is examined in Philip J. Kain's Marx'Method, Epistemology, andHumanism: A Study in
the Development ofHis Thought (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 70-76.
78 See See Henri Arvon, Marxist Esthetics, p. 26.
79 Engels, "A Letter to Margaret Harkness in April 1888," in Marx and Engels, On Literature andArt
A Selection ofWritings, ed. by Lee Baxandall and Stefan Morawski (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1973),
p. 43.
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production but also in turn to affect the latter through the activities of enlightened human
beings.80
Marxistmethod, as asserting reciprocity ofthe object and the subject with acceptance
of uneven development of consciousness, is echoed in Zhu's theories, especially his
aesthetics. It is also Zhu's approach that human beings and their environment are mutually
dependent on each other, but human beings are seen as the creators of human history.81
Zhu understood this relationship from two levels. From the fundamental level, he agreed
that human beings, together with their consciousness, are primarily the product of their
time. In criticising the Crocian concept of intuition as expression and art for defying social
influence on the artist, he made his view clear:
An artist is also a social creature who is inevitably affected by the social
environment she/he is in. Artistic motive may derive from one's heart, but external
forces may stimulate it, encourage it, restrain it or suppress it. ... As a result, each
period of history has its literary genre associated with the concurrent social milieu.82
He also attributed personal taste and emotion in artistic creation or appreciation to
one's background, experiences and education. In short, social upbringing makes marks
on consciousness and accordingly emotions. Because ofthis essential relationship between
human beings and their social environment, Zhu strongly believed and repeatedly
emphasised that art has to reflect life.
However, the fact that the content and even form of art are mostly conditioned by
the social milieu does not lead to the conclusion that art has to trail behind its social
influences. Zhu also saw the relative autonomy of consciousness and possible
counter-influences which itmay exert on society. In his aesthetic theories, art is counted
on as the educator of consciousness because it offers human beings the opportunity of
disinterested contemplation which inspires human confidence to be their own masters.
80 See Marx, "The English Middle Class," New York Tribune (1 Aug 1854), inMarx Engels on Literature
andArt (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 524.
81 See Zhu Guangqian, Tan xiuyang tiff-# [Discussion of self-cultivation] (1943), in QJ, vol. 4, p.
35 and 39.
82 Zhu Guangqian, Wenyi xinlixue (1936), in QJ, vol. 1, p. 364.
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Artists who are more sincere, sensuous, observant and imaginative in the face ofthe fetishes
of society are therefore responsible for "lending their eyes for us to see" the truths of the
world.83
Since it is individuals that constitute the totality ofa society in Zhu's theories, he placed
emphasis on the development of individual consciousness, and aesthetic education was
thus regarded to serve this purpose. The underlying claim here is that cultivated individual
consciousness can be expected to form an intellectual force which would give power to
the progress of society.84 Although Zhu did not seem to see that the reactions of individual
consciousness towards society specifically contain class awareness as Marx did, the
prospect ofemancipated consciousness offered in Zhu's aesthetics coincides with Marxist
expectations of the future of the human world, namely liberation from class bondage in
which human consciousness has been held by the relations of material production.85
83 See ibid., p. 324.
84 See Zhu Guangqian, Tanxiuyang [Discussion of self-cultivation] (1943), in QJ, vol. 4, pp. 35-41
and "Tan meiganjiaoyu" [About aesthetic education ] (1943), in QJ, vol.4, pp. 143-154.
85 See Maynard Solomon, "Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels," in Maynard Solomon ed.,Marxism and




Although the nationwide ideological reform officially ended in 1952, it continued
to gainmomentum among intellectuals, especially in literary circles. The Communist Party
gave particular attention to the thought reform ofwriters, wanting to ensure that all literary
works followed the strict guidelines of the Party and loyally assisted the Party with its
ideological reform. Through Party-controlled "people's organisations" such as the
All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and the Chinese Writers' Union, the
Communist Party either launched public criticisms against writers who deviated from the
Party line, or, in extreme cases, exercised security discipline by arresting those who
ventured overt criticism of the Party's policies.1
Between 1953 and 1956, major public criticisms were levelled at eminent scholars
such as Yu Pingbo Hu Feng M and Zhu Guangqian to coerce intellectuals into
abandoning what the Party called bourgeois idealism. Yu Pingbo, the leading scholar of
classical Chinese literature, was criticised for failing to apply the Marxist concept ofclass
struggle in his literary evaluation of the novel The Dream ofthe Red Chamber. After Feng
Xuefeng ■%, the editor of Wenyi bao (the influential forum for the Party's
policies), was stripped ofhis position for taking Yu Pingbo's side in the course ofcriticism,
Yu Pingbo backed down and adjusted his opinion to the then standard Marxist
interpretations. The biggest political reaction was against Hu Feng. As Denton observes,
Hu Feng claimed that "an empirical approach to literary creation is superior to one dictated
by doctrinaire ideology or inflexible party policy, and the writer's individual subjective
spirit is the necessary means of capturing objective reality in language."2 His persistent
argument for the relative autonomy of literature and his criticism oforthodox realism had
1 See Merle Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist China (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University
Press, 1967), pp. 87-105.
2 Kirk A. Denton, The Problematic ofSelfinModern Chinese Literature: Hu Feng andLu Ling (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 154.
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caused considerable resentment among the leftist writers of the 1930s and 40s who by then
occupied important positions in the literary establishment. After Zhou Yang the
deputy director of the Propaganda Department, who had long been in both political and
personal discord with Hu Feng, made a speech entitled "We Must Fight" in which Hu Feng
was charged with being anti-Marxist, an all-round attack started and continued against
Hu Feng and his so-called "Hu Feng Clique" in 1954. Hu Feng and more than sixty of this
so-called "conspirators" ended up either in labour camps or in prison in 1955 despite their
self-criticism.3
7.1. Zhu's Self-criticism in 1956
It was within the context of this enforcement of the Party's line that the 'Big Debate
on Aesthetics' was launched in 1956 in which Zhu Guangqian, who had been criticised
by leftist writers for advocating idealist aesthetics since the 1930s, became the main target.4
Ironically, the campaign following the arrest ofHu Feng was hailed as the implementation
ofthe Party's new policy of'Bai hua qi fang, bai jia zhengming' IT 15" [Let
a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend]. Unlike Hu Feng,
Zhu was never critical of the Party's official line after 1949. As a matter of fact, he was
grateful that Zhou Yang had given him a 'friendly' warning shortly after the campaign to
criticise him started in early 1956.5 Thus, instead of insisting on his own theoretical
terminology which might sound bourgeois and politically inappropriate, Zhu applied the
Party's ideology to argue his point with his critics. First ofall, he wrote an article entitled
"The Reactionary Nature ofMy Thinking on Literature and Art" and categorically rejected
3 See Merle Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist China, pp. 106-157 and Kirk A. Denton, The
Problematic of Self in Modern Chinese Literature: Hu Feng and Lu Ling (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998), pp. 81-84 and pp. 152-155.
4 See Zhang Darning, Chen Xuechao and Li Baoyan, Zhongguo xiandai wervcue sichao shi T S
^S$) it [A history of the trend ofmodern Chinese literary thought], vol. 2 (Beijing: Beijing shiyue
wenyi chubanshe, 1995), p. 900.
5 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zhu Guangqian jiaoshou tan meixue" ft^ [Professor Zhu
Guangqian's talk on aesthetics], Jiaoyu vol. 1 and 2 (1981), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 534.
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his own aesthetic theories as decadently idealist. Throughout the article, however, as
Fokkema observes,6 it seems that Zhu found it painful to juggle the side ofhimselfwhich
was keen to gain the Party's acceptance with the other side which sought academic sincerity.
On the one hand, the article was filled with political expressions labelling his own
intellectual background as 'feudal,' colonial, bourgeois and idealistic, and Zhu, echoing
the Party's logic, now criticised himselfas anti-people and anti-society.7 On the other hand,
Zhu defended his theories under the cloak of this jargonised self-accusation. For instance,
he accused his own theories of subjective idealism for following Croce's concept of
intuition as expression, denying abstract thinking [chouxiang siwei fh %. although
his theories never denied the possible intervention of abstract thinking. Fie then argued
that he found his self-accusation ofprevious theories to be inconsistent with the fact that
he had made efforts to make corrections:
I discovered that these conclusions (i.e. that intuition does not involve abstract
thinking and therefore is irrelevant to morality or politics) do not agree with the
facts known to common sense, nor do they accord to my own general views of
art. I tried to compromise by saying that intuition is limited to merely a moment
and yet artistic activity extends to the preceding as well as succeeding periods
of the intuitive moment. Accordingly, abstract thinking such as moral or political
considerations may affect art. Up until today, I still believe that this view is basically
correct because it agrees with the dialectic unification of thinking in images and
abstract thinking.8
Zhu reminded his readers ofthe fact that when he published his Wenyi xinlixue
in 1936, he had come to the conclusion that idealism does not after all succeed in
overcoming the dualism ofmind [xin and matter [wu 4fr]. He stressed that his effort
to add the psychological theories ofempathy and psychical distance was intended to amend
what he believed to be the theoretical error of Croce's notion of intuition as expression.
6 See D. W. Fokkema, Literary Doctrine in China and Soviet Influence, 1956-1960, pp. 93-94.
7 See Zhu Guangqian, "Wo de wenyi sixiang de fandongxing" (1956), in QJ,
vol. 5, pp. 11-16.
8 Ibid., p. 20.
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Therefore, he had always attributed beauty neither to mind nor to matter, but to the
interrelationship of the two.9
However, as soon as Zhu came to politically sensitive issues such as art serving the
people, he backed down and filled the other half of the article with self-accusation. He
unconvincingly criticised himself for setting art above ordinary taste while Lenin and Mao
Zedong saw art as belonging to the working people and being deeply rooted in them.
Ignoring the possible inconsistency from a positive assessment of his own general views
ofart in the first part ofthis article, he accused himselfofdenying the working people their
artistic taste by giving the right of art exclusively to the cultured few. He expressed his
regret for saying that what was directly reflected in art could be commonly seen or felt,
and yet it was usually the part not commonly seen or felt that begged for real taste,10 and
that such taste was, inmost cases, attained first by a cultural elite group.11 Accordingly,
he charged his own theory with the crime of being anti-people and anti-society.
Given that such ideological prejudice may sound absurd, Zhu pointed two
problematic views on art. The first one is that, according to Zhu's writing in the 1930s,
taste develops with one's experiences in life and real taste is thus the reflection of one's
thorough understanding of human life,12 hence there is no necessary conflict or
insurmountable hurdle between good taste and ordinary taste, or elite and working people.
That is, the possibility of improvement of taste from ordinary to excellent is not eliminated.
If in order to conform to the political orthodoxy, he insists that his previous interpretation
ofrefined taste treats it as the privilege ofan elitist minority to an exclusion ofpopularisation
9 See ibid., pp. 21-27.
10 See ibid., p. 32. For the whole essay where the citation comes from see Zhu Guangian, "Tan xue
wenyi de ganku" 1f itr [About the advantage and hardships of studying art and literature],
Mengshi wenchao ji.IfX# [Collected writings of Mengshi] (Shanghai: Liangyou tushu yinshua
gongsi, 1936), in QJ, vol. 3, pp. 340-344.
11 See Zhu Guangqian, "Wo de wenyi sixiang de fandongxing" [The reactionary nature ofmy thinking
on literature and art], in QJ, vol. 5, p. 33. For the whole essay where the citation comes from, see
Zhu Guangqian, "Tan quwei" [About taste], Mengshi wenchao X.#" (1936), in QJ, vol.
3, p. 346.
12 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan du shi yu quwei de peiyang" [About reading poetry
and cultivating taste], Mengshi wenchao ifilfX# (1936), in QJ, vol. 3, p. 352.
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of it, it not only contradicts his views on art with his emphasis on human value, but also
his concept of aesthetic education through which it is possible to improve human taste from
ordinary to excellent.
Another problem which would have created a dilemma for Zhu is that ifhe accepts
that art only accommodates popular taste without requiring the help of higher taste to
progress, then he must come to the conclusion that contrary to his claim, art does not perform
the function ofeducation, but passively reflects reality. In fact, he did not believe this, but
rather still believed that art is able to affect people, or otherwise dies.13 In this way, art
does have the capacity of leading ordinary taste.
However, Zhu chose to ignore the existence of any conflict or, under the
circumstances, had to make his thinking conform to meet the guidelines. As a result, his
article went from the absurd to the fallacious. Apart from belittling the cultural elite, the
implication is that artists are a group ofdecadent escapists who "take advantage of their
position of detached contemplation to enjoy other people's actual miseries."14 He then
invalidated his own notion ofaesthetic education since his own theories allegedly showed
little confidence in ordinary taste.15 This strange logic carried him forward to a stranger
conclusion that art served reality not in the manner of emotional affection, but through
deliberate edification.16
Although Zhu claimed at the end ofthe article that, "with the help of ideological reform
and the study ofMarxist-Leninist ideas in literature and art, I have managed to pull myself
from the swamp of decadent thought,"17 his troubles were far from over.
13 See Zhu Guangqian, "Wo de wenyi sixiang de fandongxing" 3%X^it!6-JtL tfr '14 [The
reactionary nature ofmy thinking on literature and art] (1956), in QJ, vol. 5, p. 33.
14 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
15 See ibid., p. 35.
16 See ibid., p. 36-38.
17 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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7.2. Zhu's Reply to Cai Yi and Li Zehou during the Debate
Theorists, especially young theorists who had received an orthodox Marxist- Leninist
education since 1949, unleashed intensified attacks on Zhu shortly after the publication
of his article in June 1956. What his critics could not accept was that, despite his
self-criticism, his aesthetics theories were not compatible with Leninist reflective
materialism.18 Zhu, on the other hand, refused to change the substance ofhis aesthetics
inmany ways. Interestingly, both sides in the debate sought support from Marxism, in a
similar way to the controversy between orthodox Marxism and Western Marxism in the
West.19 However, orthodox Marxism in the mode of Leninist reflective materialism
dominated the debate in China leaving Zhu very isolated in fighting to justify his theory
aided by his own interpretation ofMarxism in which he placed more emphasis on the
recognition of complicated human activity and value.20
Since both sides sought recourse to Marxist theories, they were to some extent
politically protected from the danger of being labelled bourgeois rightists, especially in
Zhu's case. The Anti-Rightist campaign launched in the following year of 1957 not only
overshadowed the Hundred Flowers policy, but also reconfirmed ideological purity. This
prescribed that the general form of the so-called big debates should go no further than
orthodoxy. Paradoxically, however, the fact that Marxist historical materialism attracted
various interpretations was because neither Marx nor Engels published their ideas on this
question in a single systematic context. Instead, their ideas were scattered over a large
number ofwritings and letters. In particular, it was widely though arguably accepted that
Marxist thought could be divided as 'early Marx' and 'laterMarx' because ofhis apparent
change from a humanist and naturalist approach to that ofhistorical materialism.21 As a
18 Qian NiansunM&M, Zhu Guangqian: chushi dejingshenyu rushe de shiye ikitAf: i±! if
if 6-j S [Zhu Guangqian: the spirit of transcending the world and the undertaking of going into
the society] (2005), pp. 177-204.
19 See Robert Audi ed., The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), pp. 539-540.
20 Qian Niansun Zhu Guangqian [Zhu Guangqian] (2005), pp. 179-186.
157
consequence, there was a grey area where different interpretations can be taken without
obvious contradiction ofMarxist theories. In 1950s China, this provided intellectuals with
a political environment which had the capacity to accommodate controversies as long as
they remained within the accepted ideological boundaries. For Zhu, this assured a political
room which enabled him to practise a relatively independent interpretation of Marxist
theories without having to submit himself to the standard dogmas.
The criticisms ofZhu during the debate concentrated on his approach to aesthetics,
accusing it of opposing Marxist historical materialism. The criticisms came from two
factions of theorists at different levels. One faction represented by Cai Yi HTH, an
aesthetician whose criticism of Zhu went back as far as the 1940s,22 accused Zhu's
aesthetics of neglecting the material base by attributing beauty exclusively to the mind.
In his numerous articles on Zhu's aesthetics from 1956 to 1960, Cai Yi endeavoured
to prove that the way in which Zhu dealt with art as the creation ofthe mind or expression
of subjective emotions denied the existence of the objective world and its primordial
influence on the human mind. With an assumption of the separation between subject and
object derived from Leninist reflective materialism, Cai Yi maintained that Zhu wrongly
put the human sense ofbeauty ahead ofobjective beauty while the human sense ofbeauty
was in fact the consequence or the reflection of the later. Cai Yi's argument relied on what
he believed to be Marxist-Leninist epistemology and asked, since being determines
consciousness and consciousness only reflects being, how a natural scene can be said to
express some sort ofemotional state. At the same time, successful artistic production that
21 See Robert Audi ed., The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy, pp. 539-540.
22 Cai Yi's criticism ofZhu's aesthetic ideas started from 1944 in his bookAm meixue [The
new aesthetics] in which he accused Zhu's aesthetics of being subjective and based on idealism and
metaphysics, claiming that "beauty is an objective reality, [and] the beauty ofobjective reality is the
source of the aesthetic sense and ofartistic beauty." See Cai Yi Xin meixue [The new
aesthetics], 2 vols., Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1985 and 1991 (1st ed. 1948). This
view was carried on in the debate in 1956. See Zhang Darning, Chen Xuechao and Li Baoyan,
Zhongguo xiandai wenxue sichao shi T 0YtWXlf ®-;l/l A [A history ofthe trend ofmodern Chinese
literary thought], vol. 2, p. 872 and Octave Briere, Fifty Years ofChinese Philosophy 1898-1950,
trans, by Laurence G. Thompson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 98-99.
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generates a sense ofbeauty achieves this because it faithfully, realistically and profoundly
reflects true social life - but not vice versa.23
Cai Yi thus concluded that the beauty or truth which human beings see in the object
or reality is not a creation of the human mind but rather a feature of the object or a
characteristic of reality. All that consciousness can do is to comprehend the beauty of the
object or the truth of reality.24 By arguing that beauty exists in the objective world, Cai
Yi opposed Zhu's concept that beauty is conceived only through human beings' aesthetic
experiences. Cai Yi held that "ifbeauty or ugliness was based merely on the foundation
of aesthetic experience, then it would be impossible to make a judgement of beauty or
ugliness which varies from person to person. It follows then that beauty or ugliness would
become an absolutely relative concept."25 Although Cai Yi admitted that Zhu's theory of
aesthetic experience was actually explained as an interrelated process between the subject
and the object, he was still convinced that this process would only serve the purpose of
the subject since "aesthetic experience is to express one's feeling by borrowing the image
of the object."26 Cai Yi argued that, as the image of the object in Zhu's sense was no longer
the crude appearance ofthe object (which in Cai Yi's mind, was the primary cause for the
sense of beauty) Zhu's idea thus deprived the object of any reasonable influence on the
subject and relied completely on the subject.27
Li Zehou, a member of another theoretical faction, also criticised Zhu's aesthetics
for putting undue stress on subjective initiative despite its superficial recognition of the
objective world as a material condition for aesthetic experience. Making the same
assumption as Cai Yi, Li held that beauty possesses objectivity independent of human
23 See Cai Yi It-fit,"Weishenme Zhu Guangqian de meixue sixiang shi weixinzhuyi de"
6-1 itS[Why Zhu Guangqian's aesthetic thought is idealist] in Liu Changjiu f'J-jfe
A and Pi Chaogang /Llffffi eds., Zhongguo dangdai meixue lunwen ji + H 'Jj*AA
[Collection of essays on aesthetics in contemporary China] (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe,
1988), p. 28.
24 See ibid., p. 29.
25 Ibid., p. 11.
26 Ibid., p. 12.
27 See ibid.
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consciousness and emotions. The human sense ofbeauty, in his view, is on the other hand
a mere reflection or copy of such objective existence. Thus beauty is primary, basic and
objective, while the sense of beauty and consciousness are secondary, derivative and
subjective.28
Unlike Cai, however, Li conceded that beauty is the product ofmankind and thus
should not be taken out of its human context and be treated solely as an original attribute
ofnature. Li observed that "without the social praxis of the human subject, a mere objective
existence ruled by natural law would have nothing to do with mankind much less with value
and beauty."29 Nevertheless, Li's concept ofmankind took a different point of departure
from that ofZhu. While Zhu treated mankind as the whole progressive process ofhuman
consciousness in dealing with the objective world both in a narrow sense (i.e. aesthetic
experience) and in a broad sense (i.e. social life), Li separated mankind's social praxis from
the conscious actions of individuals. The social praxis ofhuman beings is included in Li's
discussion within the category of species being, constituting independent existence
without the complement of individual consciousness. Accordingly, beauty which is
interpreted to be the product of social praxis by species being simultaneously becomes
an objective entity free from individual consciousness.
Li based his dichotomous view on Lenin's concept of the objectivity of nature and
social praxis. His view was in accordance with Lenin, who maintained that the objectivity
of social praxis does not mean that like nature, it exists independently of consciousness;
indeed, social praxis would be meaningless without human activity, but nonetheless does
not rely on individual consciousness for its existence. Whereas consciousness is variable,
28 See Li Zehou "Meigan, mei yu yishu - jianlun Zhu Guangqian de weixinzhuyi meixue sixiang"
M:S, [On sense ofbeauty, beauty and art - comments
on Zhu Guangqian's idealist thought ofaesthetics], Zhexue yanjiu # vol. 5 (1956), inMeixue
lunji t [Collection of essays on aesthetics] (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1980),
p. 25.
29 Li Zehou "Meixue san ti yi - yu Zhu Guangqian xiansheng jixu lunbian"
if'&jtfl[Three issues on aesthetics - a continued debate with Mr Zhu Guangqian], Zhexue
yanjiu Lf vol. 2 (1962), in Liu Changjiu f'j-JcA. and Pi Chaogang /JclLf-Pl eds., Zhongguo
dangdai meixue lunwenji T H 'I* Aft [Collection of essays on aesthetics in contemporary
China] (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1988), p. 286.
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social praxis is being.30 "Materialism in general recognises objectively real being (i.e.
matter) as independent of the consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of humanity.
Historical materialism recognises social being as independent of the social consciousness
of humanity. In both cases, consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an
approximately true reflection of it."31 It seems that it is on this presumption ofLenin that
Li Zehou set out his theorisation. Li accordingly stated that "since the objective world is
independent of subjective will and follows its own track, then conscious and purposive
human praxis, in order to make mark of its own will on the objective world, must accord,
grasp and apply the laws manifested in the objective world."32 In Li Zehou's account, it
is only through this adequacy and suitability of social praxis to the objective world that
a sense ofbeauty or happiness arises on human's part. Beauty, then, must be the constitution
ofperceptual form which is in accord with the laws ofnature and realistic content which
boasts of the accumulation of social praxis. In this sense, beauty is objective and primary
whilst a sense of beauty, on the other hand, is subjective and secondary.33
Li Zehou maintained that the mistake in Zhu's theory was that it confused the different
aspects of so-called subjective activity. Although social praxis and consciousness (i.e.
knowing) are both subjective activities of mankind, consciousness as a mere knowing
entity to itselfdoes not realistically produce an effect on the outside world, whereas social
praxis purposively changes the world through its own existence by establishing its own
attributes, phenomena and patterns of development. Therefore, social praxis should be
considered as an objective material force vis-a-vis individual consciousness. It follows
then that beauty, as the product of social praxis, exists in its own right whereas individual
consciousness can only passively reflect such beauty.34
30 See ibid.
31 Lenin, Vladimir I., Materialism and Empiric-Criticism: Critical Comments on a Reactionary
Philosophy (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), pp. 337-338.
32 Li Zehou, "Meixue san ti yi" (1962), in Zhongguo dangdai meixue lunwen ji, p. 286.
33 See ibid., pp. 286-290.
34 See ibid. Also see Li Zehou, "Meigan, mei yu yishu - jianlun Zhu Guangqian de weixinzhuyi meixue
sixiang" S (1956), in Meixue lunji [Collection of
essays on aesthetics], p. 25.
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The problem exists that Zhu's aesthetics, at the very beginning, was intended to be
a theory ofevents; he never seemed interested in discussing philosophical premises such
as being and entity, believing that this would lead nowhere. This intellectual tendency was
formed partly as a result ofhis Chinese traditional foundation, which treats human reality
in terms of concrete events constituted by individual experience, and partly because of
the influence he came under in Europe in the 1920s, where a trend of organism replacing
mechanism and pragmatism replacing metaphysical rationalism was taking shape.35
However, the fact that he was the target of the debate and his theories were widely
believed to be idealist, a label which was a political taboo at the time, pressured him to
shake off the shadow of idealism as soon as possible. It is discernible that Zhu also set
his theories, at least in form, against Lenin's reflective materialism, trying to draw up a
defence against critique of this in his own aesthetic theories. The issue between him and
his critics became that ofwhether beauty originates in objective reality where social praxis
unites with the objective world, or in the consciousness which is materialistically and
socially conditioned but shows the characteristic of creativity in daily social practice.36
While his critics remained faithful to Lenin's conclusion that the dialectic of
consciousness and the objective world should be interpreted materialistically, Zhu, on the
other hand, turned to Marx's more humanist and ethically oriented early writings. After
reading Marx's Economic andPhilosophicManuscripts of1844, "Theses on Feuerbach"
and German Ideology, Zhu was convinced that his concept ofbeauty as created by concrete
human beings through specific interrelating activities with the object can be explained by
the Marxist notion ofpraxis and dialectical method. He thus wrote several critical essays
35 For an account ofWestern academic influence on Zhu, see Chapter III and for the influence ofChinese
tradition on him, see Chapter I and II.
36 See Zhu Guangqian, "Meixue zenyang cai neng gai shi youwu de you shi bianzheng de - ping Cai
Yi tongzhi de meixue guandian" Is! A6-J 'A
[How can aesthetics be materialistic as well as dialectic? Comments on comrade Cai Yi's view on
aesthetics], Renmin ribao 0 (25 Dec 1956). Reprinted in Zhu Guangqian, Meixue pipan
lunwenji [Critical essays ofaesthetics] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1958), in QJ,
vol. 5, pp. 40-50. I referred to Elma E. Kopetsky's translation published in Chinese Studies in
Philosophy, vol. VI, no. 2 (Winter 1974-1975), pp. 4-18.
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in which he endeavoured to illuminate the humanist dimension of Marx's historical
materialism, which he believed had been distorted by his critics' invariable application
of Lenin's theory of reflection to it.37
Zhu held that the difference between himself and his critics was not the question of
whether his theories deny that human consciousness is determined by social being but
whether the former is also able to actively influence the latter in the process of practice.
Zhu believed that the reason that his critics insisted on a one-way influence from the object
to the subject was because of the metaphysical method they had adopted. He noted that
his critics derived all aesthetic facts solely from Lenin's theory of reflection.
We can observe in the writings of those who participated in the debate on
aesthetics that they intend to apply Marxism, but almost without exception they
apply simply and without analysis Lenin's theory of reflection, and most of their
references are to Lenin's book Materialism and Empiric-Criticism,38
That is, "human beings' perception, conception as well as senses directly reflect the
objective world which exists independently and determines human consciousness."39 As
a result, both social and natural beauty are autonomous entities which human consciousness
is able only to reflect. Art, as human creation, may be beautiful not because it transcends
social beauty or natural beauty but because it correctly typifies primary beauty either in
nature or in social life. As an instance of this argument, Zhu stated in 1957:
We know the flower is red and this 'redness' is an attribute of the flower
which exists objectively. Only when this attribute passes through the sense of vision
and is reflected in the brain, is there the perception of 'redness'. ... The 'redness'
which is perceived is just the 'redness' of the flower itself. Many aesthetic theorists
37 These essays published between 1956 and 1958 were included in QJ, vol. 10 and his bookMeixue
pipan lunwen ji [Critical essays of aesthetics] (Beijing:Zuojia chubanshe, 1958)
in QJ, vol. 5.
38 Zhu Guangqian, "Lun mei shi keguan yu zhuguan de tongyi" m — [A discussion
of beauty as an unity of the objective and the subjective], Zhexue yanjiu if vol. 4 (August
1957). Reprinted in Zhu Guangqian, Meixue pipan lunwen ji [Critical essays of
aesthetics] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1958), in QJ, vol 5, p. 62.1 used Elma E. Kopetsky's translation
with some modifications as there are critical errors. See Elma E. Kopetsky's translation of the article
in Chinese Studies in Philosophy, vol. VI, no. 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1975), p. 18.
39 Ibid.
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think that beauty is like that, too, that beauty exists objectively in the flower. (According
to Cai Yi, beauty is a natural attribute of the flower, and in Li Zehou's view,
it is a social attribute of the flower.) Only when this 'beauty' passes through the
organs of sense and is reflected in the brain, is there the sense of 'beauty'; it does
not depend on the consciousness of human beings who appreciate it. Therefore,
it is objectively determined. In their views, this 'beauty' which is perceived is also
just the 'beauty' of the flower itself; it is only a reflection of the beauty of the
flower itself. Consequently, they say "beauty is primary and fundamental whereas
the sense of beauty is secondary and derived." It follows that there are no differences
between the assertions that "the flower is beautiful" and "the flower is red." ...
However, is this appropriate reasoning?40
Zhu observed that it is true that perception of the redness of a flower, the natural
property of the object, is not what we subjectively create but rather what our consciousness
reflects through the visual sense. Nevertheless, Zhu claimed that it would be absurd to
accordingly deduce that the beauty of the flower is also its natural property like the colour
red and projects its image onto our consciousness thus generating our sense of beauty.
Instead, Zhu asserted that beauty is the product ofhuman creative activity, namely
art, and that belongs to the category of social ideology or social consciousness. If this is
so, according to Zhu, the crux of the problem is that Marx's historical materialism does
not exclude ideological reaction to the social being. "Social ideology, being superstructure
as opposed to material base, comprises politics, laws, philosophy, religion, literature and
art. Its relation to the material base is more complex than sensuous reflection."41 While
the material base (such as economic conditions, certain social relations and cultural
resources) may well affect one's way ofthinking, thinking nevertheless does not necessarily
duly reflect the current material base.42 Zhu, therefore, concluded:
There is a fundamental difference between sensuous or scientific reflection
and ideological reflection. Ideological reflection, motivated by the subjective aspect
of one's ideological totality, reflects matter refractively, which may lead to modifying
or even misrepresenting matter. In contrast, sensuous or scientific reflection is hardly
affected by ideology and mirrors matter factually.43
40 Zhu Guangqian, "Lun mei shi keguan yu zhuguan de tongyi" — [A discussion
of beauty as an unity of the objective and the subjective] (1957), in QJ, vol 5, pp. 62-63; Elma E.
Kopetsky's translation, pp. 18-19.
41 Ibid., p. 64
42 See ibid., pp. 63-65.
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As far as art was concerned, Zhu considered Lenin's theory of reflection as applicable
only to the perceptive stage of artistic activity. For instance, before comprehending the
beauty of a cherry blossom, one has to perceive the colour, the form and the smell in order
to distinguish this object from another. At this stage, one does indeed reflect matter
sensuously or scientifically because one's ideological background is not involved. It is only
at the stage ofartistic representation of the previously cognised material that the influence
of one's ideological background comes to play its part and certain values (such as beauty)
may be attached.44
In giving this assessment, Zhu hoped to justify the role of both subject and object
by placing them in the context ofhuman activity. He tried to persuade his critics that the
relationship between human beings and the world was not a static one-way mechanism,
but a dynamic process where human beings know the world and act upon it for purposes
of their own. Zhu was aware of the fact that his critics were more than reluctant to
acknowledge the active role of the subjective due to their mechanical materialist approach
as well as their fear of being labelled as idealist.
In order to support his view, Zhu quotedMarx: "the chiefdefect ofall hitherto existing
materialism... is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the
object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity,practice, not subjectively.
Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed."
Zhu argued alongside Marx that "the question whether objective truth can be attributed
to human thinking is not a question of theory but is apractical question. Manmust prove
the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness ofhis thinking in practice. The
dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely
scholastic question."45 Zhu thus drew the attention ofhis critics to the question ofwhether
43 Ibid., p. 65
44 See ibid., pp. 65- 68.
45 Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" (1845), in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p.
144. See Zhu Guangqian, "Lun mei shi keguan yu zhuguan de tongyi
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aesthetics should be understood from an epistemological point ofview in the first place.
He pointed out:
Since the German scholar Baumgarten established aesthetics as an independent
discipline in 1750, aesthetics has long been treated by philosophers such as Kant,
Hegel and Croce solely as epistemology. Some current aesthetic theorists who consider
literature and art only from the point of view of reflection also regard beauty simply
as epistemology.46
Zhu endeavoured to pull the debate out of the trap ofthe question of the metaphysical
approach to the essence ofbeauty which his theories had sought to avoid, and instead to
encourage concentration on the actual aesthetic phenomena through which beauty was
produced.47 He thus hailed Marx's theory ofpraxis because it gave him a legitimate right
to return to his original interest in the actual process ofthe artistic activities ofhuman beings.
7.3. Zhu's Interpretation of Marxism
The inspiration which Zhu obtained from Marx's notion ofpraxis lies in its humanist,
historical, realistic and dialectical treatment of the relationship ofhuman beings and the
objective world. Firstly, Zhu agreed withMarx that it is through human praxis that human
beings make their marks on nature as species being, which in turn provides human beings
with humanised sensibility.48 As Marx says:
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate,
and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material
re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of
her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces
of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to
[A discussion ofbeauty as an unity ofthe objective and the subjective] (1957), in QJ, vol 5, pp. 72-74.
46 Zhu Guangqian, "Lun mei shi keguan yu zhuguan de tongyi" — [A discussion
ofbeauty as an unity ofthe objective and the subjective] (1957), in QJ, vol 5, p. 70. Elma E. Kopetsky's
translation, p. 28.
47 See ibid., pp. 69-70.
48 See Zhu Guangqian, "Shengchan laodong yu ren dui shijie de yishu zhangwo - Makesizhuyi meixue
de shijian guandian" [Productive
labour and human artistic appreciation of the world - the concept of praxis in Marxist aesthetics],
Xin jianshe 1, vol. 4 (Apr 1960), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 200.
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his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the
same time changes his own nature.49
This reciprocal process ofhuman and nature, in Zhu's view, not only acknowledges
interdependency between the subject and the object, but also more importantly indicates
the prospect of gradual sophistication of human mental power as the result of constant
feedback from objectified reality. In other words, the more human essential power is
objectified, the higher the demand becomes for human consciousness to adjust. It thus
follows then that human praxis is not mere instinctive activity solely for the purposes of
crude practical needs; indeed, it develops ceaselessly from a lower condition to a higher
condition through constant trying in the light of theorisation.50 Thus, as Zhu cited Marx,
"the objectification of the human essence both in its theoretical and practical aspects is
required to make man's sense human, as well as to create the human sense corresponding
to the entire wealth of human and natural substance."51
Secondly, this would be possible only ifknowledge and action, or theory and practice,
were not divorced for amoment in the whole process ofobjectification ofhuman essence.
Their continuous mutual dependency and stimulation must then be embodied in the real
daily life of individual human beings. Zhu criticised Li Zehou for abstracting practice from
theory by placing the former in the category ofobjective social being which is independent
of individual consciousness.52 Consequently, social praxis is deprived of the realness,
concreteness and purposiveness, which are considered by Marx to be created by real
individual social beings. As Marx observes, "man, much as he may therefore be aparticular
individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real
49 Karl Marx, Capital, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 344.
50 See Zhu Guangqian, "Shengchan laodong yu ren dui shijie de yishu zhangwo"
frU- [Productive labour and human artistic appreciation of the
world] (1960), in QJ, vol. 10, pp. 190-200.
51 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The
Marx-Engels Reader, p. 89; Zhu Guangqian, "Shengchan laodong yu ren dui shijie de yishu zhangwo"
[Productive labour and human artistic appreciation of the world], in QJ, vol. 10, p. 201.
52 See Zhu Guangqian, "Lun mei shi keguan yu zhuguan de tongyi" [A
discussion ofbeauty as an unity of the objective and the subjective] (1957), in QJ, vol 5, pp. 73-74.
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individual social being), is just as much the totality - the ideal totality - the subjective
existence of thought and experienced society present for itself; just as he exists also in the
real world as the awareness and the real enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality
ofhuman life-activity."53 Zhu argued in favour ofMarx's approach, namely that individual
consciousness should not be separated from social relations, religious beliefs, nationality,
education and so on.
Thirdly, from the corresponding relationship between knowledge and action, or
theory and practice, engendered in actual social life, Zhu readily accepted Marx's proposal
of a genetic link between productive labour and artistic activity, and thus their shared
common characteristic, that is the creative appropriation of the world. To Marx, productive
labour is the specific form ofproduction performed by human beings. "We pre-suppose
labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human.... At the end ofevery labour-process,
we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement.
He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises
a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must
subordinate his will."54 Nature, then "appears as his work and his reality. The object of
labour is, therefore, the objectification ofman's species life: for he duplicates himselfnot
only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he
contemplates himself in a world that he has created."55
Zhu was convinced that it is precisely through this self-realisation, self-affirmation
and self-contemplation of the object that human beings establish an artistic relationship
with the world. He regarded productive labour as a form ofartistic creation because they
both apply to the objectification ofhuman essential power. Zhu held that, in realising the
53 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The
Marx-Engels Reader, p. 86.
54 Karl Marx, Capital, in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 344-345; Zhu Guangqian,
"Shengchan laodong yu ren dui shijie de yishu zhangwo" i.
[Productive labour and human artistic appreciation of the world] (1960), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 195.
55 Karl Marx, Economic andPhilosophicManuscripts of1844 in Robert C. Tucker ed., TheMarx-Engels
Reader, p. 76; Zhu Guangqian, "Shengchan laodong yu ren dui shijie de yishu zhangwo"T:/i.
m (1960), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 196.
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object as their own 'product' and through the recognition of their own power as species
being, human beings feel pleased - this sense ofdelight can also be called sense ofbeauty.
Thus all creative labour, including material production and artistic production, engenders
a sense of beauty. To use Marx's words, "human efficaciousness and human suffering,
apprehended humanly, is an enjoyment ofself in man."56 Looked at from this angle, namely
that ofhuman praxis as creative appropriation of the world, beauty no longer appears to
be separable from the human sense ofbeauty which is the direct result ofthe creative activity
ofhuman beings themselves. Zhu declared that neither beauty nor ugliness exist in crude
nature without human beings actually making their mark on it.57
However, Zhu did not want to identify material production for utilitarian purposes
and artistic production for spiritual or emotional purposes in a static condition despite their
being recognised as historically associated in the process ofhuman praxis. He maintained
from a Marxist point of view:
The real need of human beings is not merely to satisfy their practical need
but to realise themselves as human beings in totality.58
In Zhu's view, art can play a substantial role in satisfying this self-realisation in human
beings. According to Marx's approach, Zhu pointed out that since art develops its relative
autonomy as spiritual production, resulting from the division and alienation of labour under
the capitalist mode ofproduction, it appeals directly to human thought and emotions by
promoting an intellectual aspect ofhuman praxis or amental form of social life. Zhu was
then convinced that art, in an ideal form of free production, is a perfect example ofhuman
creativity. Artistic activity, as a natural expression of human emotion by overcoming
labour alienation, coincides with human productivity.59 AlthoughMarx considers art, as
56 KarlMarx, Economic andPhilosophicManuscripts of1844 in Robert C. Tucker ed., TheMarx-Engels
Reader, p. 87.
57 See Zhu Guangqian, "Shengchan laodongyu ren dui shijie de yishu zhangwo"AdLA#f
WIMUlta (I960), in 07, vol. 10, pp. 196-199.
58 Ibid., p. 204.
59 See ibid., pp. 204-205.
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part of the superstructure, to be based on material production and social relations, he also
concedes that uneven development in human consciousness does occur:
It is even recognised that certain forms of art, e.g. the epic, can no longer
be produced in their world epoch-making, classical stature as soon as the production
of art, as such, begins; that is, that certain significant forms within the realm of
the arts are possible only at an undeveloped stage of artistic development. If this
is the case with the relation between different kinds of art within the realm of
the arts, it is already less puzzling that it is the case in the relation of the entire
realm to the general development of society.60
For Marx, the inconsistency and discrepancy between the major assumption (i.e.
economic base decides superstructure) and the minor assumption (i.e. uneven development
in human consciousness) should not represent a problem if human beings as thinking agents
do not forget that they are simultaneously agents of concrete practice. "The difficulty
consists only in the general formulation of these contradictions. As soon as they have been
specified, they are already clarified."61
Since art can be singled out to represent human spiritual or emotional needs, it implies
some specific character of human consciousness. Zhu noted this and quickly raised the
issue ofthe universality ofhuman consciousness during the debate. The question is whether
all people regardless of their various social relations, class or even historical background,
share certain human emotions expressed in art. His concern is very similar to that ofMarx,
who observes;
... the difficulty lies not in understanding that the Greek arts and epic are
bound up with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they
still afford us artistic pleasure and that in a certain respect they count as a norm
and as an unattainable model.
A man cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish. But does he
not find joy in the child's nai'vite, and must he himself not strive to reproduce
its truth at a higher stage? Does not the true character of each epoch come alive
in the nature of its children? Why should not the historic childhood of humanity,
its most beautiful unfolding, as a stage never to return, exercise an eternal charm?
There are unruly children and precocious children. Many of the old peoples belong
60 Karl Marx, The Grundrisse (Foundations ofthe Critique ofPoliticalEconomy) (1857-58), in Robert
C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 245.
61 Ibid.
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in this category. The Greeks were normal children. The charm of their art for
us is not in contradiction to the undeveloped stage of society on which it grew.
[It] is its result, rather, and is inextricably bound up, rather, with the fact that
the unripe social conditions under which it arose, and could alone arise, can never
return.62
Although Marx, as Zhu pointed out, does not offer a satisfactory answer except for
acknowledging the transcendental character ofart, Zhu was convinced that Marx was on
his side and proposed that people with different ideological backgrounds tend to be able
to appreciate the art produced on different material bases and under different ideological
influences, which can be explained as the continuation of historical life.
Every historical period inherits many useful traditions, like a person establishing
his/her maturity in adulthood on the basis first of his infancy and then his youth.
In this sense, the life of each historical period fuses with the living experiences
of previous history. ... The reason why classical masterpieces are still attractive
to us today is because they truthfully and profoundly reveal some fundamental
elements which universally concern human beings.63
Thus, asserted Zhu, "art possesses universality simply because its derivation, namely
history, is a continuation ofmankind."64 If this is so, then certain common characteristics
in human beings must exist which differentiate them from lower forms of life such as
minerals, plants and animals. This character, in Zhu's view, is included in human
consciousness. For instance, human beings ofall eras share common ethical ideals such
as praising good and loathing evil. Despite various ways ofexpressing love across different
forms of society (including slave society and capitalist society) a need for love is universally
applicable.65
It is worth noting that, while applying Marx's theories to re-evaluate his theory of
aesthetics during the debate, Zhu reaffirmed the stance which he had initially adopted in
62 Marx, The Grundrisse (Foundations ofthe Critique ofPolitical Economy) (1857-58), in Robert C.
Tucker ed., TheMarx-Engels Reader, p. 246; Zhu Guangqian, "Lun mei shi keguan yu zhuguan de
tongyi" [A discussion of beauty as an unity of the objective and the
subjective] (1957), in QJ, vol 5, p. 91.
63 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
64 Ibid., p. 92.
65 See ibid., p. 93.
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the construction ofhis aesthetic theories from the 1920s to the 1940s, namely setting his
aesthetics on the basis of human values in the course of reciprocal human activity in
aesthetic experience. The way he approached aesthetic issues based on Marx's concepts
ofhumanity, praxis and dialectics seemed to be gradually leading him back to his previous
psychological assessment of concrete aesthetic phenomena.
The fact that he could not help raising the issue of the universality of human
consciousness during the debate where such an assertion was considered ideologically
opposed to the official orthodox view, indicates the theoretical coherence which he was
obliged to follow. However, he was not able to pursue the issue further due to its political
sensitivity, as it did not accord with the dominant doctrine of class struggle and, in fact,
could not receive any positive attention in China where, under Soviet influence, the
objective laws of aesthetics were now the dominant methodology.
7.4. The Post-Mao Era: Discovery of Vico
It was not until after the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s that Zhu had the
opportunity to review the issue which he had to leave behind during the Big Debate on
Aesthetics of 1957. Despite the fact that the Cultural Revolution totally deprived him of
academic life as well as human rights for over ten years, it played an influential role in
strengthening his belief in the universality of human emotions.66 This reversing effect
engendered by the Cultural Revolution, not only on Zhu but also on many other Chinese
intellectuals, was commented upon by Zhang Han, who observed that "just like the West
that turned its attention to the question ofhuman life and destiny in the wake of the Second
World War, the Chinese people were awakened to think about the fate of the nation and
66 For a detailed account ofZhu's life during the Cultural Revolution, see Kuai Dashen wJA1!7, Zhu
Guangqian houqi meixue sixiang lunshu [Discussion of the late aesthetic
thought ofZhu Guangqian] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2001), pp. 141-151
and Wang Youxin i-fT/if, Zhu Guangqian xueshu sixiang pingzhuan 3k it 4Mb®-Mifif [A
critical biography of the academic thought ofZhu Guangqian] (Beijing: Beijingtushuguan chubanshe,
1999), pp. 107-112.
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human value after the ten years of the disastrous Cultural Revolution. As a result, attention
has taken a sudden turn from the object to the subject; the study of aesthetics in China has
started to explore multi-dimensional, multi-directional and multi-perspective aesthetic
experience and aesthetic psychology. ... The issues of universal beauty, imagination,
realism, humanism and socialist tragedy have become the focal point."67
This new trend gave more room for Zhu to illustrate his ideas ofhuman value, which
he was not able to advocate fully during the debate on aesthetics. After 1977, he reaffirmed
that human beings, through their active interrelation with nature, engender both economic
value and spiritual value - physically, emotionally and mentally. Thus, the study ofvalues
such as beauty has to be derived from human beings. In an essay entitled "Talking about
Human Beings," he clearly renewed the reciprocal approach that characterised his early
works by treating human beings not only as a part of nature but as the conscious beings
that feel and think.68 He strongly urged Chinese theorists to abandon metaphysical
materialism69 and to adopt an holistic way of thinking by treating human beings and their
activities as a whole. He cited Goethe:
The artist would speak to the world through an entirety; he does not find
this entirety in Nature - it is the fruit of his own mind; or, if you like it, of the
aspiration of a fructifying divine breath.70
67 Zhang Han ffc®, "Zhongguo dangdai meixue xianzhuang yu zouxiang" T @#A J4
[Current situation and inclination of the study of aesthetics in contemporary China], Wenyiyanjiu
vol. 5 (1989), p. 52.
68 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan ren" tiltA [About human beings], Tan mei shujian [Letters of
talking about beauty] (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1980), in QJ, vol. 5, pp. 243-250.
69 Zhu seemed to be frustrated to see that some theorists were still trying to deduce the essence ofbeauty
metaphysically and ignoring human factors. He wrote several articles to show his concerns. For
instance, see Zhu Guangqian, "Cong xianshi shenghuo chufa haishi cong chouxiang gainian chufa"
titbitAA il fffiA ftfij Ikfc&rit!# [From the viewpoint of real life or abstractive conception],
Tan mei shujian [Letters of talking about beauty], Tan mei shujian A♦ (1980), in QJ, vol. 5,
pp. 235-242 and "Guanyu Makesi zhuyi yu meixue de yixie wudu" [$ A J- #1A^ tfj —ifA
if [Some misunderstanding ofMarxism and aesthetics], Tan mei shujian (1980), in QJ,
vol.5, pp. 251-257.
70 Goethe, "A Conversation with Eckermann on Rubens' Landscape in Engraving on April 18, 1827,"
in J. R Eckermann ed. Conversations with Goethe (London: J. M. Dent& Sons Ltd., 1935), p. 196;
Zhu Guangqian, "Tan ren" [About human beings], Tan mei shujian f! (1980), in QJ, vol. 5,
pp. 249-250.
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From 1979 to 1981, during which the intellectual atmosphere in China became more
relaxed, Zhu made another effort to include the issues of the universality ofhuman emotions
and thus a common sense ofbeauty in his study of aesthetics. He was convinced that once
human beings are accepted as the initiator in mediating with nature and the designer of
human history, issues in aesthetics such as natural beauty versus artistic beauty, realism
versus romanticism, in aword, objective beauty versus subjective beauty, can be resolved
accordingly.71 What is more interesting is that for the first time he placed Giambattista
Vico (1668-1744) on his theoretical agenda although he had become acquainted with
Vico's theory as early as the 1920s when he studied Croce, whose aesthetic theory was
largely inspired by the former. When he wroteA History ofWestern Aesthetics from 1961
to 1962 while the debate on aesthetics was still going on, he introduced Vico without trying
to identify with Vico's theory as he had done with that ofMarx, probably deterred by the
fact that Vico's theory tends to be reminiscent of Croce's.72
In 1980, however, Zhu explicitly expressed an interest in Vico's theory, so much so
that he decided at the age of eighty-three to dedicate his time and energy, aside from
teaching, to translating Vico's New Science (1725). On top of that, he wrote five essays
between 1981 and 1983 introducing Vico's theories in a strongly favourable light. It seems
that what impressed Zhumost was Vico's principle ofverum ipsumfactum [the true is the
made], which designates human beings as the makers of their own history and which was
also the point of attraction for Zhu in the early Marxist theory of praxis. The affinity in
this area between Vico and Marx lies in the fact that both share a belief in human
consciousness being the distinguishing characteristic ofhuman nature; accordingly, both
thinkers explain the social nature of human beings and the social nature of human
knowledge in terms of the origin and development of consciousness. The philosophical
71 See Zhu Guangqian, "Tan ren" i&A (1980) and "Guanyu renxing, rendao zhuyi, renqingwei he
gongtongmei wenti" AitliK, Adf"F#17F] -j4 f»]M [About human nature, humanism,
human touch and universal beauty], Wenyiyanjiu ■£, vol. 3 (1979), in QJ, vol. 5, pp. 388-395
72 During the debate on aesthetics, Zhu was accused ofpursuing Crocian idealism. He therefore made
efforts to distance himself from Croce. His own accusation ofCrocian idealism seemed however to
become weaker in the 1980s though.
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issue of the relationship between human beings and their knowledge is therefore
inseparably tied to the problem ofhuman nature: ultimately, what human beings are cannot
be divorced from what human beings know and the means by which they arrive at this
knowledge.73 In other words, it is through human beings' own activities, both mental and
physical, that human beings come into meaningful existence. Vico stated:
The world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles
are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind ...
This aberration was a consequence of that infinity of the human mind by which,
immersed and buried in the body, it naturally inclines to take notice of bodily
things, and finds the effort to attend to itself too laborious; just as the bodily eye
sees all objects outside itself but needs a mirror to see itself.74
With regard to a pattern of development which accounts for the uniformity,
continuity, and totality of human history, Vico sees the internal value of concrete human
activities as a genetic realisation of human nature. He thus formulates his universal
principle of human history based on an original mentality and form of life, and
consequently, the common nature, feeling, imagination and creativity embodied in
language. For Vico, "the expression of imaginative universals does not depend on logical
deduction and speculative rationalisation but on rhetorical forms and tropes ofpoetic logic
which constitute the means of accomplishing imaginative acts of predication and of
conceptual interrelations."75 Accordingly, human struggle or human differences are not
treated as the obstacle for the flux ofhuman consciousness in the broad context ofthe whole
ofhuman activity. On the other hand, Marx presupposes the division of labour as a division
ofconsciousness and insists that true universal consciousness presupposes the elimination
73 Adrienne Fulco, "Vico and Marx: Human Consciousness and the Structure ofReality," in Giorgio
Tagliacozzo ed., Vico andMarx: Affinities and Contrasts (New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc., 1983),
p. 127.
74 Giambattista Vico, The New Science ofGiambattista Vico, trans, by Thomas Goddard Bergin and
Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948), pp. 96-97.
75 Donald Phillip Verene, "Vico's Science of Imaginative Universals and the Philosophy ofSymbolic
forms," in Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene eds., Giambattista Vico's Science of
Humanity (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 309. Also, see Giambattista Vico,
The New Science ofGiambattista Vico, pp. 128-129.
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of the capitalist mode of production. This means, in Shlomo Avineri's words, that "the
imperfect modes of consciousness will exist as long as bourgeois society continues to
exist."76 Yet Marx also holds a vision of consciousness extending beyond the mere
understanding of reality and towardswillfully changing it for the better: "The philosophers
have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."77
Furthermore, he emphasises the artist as a thinker, an educator and an unfolder of social
truths, as one who reveals the inner workings of society and as an ideologist who pierces
the veil of false consciousness.78 In his evaluation of the writings ofBritish novelists such
as Charles Dickens, Charlotte Bronte and Elizabeth Gaskell, Marx remarks that their
"eloquent and graphic portrayal of the world has revealedmore political and social truths
than all the professional politicians, publicists, and moralists put together."79
As far as Zhu's theory is concerned, it preserves some of the characteristics ofboth
Marx's and Vico's concepts of consciousness. While accepting that reality is imperfect
and assigning art as an educator for the betterment of consciousness in a Marxist light
(although Marx expected the proletariat, truly universal because of its economic status,
to be the force affecting the change from false consciousness or ideology to universal
consciousness or human freedom80), Zhu validated the effectiveness of aesthetic
experience by affirming the imaginative universals or the common sense ofbeauty within
the realm of art, in Vico's light, something not explicitly covered by Marx. Within the
domain of art and its close relations with reality, therefore, Vico's theory seems to offer
more evidential support in terms ofuniversal sense of human activity by substantiating
the latter with data from all peoples at all times and all places. In other words, Vico's New
Science, in looking for a universal law ofhuman history not in a certain form of society
76 Shlomo Avineri, The Social andPolitical Thought ofKarlMarx (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1968), p. 69.
77 Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 145.
78 See Maynard Solomon ed.,Marxism andArt: Essays Classic and Contemporary (Brighton: Harvester
Press, 1979), p. 11.
79 Marx, "The English Middle Class," New York Tribune (1 Aug 1854), in Marx Engels on Literature
andArt (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 524.
80 See Marx, The German Ideology, in Robert C. Tucker ed., TheMarx-Engels Reader, pp. 173-175.
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but in the general pattern of historical development itself, attaches more immediate
significance to real daily life and thus gives a more positive light to human power.81
Despite the fact that Zhu apparently conceded once during the 1950s debate that
human consciousness was conditioned by the material base because, together with politics
and law, it belonged to the superstructurewhich serves the material base, he nevertheless
endeavoured - first in the long Preface to the second edition of his A History ofWestern
Aesthetics in 1979 and secondly in an interview in 1981 to clarify his view of human
consciousness.82 Zhu argued that, under the conditions ofdivision of labour in the Marxist
sense, consciousness may indeed entail some fetish concepts due to one's social
background (including education, cultural upbringing, socio-economic status etc).
Nevertheless, human consciousness is able to actively approach universal truth through
the dialectical process of action in which those concepts inputted are then critically
evaluated.83 Such procedures for making new truth, according to Vico, follow the pattern
of tri-stage development ofhuman consciousness, namely the age ofmyth, the age of the
hero, and the age of human beings.
It seems that Zhu's attraction to Vico's theory in his late career results from some close
link to his life-long concern with human position and role in human life, in turn explaining
his persistent practice of an aesthetic theory which pays particular attention to the
psychological aspects of aesthetic experience. In Vico's concept, Zhu seems to find not
only his sense of human consciousness but also justification for his own reciprocal
approach to aesthetics. That is, as expression ofhuman feelings, art must give priority to
81 See Zhu Guangqian, "Weike de Xin fexwejianjie" .fftfT 6-J CfrTlW ffiTf [A brief introduction to
Vico's New Science], Waiguo wenxue vol. 4 (Dec 1981), in QJ, vol. 10, pp. 581-582.
82 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zaiban xulun" [Preface to the second edition], Xifang meixue shi
[A history ofWestern aesthetics], vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1964 first
ed. 1979 2nd ed.), in QJ, vol. 6, pp. 16-41; "Zhu Guangqian jiaoshou tan meixue"
[ProfessorZhuGuangqian's talk on aesthetics],.7/aoyw #i7f, vol. 1 and2(1981), in 0/,vol. 10, pp.
528-543.
83 See Zhu Guangqian, "Zaiban xulun"[Preface to the second edition] (1972), in QJ, vol. 6, p. 39 and
"Zhu Guangqian jiaoshou tan meixue" fiHT ^ (1981), in QJ, vol. 10, pp. 536-537.
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imaginative thinking which is instanced in empathy, inner imitation and psychical distance.
In this way, human value as the creator oftheir ownworld is appropriately acknowledged.84
By and large, the affinity Zhu recognised between his own theory and that ofVico
seemed to strengthen his confidence in his enduring efforts to establish his theory of
aesthetics. With the help ofVico as well as Marx, Zhu again picked up a human-oriented
reciprocal approach which started from his traditional Chinese background, converged
with Western thinkers such as Croce, matured withMarx, and was summed up in Vico.
Unfortunately, Zhu himselfdid not explicitly speculate upon the trace of this intellectual
development, although he did briefly give an affirmation to the pattern ofhis intellectual
development in 1981, saying that his ideas "were first ofall affected by the Chinese thought
of the feudal age, then received some influence from [Western] bourgeois thought, and
finally matured after the study ofMarxism."85
During the course of translating Vico's New Science, from 1981 to 1984, Zhu also
realised how congenial the theories ofMarx and Vico are to one another, despite their
differences. The effort made by both to comprehend the world in terms ofhuman beings
whose development lies in human activity fundamentally accords with his own. In Zhu's
view, both the Marxist concept ofpraxis and Vico's principle of'the true is the made' were
aimed at solving the age-old problem of the dichotomy of theory and praxis, which
coincided with the traditional Chinese doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action.86
In this way, Zhu saw the theories ofMarx and Vico as possessing the intellectual affinity
84 See Zhu Guangqian,"Weike" $iM5T [Vico], Zhongguo da baike quanshu: waiguo wewcue T HUi444
vol. II (Beijing: Zhongguo da baike quanshu chubanshe, 1982), in QJ, vol. 10, p.
625. Also, see Giambattista Vico, The New Science ofGiambattista Vico, pp. 21-22, 23-24 and p.
32.
85 Zhu Guangqian, "Zhu Guangqian jiaoshou tan meixue" {1981), in (99, vol. 10,
p. 535. Some ideologically affected words such as 'feudal thought' and 'bourgeois thought' was used
in his talk due to the political environment in China. All he wanted to say, perhaps, was that his ideas
had gone through three stages, namely traditional Chinese, Western and Marxist and that there is
a link between the three stages manifested in his intellectual formation.
86 See Zhu Guangqian, "Weike deXin kexue ji qi dui zhongxi meixue de yingxiang" 444TV] (#444^)
'fS? [Vico's New Science and its influence on Chinese and Western aesthetics],
Xifang zhuming zhexuejiapingzhuan SjV 44^# (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe,
1984), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 711.
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with his own thinking, as from the very beginning and throughout the years, his own theories
had also been intended to bring together what he called action and tranquillity, natural
beauty and ideal beauty, the subjective and the objective, - in short, human beings and the
world. This unity was understood by him to be best illuminated by aesthetics which sees
human consciousness universalised. Around the time when Zhu retired from his positions
as the Professor ofPhilosophy at Peking University and Research Fellow of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences in the early 1980s, he noted similar efforts by Western
contemporary philosophies (such as structuralism and cybernetics) to unite the subject and
the object and to affirm subjectivity. Zhu was reassured by the parallel development of
these theories, but due to his old age and weak health, could not pursue his new discovery
which, he believed, was fully in line with Vico's principle of'the true is the made'.87
As Zhang Qiqun pointed out, Zhu's aesthetic theories, which seek unity and harmony
of the subject and the object, remain significant and influential because Zhu's persistent
belief that the human mind is responsible for images of objects during the course of
correlating with nature manifests a strong character ofmodernity, both in a historical and
a scholastic sense.88 That is, he rejected the crude forms ofobjectivity or subjectivity of
beauty and sought after the internal correlativity of the object and the subject. Therefore,
the most significant contribution ofZhu's aesthetic theories is its pivotal role between China
and the West, the past and the present, the traditional and the modern, by seeking truth
and value in human reality at the vantage point of both traditional Chinese values and
Western intellectual achievements.
87 See ibid., p. 719 and also Zhu Guangqian, "LiietanWeike dui meixue jie de yingxiang" -A
[A brieftalk on Vico's influence on the study ofaesthetics], Meixue he Zhongguo meishu
shi (Shanghai: Shanghai zhishi chubanshe, 1984), in QJ, vol. 10, p. 672.
88 See Zhang Qiqun , "Xiandai de yu gudian de zhi wo jian - Zhu Guangqian yu Zong Baihua
deyizhongbijiaoyanjiu" [My view on
the modern and the classical - a comparative study ofZhu Guangqian and Zong Baihua], Zhexueyanjiu
#W£,vol. 5 (1997), p. 64.
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CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate the necessary connections and
possible common ground between modern Western and traditional Chinese modes of
thinking by examining Zhu's personal experiences, intellectual influences, historical
context and theoretical development. In so doing, one is able, through the formation of
Zhu's aesthetic theories, to discern the continuity, coherence and inner principle of
twentieth century concerns shared by both Chinese and Western minds.
First of all, Zhu's theories constitute the necessary result of the peculiar times and
environment in which he lived. Being amember of the modern Chinese generation, ifhe
had not been physically isolated from the political centres and had not received a systematic
education in the traditional Chinese classics first at home and then at Tongcheng Middle
School, Zhu could easily have become an iconoclast like many ofhis contemporaries who
were involved in the New Culture movement of the May Fourth period. Away from the
intellectual turbulence experienced in major cities, this particular environment contributed
to building a solid intellectual foundation based on traditional Chinese values. Zhu was
not substantially affected by the negative attitudes towards the Confucian doctrine simply
because he did not have the opportunity to mix with the rebellious intellectuals concentrated
in major cities. The direct transition from his hometown to Hong Kong to study Western
ideas provided him not only with an environment relatively free of passionate extremes
but, more importantly, a unique opportunity to practice independent thinking. This meant
that if there was a common ground between Chinese and Western values, Zhu was able
to discern it with a calm, detached mind rather than being ideologically overshadowed
by totalistic acceptance ofWestern values and outright denial ofChinese values (this being
widely practiced by the New Culture intellectuals in the 1920s).
The reason for Zhu's development ofa unique attitude towards the intellectual turmoil
of 1920s China and his emphasis on emotional cultivation as a basic measure to improve
society may well have stemmed from his combination of traditional Chinese ethical ideals
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with European romantic and idealist attitudes towards human value and the new theories
of psychology. It seems that the bleak reality of 1920s China, especially moral
degeneration, and the over-emphasis on science, stimulated Zhu to dwell more upon the
meaning ofethically oriented human value. His enthusiasm in running the Lida Academy
and offering advice to young people with ideals which are substantiated by traditional
Chinese values as well as Western humanist ethics, shows that he was already preoccupied
with the question ofhuman value before he began his study of aesthetics in Europe. His
inclination towards examining the meaning of life was manifested in his view of the true
value of human existence lying in harmonious relationship with nature (reality). Such
harmony is attained by human beings through action (realising the heavenly-endowed
nature ofcreativity) and tranquillity (recognising the human being as a thinking creature).
The dynamic interchange of action and tranquillity as the totality ofhuman activity was
recognised not only by Zhu, but also in the traditional Chinese doctrines ofConfucianism
and Taoism. This reciprocal duality subsequently became the theoretical paradigm ofZhu's
further studies.
After travelling to Europe for further studies in 1925, Zhu lost direct contact with
social reform projects, although moral welfare, especially ofyoung people, was always
at the back ofhis mind. In his first few years in Europe, Zhu continued to exert an influence
on moral issues by sending back essays for publication. Despite being physically distant
from China, he became increasingly preoccupied with issues ofhuman consciousness and
human value which he, like many ofhis Chinese contemporaries, believed to be the core
problem of social backwardness in China. During his eight years of study in Europe, Zhu's
Western studies in philosophy, psychology and classical literature caused him to develop
a tendency towards a more systematic theorisation. After he became acquainted with
Croce's idealism and the life-affirming philosophy ofNietzsche, Zhu's aesthetic attitude
towards life was elevated to a higher level. It was under the influence of these thinkers
that Zhu decided to undertake the study ofaesthetics to inquire into a deeper level ofhuman
consciousness for answers to his questions on human activity in aesthetic experience.
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In Europe, Zhu's theoretical paradigm based on this presumption of human value
was not weakened, as the philosophical issue of the relationship between human beings
and nature was also verymuch in the minds ofWestern thinkers at that time. The obsession
of the modernist mind in Europe to establish the validity ofhuman reality by justifying
human knowledge without resort to metaphysics or transcendentalism was in tune with
traditional Chinese thinking ofhuman beings and nature as an organic whole in a flux of
change, although the Western thinkers' general approach was not yet free from
dichotomous dualism. This may explain why Zhu found a spiritual affinity with Croce's
idealism and yet could not completely assimilate Croce's ideas into his own theory. Zhu's
approach, on the other hand, does not construe the coherence of human activity as an
ultimately separate order; human action (doing) and tranquillity (knowing), as emphasised
in Zhu's view of life, are reciprocally fused and led his theorisation in the direction of
empirical psychology. It is not surprising that Zhu turned to empirical psychology for
support when he started to organise an aesthetic system.
From the time when he began his study of aesthetics, Zhu, as a matter ofprinciple,
kept his theorisation pragmatic. Under the influence of the traditional Chinese approach
and Western pragmatism, Zhu placed his focus on a practical assessment of aesthetic
experience rather than an abstractive analysis of the essence ofbeauty. He believed that
aesthetic experience as the highest attainment ofhuman creativity was best presented in
Croce's concept of intuition as expression because the latter, in finding its intellectual
resources in human history and thus human reality, affirms human activity not only as
existence but also as value giving. Zhu found this inspiring as he was able to identify it
partly with the traditional Chinese ideal of the mutual reciprocity between human beings
and nature, exemplified in Taoist intuitionism. However, he was not able to recognise the
incompatibility between Croce's theory and the Taoist theory of intuition, whichmay have
led him to resort to psychological empiricism for evidence (as in the theories of empathy,
inner imitation and psychical distance, which were against Croce's original intention). Zhu
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treated the aesthetic experience as an empirical formation ofcognitive variants including
intuition, perception and conception from the perspective of concrete human reality.
In accepting the psychological aspect (Lipps' notion of empathy) as well as the
physiological aspect (Groos' notion of inner imitation) of aesthetic experience, Zhu's
aesthetic theory actually uses modern psychology to echo the traditional Chinese notion
of emotional cultivation as a process through which the self, being a vital force in tune
with the rhythm of life, is concretely and fully realised. This comprehension was further
manifested in his application ofBullough's notion ofpsychical distance. The relativity of
aesthetic experience due either to personal history or to objective feedback accommodated
in Bullough's theory accords with Zhu's general view that art is the reflection of life: since
human life is a dynamic process ofaction and tranquillity, aesthetic experience taking place
during this process must work in a similar manner.
It is worth noting that apart from seeking scientific and positivistic evidence in modern
psychology, Zhu's aesthetic theories also served philosophically to unfold a deeper sense
ofhuman existence, particularly after he returned to China, where there was not only an
economic, political and moral but also a national crisis. Although Zhu seemed to agree
with Croce's view on the role of the autonomy of intuition in aesthetic experience when
he wrote Wenyi xilixue Tf-'CJl'f during his stay in Europe, he nevertheless established
his theory in such a way that aesthetic experience is genetically related to other experiences
such as empathy, inner imitation and psychical distance. However, in attempting to apply
his aesthetic theory to reality in China after his return there, the underlying incompatibility
emerged and accordingly demanded revision. Zhu's understanding of Croce's notion of
intuition had to be corrected in order to justify his more flexible system, which should
allowed for the dynamic interaction of human activities in aesthetic experience.
Particularly as Zhu developed his theory alongside his faith in aesthetic education as a step
to moral enlightenment, it seemed even more necessary for him to review the aesthetic
theory he had established in Europe. The most noticeable adjustment was his acceptance
ofassociative thinking in aesthetic experience which accordingly aligns itselfwith other
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psychological and cognitive data derived from perception and conception. Moral sense
hence made its way legitimately into the process ofartistic creation and therefore played
an affective role in aesthetic experience. Despite the fact that by justifying associative
thinking he allowed moral sense to intervene in aesthetic experience, Zhu did not sacrifice
the unity of content and form in art. He made his intention clear that morality is signified
in art not as a conceptual discourse but as something harmoniously blended with artistic
image, which in turn elevates the socially derived moral sense into a sense of ultimate
goodness.
In holding his view on the reciprocity of the subject and the object in aesthetic
experience, Zhu made an effort to define the concept of beauty. In deciding that beauty
resided neither in the subject nor in the object but in the interrelationship of the two, he
not only maintained his inclination towards an organic view on human activity in aesthetic
experience, but also rejected the absolute idealism ofBenedetto Croce which subjected
the objective world completely to human mentality.
Although compelled to accept Marxism-Leninism and the thought ofMao Zedong
as an ideological dogma after the Communist Party took power in 1949, Zhu learned to
manoeuvre his thinking within these circumstances. In the so-called 'Big Debate on
Aesthetics,' he succeeded in putting his studies ofMarxist political and aesthetic theories
to the advantage ofhis own theory. The irony was that Zhu's intellectual inclination towards
the unity of the subject and the object was by and large echoed in Marxist aesthetic theories,
especially in Marx's notion ofpraxis. Some essential similarities between his own general
stance and Marx's brought Zhu closer to Marxism, especially Marx's concern with the
alienation ofhumanity under the capitalist mode ofproduction in early Marxism. Marx's
view of human beings as the physical and mental creators of their own history through
their specific praxis reassured Zhu ofhis own concept of aesthetic experience in art to form
the totality of human activity. It is through Marxism that Zhu, at least in his own belief,
established justification for the holistic and concrete interrelationship of the subject and
the object with human subjectivity as the initiating agent.
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As intellectual restrictions eased after the Cultural Revolution, Zhu endeavoured to
set the Marxist concept ofhuman value into its proper historical perspective. In allocating
Vico's notion ofhistory as the creation ofhuman beings, Zhu tried to find the coherence
ofhis reciprocal approach to human reality parallelled in modern thinking such as the ideas
ofMarx and Vico. In so doing, Zhu put his own aesthetic theories in their context; from
the turmoil of 1920s China to the transformation of thinking methods in 20th century Europe,
from the Chinese national crisis of the 1930s to the communist victory of 1949, from
ten-year-long studies ofMarxism to final reflections on its historical significance in the
wake of the Cultural Revolution, and from a new vision of early humanist Marxism to
tentative attempts to fuse it with Vico's historicism. The breadth of this context also
illustrates his life-long commitment to an illumination ofhuman value and creative activity
in art and society.
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